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What works for whom in public employment policy?
1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Employment Insurance 1996 Reforms

The Canadian Employment Insurance (EI) Act, passed in June 1996, established two
parts to the EI program. Part I, Employment Insurance Benefits (EIB), is cash unemployment
compensation. It provides temporary income support to Canadians between jobs.2 Part II
provides for Employment Benefits and Support Measures (EBSM), which are active labour
market programs to help the unemployed return to work.3 The overriding policy objective is to
provide “eligible Canadians with better opportunities to obtain and keep employment and be
productive participants in the labour force.” The EBSM should also advance other policy
objectives, including reduced EIB expenditures.
A major goal of the EI Act was harmonization of federal and provincial employment
programs while maintaining local flexibility in design and delivery of services. The act provided
for bilateral agreements between the provinces and the federal government, as well as for
contracts between provinces and third parties for the design and delivery of services. The
bilateral agreements are known as Labour Market Development Agreements (LMDA).
1.2

Labour Market Development Agreements

By the fall of 1999, LMDA had been concluded between the federal government and
each province and territory except Ontario, where the agreement did not go into effect until
January 1, 2007. The delivery of EBSM in this province was handled by the federal government
until that date. The federal government is represented by Human Resources and Skills
Development Canada (HRSDC) in these agreements. The initial agreements were either
comanaged or devolved. In the comanaged situation, the province or territory and the HRSDC
shared responsibility for labour market activities.4 In the devolved situation, the province or
territory had sole responsibility for the design and delivery of interventions. Since February
2010, all LMDA have been devolved. The interventions are designed and delivered within the
principles and guidelines established by the legislation and the LMDA.
In keeping with the new approach to results-based management in the federal
government, known as “Modern Comptrollership,” HRSDC has developed and continues to
explore new results-based indicators to reflect outcomes rather than only throughputs or inputs.
Modern Comptrollership places emphasis on the department and its minister to account to
Parliament and the Canadian public for the use of resources. As a consequence, with the
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Benefits may also be paid, for example, to persons on maternity leave or on sick leave.
An overview of Employment Insurance (EI) Part I, income benefits for the unemployed in Canada, is
available at http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/dept/guide98/ei2.shtml. EI Part II is the subject of this report.
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See <http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/dept/guide98/hri2.shtml>.
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implementation of the EBSM came the introduction of a new results-based accountability
framework—a systematic approach to managing departmental performance by results.
EI Part I is delivered by HRSDC through Service Canada centers, but delivery of EBSM
have been devolved to the provinces and territories. The LMDA required formative and
summative evaluations of EBSM in each province and territory. The formative evaluations were
completed, and the first summative evaluations have been done in all jurisdictions except for one
province, where the completion is expected in Summer 2011. Those evaluations answered some
questions but raised others about program effectiveness and evaluation design. This paper
recapitulates results from the summative evaluations and contrasts these results with findings in
the international literature with an eye toward informing the next round of EBSM evaluations
under the LMDA.
1.3

Canadian Active Labour Market Programs

The EBSM comprise four main Employment Benefits (EBs): Skills Development (SD),
Targeted Wage Subsidies (TWSs), Self-Employment (SE), and Job Creation Partnerships (JCPs).
The main support measure under Employment Services interventions is Employment Assistance
Services (EAS). Eligibility for EBs is limited to current EI recipients (referred to as “active
claimants”), and unemployed persons who have had an EI claim in the past three years or
received maternity or parental benefits in the past five years before applying for EBSM
assistance. The latter group is referred to as “EI former claimants,” or “reachbacks.”
Employment Assistance Services (EAS) are available to all unemployed Canadians and legal
residents regardless of their involvement with EI Part I. Following are brief overviews
describing how each program works and recent levels of participation and program
expenditures.5
Skills Development (SD) is the primary job skills training program available through the
EBSM. Typically, SD training is funded through client vouchers to third party providers, with
clients paying a negotiated portion of the total cost. Individuals needing training to upgrade their
skills for employment may be eligible for financial assistance through SD to help with training,
related costs, and living expenses. A portion of SD assistance may be repayable on a conditional
basis.
Skills Development, which includes SD-Regular and SD-Apprentices, helps participants
obtain employment by providing direct financial assistance that enables them to select, arrange
and pay for training in skills ranging from basic to advanced. SD-Regular participants receive
financial assistance to defray basic living costs and training costs, including tuition. Participants
in SD-Apprentices interventions are supported during the classroom portion of apprenticeship
training, primarily through EI Part I. These individuals may also receive Part II support for
additional classroom-related expenses.
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This overview draws freely on a technical document prepared by Nicholson (2010) under contract with
HRSDC and continuously updated by HRSDC (2009).
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As is consistent with the high priority placed on addressing skills shortages across
Canada, SD traditionally accounts for the largest proportion of Employment Benefits
interventions and expenditures, and these trends intensified in 2008/09. SD interventions rose
11.4 percent, to 159,011. This total accounted for 83.7 percent of all Employment Benefits
interventions delivered in budget year 2008/09, up from 82.1 percent the previous year.
Targeted Wage Subsidies (TWSs) help participants obtain employment through the
acquisition of work experience and on-the-job training. TWSs encourage employers to hire
individuals whom they would not normally hire in the absence of a subsidy. Financial assistance
is provided to the employer to cover a portion of the participants’ wages, as well as other
employment-related costs. These subsidies are typically targeted at hard-to-employ workers and
may account for up to 60 percent of total wages. The subsidies last for up to 52 weeks and can
be extended to 78 weeks for workers with disabilities. Earnings from subsidized jobs are
insurable under EI and therefore enable workers to renew their EI eligibility.
In 2008/09, 15,412 TWS interventions were delivered across the country, a decrease of
2.9 percent from the previous budget year. This type of intervention has declined in each of the
last eight years. The TWS share of all Employment Benefits interventions fell from 9.1 percent
the previous year to 8.1 percent in 2008/09. Total TWS expenditures fell to $87.4 million in
2008/09.
Self-Employment (SE): Eligible individuals who have a good idea for their own
business may qualify for financial support, planning assistance, and ongoing support while they
get their business up and running. Applicants must attend an orientation, provide a viable longterm business plan, start a new business, and agree to work full-time on this business while
receiving financial assistance. Workers are provided with technical assistance in setting up their
own businesses. They are able to collect their remaining EI entitlements during this process and
may in some cases collect additional EI Part II benefits. Earnings under SE are not insurable
under EI and therefore do not provide for renewed EI eligibility.
Self-Employment enables participants to obtain employment by helping them to start
their own business or become self-employed. It provides financial assistance for basic living
expenses and other personal needs while the participants are developing and implementing their
business plan. SE also funds coordinators who ensure participants have access to business
planning advice and expertise.
The number of SE participants rose for the first time in five years, climbing 2.2 percent to
10,380 in 2008/09. Even with this increase, SE interventions have declined 13.6 percent since
2004/05. SE represented 5.5 percent of all Employment Benefits interventions in 2008/09, down
from 5.8 percent the previous year. Expenditures for SE declined year-over-year, falling 3.0
percent to $135.6 million.
Job Creation Partnerships (JCPs): Eligible individuals may have an opportunity to
work on special projects developed in partnership with the provinces/territories, the private
6

sector, labour, and community groups. These projects create incremental and meaningful work
opportunities and help develop the community and local economy. These are jobs in the public
and nonprofit sectors that are intended to benefit the community. JCPs give participants the
opportunity to gain work experience to improve their prospects for obtaining and maintaining
employment. Financial assistance is provided to short-term projects that offer work experience to
participants. Employees on these jobs continue to receive their EI benefits in lieu of wages and
may have these benefits “topped up” to prevailing wage rates for the specific occupations.
Wages earned under JCP activities are not insurable under EI.
In 2008/09, there were 5,275 participants in JCPs, an increase of 3.0 percent year-overyear. This was the first increase in JCPs since 2002/03. Even with this small gain, the number of
JCP participants has declined by 49.9 percent since 2002/03. JCP interventions made up 2.8
percent of total Employment Benefits interventions, down from 2.9 percent last year.
Expenditures were relatively stable at $49.3 million compared with $49.5 million in 2007/08.
Employment Assistance Services (EAS): These are job search assistance services
provided to help unemployed workers find employment. Services include job interview
referrals, job skills inventory, aptitude testing, job search assistance, access to information and
resource centers, job finding clubs, individualized and group counseling, and group information
sessions. The services are often provided through third-party service delivery agreements.
Employment Services are available to any unemployed person in Canada who requires
assistance to enter or return to the labour force. There are three types of Employment Services
interventions: 1) Employment Assistance Services (EAS), 2) Group Services, and 3) Individual
Counseling. Total expenditures for Employment Services rose 2.2 percent to $566.3 million in
2008/09. The number of interventions delivered rose at a significantly higher rate of 14.4 percent
to 878,254. As the economy worsened during the latter half of the year, an increasing number of
individuals sought Employment Services to facilitate a quick return to the labour market, or,
conversely, needed multiple interventions as they developed a return-to-work action plan.
EAS interventions comprise a variety of services that support participants as they prepare
to enter or re-enter the labour force. These services range from job search assistance, provided to
job-ready clients, to the development of in-depth return-to-work action plans for clients facing
multiple employment barriers. EAS interventions may be combined with other EBSM
programming for which the client is eligible. A total of 512,198 EAS interventions were
delivered in 2008/09, which was a year-over-year increase of 15.1 percent. EAS interventions
accounted for 58.3 percent of all Employment Services interventions delivered during the year.
1.4

Overview

The next section reviews results from the Canadian evaluations as summarized by
Nicholson in a technical document contracted by HRSDC (2010), and lists the knowledge gaps
left from these studies concerning the effectiveness of programs for participant subgroups, in
differing labour market conditions, for various program features, and in differing combinations
7

and sequences with each other. The third section is the body of this paper, where we attempt to
present the findings on the effectiveness of active labour market programs in other developed
countries, relying on high-quality evaluation studies. In Section Four, the knowledge gaps in the
evaluation literature from both Canada and other countries are presented. Finally, in Section
Five, based on knowledge of the LMDA evaluations in Canada and the evidence from other
countries, we will suggest evaluation strategies that could be tried in the next round of Canadian
EBSM evaluations under LMDA.
2

EFFECTIVENESS OF ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET PROGRAMS IN CANADA

2.1

Evidence from LMDA Summative Evaluations

This section reviews the evidence from the LMDA evaluations as summarized by
HRSDC (2009) and Nicholson (2010). Results were available for evaluations in the following
provinces and territories: Alberta, British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador, New
Brunswick, Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Quebec, Prince Edward Island,
Saskatchewan, and Yukon. The regions spanned by these 11 evaluations cover 97 percent of the
total Canadian labour force. The reference period used in the summative evaluations to assess
program net impacts falls between 1998 and 2004.
The summaries of evaluations focused on three outcome measures (annual hours of
employment, annual earnings, and number of weeks per year in receipt of EI benefits), by type of
EBSM, for active and former EI claimants. The summaries focused on evidence from
comparison group–designed quasi-experimental evaluations. The most common estimation
methodology used in the LMDA summative evaluations is called difference-in-differences. The
outcomes of participants are contrasted to those of similar individuals who did not participate in
the program, with a second contrast computed before and after the program participation time
frame.
The EBs examined were Skills Development, Targeted Wage Subsidies, SelfEmployment, and Job Creation Partnerships. The SM evaluated was Employment Assistance
Services. Following are the main findings for each program.
Skills Development (SD). Active claimants who participated in SD increased their
earnings in seven jurisdictions, representing 33 percent of the national labour force covered by
the evaluations. The typical estimated gain in annual earnings was in the $2,000 to $5,000 range.
In proportional terms, the earnings gains were about 10 to 20 percentage points. The impact on
employment was positive (an increase of 211 hours per year, or about five weeks) for active
claimants in one jurisdiction, representing 15 percent of the national labour force covered by
these evaluations. Smaller increases were reported in the remaining jurisdictions reporting on
this measure, representing 85 percent of the labour force covered. However, the smaller
estimates were not statistically significant at standard levels. Both positive and negative net
impacts were found for EI use among active claimants. Predominantly positive findings were
found for EI use in six jurisdictions encompassing 57 percent of the nation’s workforce, with
8

estimated decreases ranging between 1.2 and 3.2 weeks in EI use per year. Average increases of
1.8 weeks in EI use per year were estimated for two jurisdictions, representing 17 percent of the
national labour force covered by the evaluations.
For former claimants, SD had mixed effects on employment, earnings, and EI use. Point
estimates ranged from a decrease of 235 hours to an increase of 342 hours, estimated earnings
impacts ranged from a decrease of $3,900 per year to an increase of $5,300 per year, and
estimated EI impacts ranged from a decrease of 2.5 weeks per year to an increase of 4.3 weeks
per year.
These relatively positive results may in part be explained by the focus of many SD
interventions on obtaining credentials. A majority of SD participants report that their program
provided some sort of credential for completion, and there is empirical evidence that such
credentials may serve as a signal about productivity to prospective employers (Martin and Grubb
2001). Another reason for the preponderance of positive results may be the relatively weak
labour markets that the comparison groups faced in many of the evaluations.
Targeted Wage Subsidies (TWSs). Significant employment and earnings gains were
reported for former claimants who participated in TWSs. Four jurisdictions, representing 87
percent of the national labour force, reported increases in employment between 194 and 419
hours per year. Similarly, former claimants who participated in TWSs recorded increases in
annual earnings ranging from $2,600 to $4,400 in four jurisdictions, representing 85 percent of
the national labour force covered by the evaluations. Significant postprogram earnings gains
were found for active claimants who participated in TWSs in two jurisdictions, representing 15
percent of the national labour force covered by the evaluations. The typical estimated gain in
annual earnings was in the $4,200 to $4,800 range. The impact on EI use was mixed for active
claimants, ranging between a decrease of 1.8 weeks per year and an increase of 2.7 weeks per
year.
For former claimants, the impact was negative, with increases in EI use of between 0.2
and 8.5 weeks per year in four jurisdictions, representing 84 percent of the labour force covered.
The negative impact on EI use may, in part, reflect eligibility effects. Employment under a TWS
program is insurable under EI, so eligibility is more or less automatic for most participants. Even
if there are employment gains after the intervention, it is still possible that some of those who
lose their subsidized jobs will collect EI. Significant employment and earnings gains for former
claimants were found in the majority of the evaluations that studied this intervention.
Specifically, significant increases in employment were found in four out of five evaluations that
assessed this outcome, and increases in earnings were found in four out of six evaluations. The
estimated gains in earning were in the range of $2,600–$4,400. The results for active claimants
were more modest, as only one out six evaluations found a positive impact on earnings, and only
one out of seven evaluations reported an increase in earnings.
Self-Employment (SE). SE showed positive net impacts on employment for both active
and former claimants. The jurisdictions with positive employment outcomes represented 98
9

percent of the national labour force covered by the evaluations for active claimants and 87
percent of the national labour force covered for former claimants. Increases of 20 to 30 percent
in annualized hours worked were reported, with much larger gains being reported in some
provinces. These strong gains suggest that many SE participants remain self-employed after the
formal intervention ends and that they generally report working full-time on such jobs. Increases
in the annual number of hours SE participants worked were often not accompanied by increases
in earnings. In some cases, the evaluations reported significant declines in earnings (up to $2,600
per year). In contrast, however, some increases in earnings (up to $4,700 per year) were found
for former claimants in one jurisdiction, representing 26 percent of the national labour force
covered. Both active and reachback claimants experienced significant decreases in EI use in the
postprogram period. Specifically, reductions in EI use of up to 16 weeks per year for active
claimants were found in seven jurisdictions, representing 86 percent of the national labour force.
Similarly, reductions in EI use of up to four weeks per year for former claimants were found in
three jurisdictions, representing 87 percent of the national labour force covered by the
evaluations.
The principal finding is that outcomes from participation in SE are extremely
heterogeneous. In some cases, the ventures can be wildly successful, creating employment not
only for the individual involved but for many others as well. In other cases, SE can have serious
negative consequences for the individuals involved—their businesses may be unsuccessful, and
they may incur a wage penalty when they seek to re-enter paid employment. Negative results
were found for women, but these were often not statistically significant because of small sample
sizes for women entering self-employment. However, the negative impacts from spells of selfemployment are considerably smaller than those from unemployment itself.
Job Creation Partnerships (JCPs). The net impact estimates for JCPs were generally
quite varied. For active claimants, a positive net impact was found on hours worked in one
jurisdiction (an increase of 285 hours, or about seven weeks per year), representing 20 percent of
the national labour force of the jurisdictions in which this outcome was assessed. Mixed results
were found for impacts on earnings. Increases of $3,600 per year were found in one jurisdiction,
representing 17 percent of the national labour force, while in another jurisdiction, representing
58 percent of the national labour force, decreases of $2,500 per year were reported. No
significant results were reported for EI weeks for these claimants. Employment results for former
claimants who participated in JCPs were mixed (ranging from a decrease of 259 hours, or about
six weeks worked per year, to an increase of 85 hours, or about two weeks worked per year).
JCPs had negative impacts on earnings for former claimants (decreases ranging from $2,100 to
$3,800 per year) in three jurisdictions, representing 40 percent of the national labour force. A
negative impact was found for EI weeks in one jurisdiction (an average increase of 1.5 weeks),
representing 60 percent of the national labour force covered by the evaluations.
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the JCP evaluation results is that the
estimates were generally quite varied and often not statistically significant. For active claimants,
only two of the earnings estimates were significantly different from zero, and one of them was
negative. For former claimants, three significant declines in earnings following JCP
10

participation were reported. Estimates of impacts on EI receipt were rarely statistically
significant.
Employment Assistance Services (EAS). These programs are generally short and
relatively low-cost. Often EAS are combined in action plans with other interventions. Because
of this complexity, evaluations of EAS have tended to focus on the group of “EAS-only”
claimants. According to the British Columbia data, these represent perhaps 65 percent of
individuals who received any EAS-related services, but a much smaller fraction of total EAS
services provided (because those with an Employment Benefits intervention tend to have more
EAS interventions than do members of the EAS-only group). The extent to which the EAS-only
group is representative of all EAS participants has not been explicitly addressed in the
evaluations, but on a priori grounds it seems plausible that this group might have more successful
employment experiences than the other EAS participants.
Results for active claimants were generally not statistically significant for employment
and earnings, with the exception of one jurisdiction where an earnings increase was estimated. In
part, this may have resulted from the difficulty of detecting such impacts given the small sample
sizes available in the evaluations. For EI weeks, five out of eight evaluations generated
statistically significant impacts; these included both positive and negative results. Given the
mixed results, no overall conclusions can be drawn about the impact of EAS-only in the EBSM
context. EAS participants did report strong levels of program satisfaction, job readiness, and
interest in further training.
2.2

Lessons Learned and Knowledge Gaps

We list the lessons learned and the remaining gaps in knowledge about effects of EBSM
operated under LMDA in the provinces and territories. Likely gaps concern effects by
participant characteristics, program features, labour market conditions, and bundling or
sequencing of services.
Skills Development. Sample size restrictions generally prevented the evaluations from
estimating effects of SD separately for subgroups of participants. A few of the evaluations did
report that women had somewhat more favorable overall impacts on employment and earnings
than men, though these results were generally not reported separately for SD participants only. In
the evaluations that were able to estimate gender-specific impacts for SD participants only, gains
for men often exceeded those for women. Hence, the EBSM results may not precisely mirror the
international finding that women are more likely to benefit from training than men.
Estimated impacts of SD on former claimants were more variable than were SD impact
estimates for active claimants. This larger variance in results may in part be explained by the
difficulties that some of the evaluations had in identifying a proper comparison group for former
claimants, some of whom had been out of the labour force for some time.
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Targeted Wage Subsidies. A general wage subsidy should increase both wages and
employment. Katz (1996) provides a “guesstimate” that each 10 percent of subsidy should
increase wages by about 6 percent and employment by about 2 percent. However, when a
subsidy is targeted at only one class of workers, the situation becomes more complicated,
because the displacement of unsubsidized workers by subsidized ones becomes relevant. By
some estimates such displacement effects may be as large as 80–90 percent.
The more consistent positive impacts on employment and earnings among former
claimants are not surprising. Many former claimants have been out of the labour force for
substantial periods of time, and a temporary subsidy reduces employers’ costs of getting them
“up to speed” in their jobs. On the other hand, active claimants have recent employment
experiences, so their potential gains from TWSs are not as great. Given these caveats, the actual
results reported for TWSs in the evaluations were modestly promising.
The temporary nature of many wage subsidy programs adds further complications. In
most economic models, the effect of a temporary subsidy should be smaller than that of a
permanent one because firms would not make the kinds of labour-using investments they might
if the subsidy were permanent. But more complex models suggest that such differences will be
smaller when learning on the job is important. In these cases, the subsidy may help to
compensate for an initial period of low productivity for new workers and help to overcome
firms’ reluctance to make such hires.
These conceptual issues about the concurrent effects of wage subsidies have not played
an important role in the EBSM evaluations, however, because the evaluations focused
exclusively on outcomes after the subsidies end. That is, the subsidy period was viewed as being
the TWS “treatment,” and this program was evaluated in ways similar to any other active labour
market program. TWSs should have positive employment effects since skills and attitudes
developed during the subsidy period may make employees more attractive.
Many evaluations of short-term subsidy programs have found beneficial outcomes. For
example, the random-assignment Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) evaluation in the United
States found that female subsidy recipients experienced earnings gains of about 15 percent
relative to the control group, and males experienced gains of about 10 percent (Bloom et al.
1993). In many cases, these gains persisted into the second postprogram year. Similar positive
results were found in the National Supported Work evaluation and in some of the analysis of
some states’ welfare reform initiatives (Gueron and Pauly 1991). Although evidence from
formal evaluations is less readily available outside of the United States, a survey of OECD
experiences offers the assessment that subsidy programs have a greater impact per dollar spent
than either training programs or direct government job creation (Martin and Grubb 2001). In the
same way, a meta-analysis of 95 studies of European active lLabour market policy reports that
evaluations of private sector incentive programs such as wage subsidies are more likely to report
a positive impact from participation in these programs than from participation in training (Kluve
2006).
12

One complication in conceptualizing the wage subsidy component of the EBSM program
is in understanding precisely how it is targeted. Although most of the evaluations report that
TWSs are more appropriate for younger and harder-to-employ workers, few details are provided
about how such targeting is achieved. The fact that the EBSM recipients studied in the
evaluations must have been EI claimants further complicates the targeting issue. In some
respects, EI claimants have characteristics more similar to dislocated workers than to the
disadvantaged workers typically served by temporary wage subsidies. Precisely how the theory
of wage subsidies applies to such workers is an open question. Similarly, the evidence on the
effectiveness of such subsidies in achieving labour market gains among dislocated workers is
much less well-developed.
Self-Employment. Unfortunately, the employment gains from participating in SE were
often not accompanied by increases in earnings. Once all sources of self-employment income
were taken into account, one evaluation reported significant increases in earnings, and another
evaluation reported decreases in earnings for former claimants. For active claimants, the only
significant impact found in the evaluations with respect to earnings was negative. Whether the
differences between these positive and negative findings can be explained by differences in the
ways in which the earnings data were collected is an open question. Clarifying whether SE
provides a good income source for participants or, instead, raises difficulties in returning to paid
employment should be an important goal of future evaluations.
SE participants generally experienced significant decreases in EI receipt in the
postprogram period. Because weeks in self-employment are not insurable under EI, it is likely
that these outcomes largely reflect eligibility effects rather than a decline in EI collection among
eligible workers. If this decline was accompanied by declining earnings, the incomes of workers
pursuing self-employment may experience serious declines, especially in the short run.
Although this sort of impact was not found in all of the evaluations, the possibility that those in
self-employment may experience large short-run declines in income suggests caution in
expanding self-employment interventions beyond carefully targeted subgroups of claimants.
Job Creation Partnerships. Some studies have reported that participation in public
sector employment can help to improve training outcomes for low-skilled workers. That is, the
effects of training are more likely to stick for this group if they can experience a period of
relatively undemanding work prior to joining the formal labour market (Heckman, LaLonde, and
Smith 1999). However, interactions between SD and JCPs were not explicitly studied in the
EBSM evaluations.
Employment Assistance Services. A complication in evaluating EAS in the EBSM
context is that often these services are combined in action plans with other interventions.
Evaluations have tended to focus on EAS-only claimants, and evidence suggests that these
claimants may be more successful than those who received EAS in combination with other
services. The evaluation findings for EAS were generally not strong. As noted, the employment
and earnings impacts, with the exception of one jurisdiction, were not statistically significant,
13

and although the impacts on EI weeks were significant in five out of eight cases, the signs of the
impacts were both positive and negative.
A natural question to ask is why these results seem to differ so much from the small
though relatively stable findings reported in many job search evaluations. Three possibilities
might be mentioned. First, it may be that it is especially difficult to evaluate EAS using
nonexperimental methods (many of the best job search studies used random assignment).
Measuring the impact of this low-cost intervention may require a very precise matching of
participant and comparison cases in the preprogram period, and it may not be possible to achieve
that precision with the propensity score methods used here. A second possibility is that the
actual services delivered under EAS are more heterogeneous than the package of job search
services usually studied. The fact that many claimants received numerous specific EAS services
supports this view. Finally, many previous job search studies have been done in the United
States, where the provision of such services also plays a monitoring and enforcement role with
respect to continuing eligibility for unemployment benefits. That role may be less significant in
Canada, and this may account for a reduced impact.

3

EFFECTIVENESS OF ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET PROGRAMS IN OTHER
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

3.1

Overview of Employment Programs in Developed Economies

In this chapter of the report, we review evidence on the effectiveness of the generic
categories of Active Labour Market Programs (ALMP) as they are delivered by public agencies
in other developed economies. This review will serve as a context for comparative evidence on
EBSM effectiveness.
3.2

Subgroups, Program Features, Sequencing of Services, and Labour Market Context

The specific aspects of program evaluation we will focus on in the cross-country survey
are these: participant subgroups, program features, bundling or sequencing of services, and
labour market context. Participant characteristics are the most commonly reported subgroup
effects. We report estimates of program features, sequencing, and labour market context when
available.
3.3

Methodological Standards

We limit our review of results to evidence from comparison group–designed evaluations
of programs. We consider evidence from both experimental and non-experimental evaluations.
At the back of this report we attempt to provide an exhaustive bibliography of relevant prior
studies. In this report we reference only a subset of the studies listed. For each evaluation study
referenced we will briefly summarize the identification strategy for producing reliable estimates
of program effects. For example, we clearly distinguish evidence from studies where
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experimental designs with randomization were used to identify exogenous program treatments.
Similarly, for nonexperimental evaluations we briefly summarize the conditioning variables for
dealing with nonrandom selection into program assignment. Our review of evidence focuses on
statistically significant program-effect estimates on employment, earnings, and conservation of
cash EI assistance. Where available, our discussion of results includes program effect estimates
by the following areas: demographic subgroup, program features, services bundles and
sequences, and the labour market context. Summary tables of the key research evidence for each
program are presented in the paper. The factors summarized in the tables are as follows: author
(year), country, sample and time frame, identification strategy, estimates by subgroup, program
feature, labour market context, and service bundle or sequence.
3.4

Findings by Intervention Type

3.4.1

Skills Development

Studies of the effectiveness of publicly funded Skills Development (SD) have been
conducted in a number of countries, although only a limited number of these studies present
results for subgroups of the population. While there is considerable variation across the studies,
in the main, SD has been found to have positive impacts on employment or earnings, although
there is considerable uncertainty about whether the positive impacts offset the social and private
costs.
The purpose of SD is to enhance individuals’ human capital, which may be defined as the
set of skills and knowledge that an individual possesses that may be applied in a job in order to
be productive. The skills may be general or specific, meaning that they may be applicable in
many jobs, or they may be applicable only to a specific occupation or job. Skills are sometimes
referred to as “soft” or “hard.” Soft skills are personal attributes or characteristics that tend to
affect job performance through interpersonal interactions in the workplace. They include
characteristics such as personality traits, communication skills, motivation, friendliness, and
optimism. Hard skills are the abilities to perform a certain type of task or activity.
Public funding of SD may be warranted for unemployed individuals and may be
warranted for incumbent workers as well. Unemployed individuals may be emerging workers,
meaning that they have very limited labour market experience, if any at all, or they may be
dislocated workers, meaning that they have become involuntarily unemployed after many years
of tenure. In either case, workers’ skills do not match the skill requirements of jobs because
useful skills have not been acquired or because existing skills have become obsolete. Public
funding of SD is appropriate on the basis of 1) the efficiency gains and positive externalities that
are associated with employment, 2) imperfect capital markets that do not generally support
investments in human capital, and 3) potential informational diseconomies to the extent that
individuals may not be aware of or learn about the payoffs to training or educational
opportunities. Public funding of SD for incumbent workers may be warranted to prevent such
workers from becoming unemployed.
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In any case, skills development is an investment that is made in order to gain future
benefits in the form of employment and earnings, as well as productivity. Table 1 provides
information about two thorough and rigorous meta-analytical studies that summarize results from
several dozen studies of training.

Table 1 Characteristics of Meta-Analyses of Skill Development Impacts
Number of
underlying Geographical Dates of Dependent
studies
coverage
coverage variable

Study
Greenberg,
Michalopoulos,
and Robins
(2003)

37

U.S.

1975–
2000

Annual earnings

Main covariates

Main results

Training type,
gender, age, race,
unemployment rate,
program cost,
experimental
dummy

Men: inconclusive; onthe-job training (OJT)
significant in most
specifications;
experimental dummy
strongly positive;
nonwhite positive
Women: all training
types except basic ed
strongly positive; no
other covariates
significant
Youth: classroom skills
training strongly positive;
nonwhite positive;
unemployment rate
negative

Card, Kluve, and
Weber (2009)

97

26 countries;
primarily
European

1995–
2007

Sign/significance
of short-term
impacts;
sign/significance
of medium-term
impacts

ALMP type; age;
gender; country
group; experimental
dummy; duration in
program

Short-term impact:
training not effective
Medium-term impact:
training (classroom or
OJT) effective
Outcome for men and
women similar

SOURCE: Studies comprising rows of the table.

In the United States, a summary article by Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins (FGR)
(1997, p. 1810) notes,
The broadest generalization about the current knowledge of government training
programs for the disadvantaged is that they have produced modest positive effects
on employment and earnings for adult men and women that are roughly
commensurate with the modest amounts of resources expended on them. . . .
Moreover, they have failed to produce positive effects for youth.
Barnow and Smith (2009, p. 173) conclude,
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Most employment and training programs have either no impact or modest positive
impacts. Many do not pass careful social cost-benefit tests, though some that fail
may be worth doing on equity grounds.
In perhaps the most exhaustive, recent review of the evidence, Card, Kluve, and Weber
(2009, p. 20) found, in their meta-analysis of active labour market policy evaluations
representing 26 countries,
In the short run [< 12 months], job search assistance programs appear to
have a relatively positive impact, while training programs seem to have a
bigger advantage in the medium run [12–24 months]. . . . Programs for
youth appear to be relatively unsuccessful in the short or medium run.
(bracketed phrases added for explanation)
An interesting methodological finding in this meta-analysis is the suggestion that
nonexperimental research designs are likely unbiased—a conclusion drawn by the authors after
finding that experimental and nonexperimental studies have very similar outcomes (positive and
negative) controlling for outcome measure, type of program, and type of participants.
In his summary of EBSM under the LMDA in Canada, Nicholson (2010, p. 11) reports as
follows:
The results in Table 3 for active claimants are encouraging. . . . The typical
estimated gain in annual earnings was about $2,000–$4,800. . . . In proportional
terms, the earnings gains are quite large by international standards—about 10–20
percentage points. . . . Estimated impacts of SD on former claimants are also
shown in Table 3. In general, these estimates were more variable than were the
ones for active claimants.
Oftentimes, studies treat SD—i.e., training—as if it were a “black box” and do not
attempt to disentangle what characteristics of the training might be responsible for its impacts.
SD interventions are quite heterogeneous; among other things, they differ in terms of content,
modality of delivery, pedagogy, and length. Some studies have attempted to examine some of
these aspects. In the National JTPA Study (NJS), a rigorous random-assignment evaluation of
training, Orr et al. (1994) were able to estimate impacts on the earnings of three service
strategies: classroom training (either occupational skill training or basic education), on-the-jobtraining in combination with job search assistance (OJT/JSA), and all other service
combinations. Their results were as follows:
Both women and men in the classroom training subgroup experience earnings
losses during the in-program period with earnings gains in the post-program
period. None of these estimated impacts are statistically significant when adult
women and adult men are analyzed separately, but when the two target groups are
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combined statistically significant impacts on earnings are found in both postprogram years. . . . Women in the OJT/JSA strategy had immediate, statistically
significant earnings gains that persisted throughout the follow-up period; men had
estimated impacts that were quite similar in magnitude, but were only statistically
significant in the second post-program year. (pp. 132–133, emphasis in original)
Interestingly, despite using the phrase “modest” in their summary of results, FGR (1997)
report rather hefty rates of return to training. They use the NJS data to show real rates of return,
assuming that the mean effect lasts 3 years or lasts 10 years. These rates are over 80 percent for
OJT and, in the case of men, they are over 70 percent for classroom training. For women,
classroom training has rates of return of < 0 percent and 15 percent, depending on whether the
mean effect is assumed to last 3 or 10 years, respectively.
Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins (2003) report that, in the U.S. experience,
classroom skills training has apparently been effective in increasing earnings, but basic education
has not. This meta-analysis also finds that OJT significantly increases earnings for adults.
Ostensibly, this study intended to test the hypotheses that 1) publicly-funded training would
become more effective over time as administrators learned what worked and what didn’t work
and that 2) training outcomes should be correlated with the cost of training. The authors
conclude that both of these hypotheses are false—over the 25-year time frame of studies, there
was no positive trend in effectiveness, and the most expensive training modalities were not
superior for adults.
Biewen et al. (2007) investigate the issue of the length of training using German data.
For programmatic purposes, Germany categorizes training programs into short-term training
(lasting 2–12 weeks), further training (several months to 1 year), and retraining (2–3 years or
more). Further training could be purely classroom or practical (involving OJT, internships, or
other stints at a firm). This study uses propensity score matching to estimate the net impacts of
the various training modalities. The authors argue that a rich set of preprogram variables as well
as a case worker assessment of participant motivation and regional unemployment rates satisfy
the conditional independence assumption (CIA) necessary to identify findings. The study finds
that all training modalities increase employment likelihoods, but surprisingly, short-term training
and classroom further training had the most beneficial outcomes.
Osikominu (2009) also investigates the issue of training length and notes that long-term
training has a tradition in Germany even though many studies have noted the lock-in effect of
such training. This analysis examines spells of unemployment and employment using a
competing risks hazard model. The author maintains that variation in the timing of treatment is
adequate to identify treatment effects. The study finds that short-term training reduces
unemployment spells, especially if it is introduced early in the spell. Long-term training, on the
other hand, increases unemployment spells, especially if it is used early in the spell; however,
long-term training pays off with longer employment spells.
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3.4.1.1 Subgroups
Obviously, an important characteristic of any analysis of the impacts of training on
employment or earnings is the distribution of those impacts across subgroups of the population.
Subgroup analyses may identify subpopulations for whom training seems to be systematically
effective or ineffective. To the extent that disparate outcomes across subgroups are caused by
unintentional aspects of the program, then it may be possible for administrators to alter policies
or practices to alleviate any inequities. On the other hand, if there is a structural or
programmatic reason for the disparate outcomes, then alternative programs or policies may need
to be developed, if possible and if desired, by policymakers. The subgroup effects that have
been analyzed in studies include the following: age (youth versus adults), sex, disability status,
geographic region, educational background, and circumstance of training participation
(dislocation or not). Table 2 summarizes the studies that examine impacts for subgroups.
Age. A number of studies have found consistently only modest, if any, positive impacts
from training youth (usually defined as less than 21) through the public workforce development
system. Kluve et al. (2007) discuss evaluation findings for youth programs in Europe. They
report that one study (Brodaty et al. 2002) that looked at workplace training programs for two
cohorts of youth in France (1986–1988 and 1995–1998) found positive results in the earlier
cohort, but the results for the second cohort turned negative. This nonexperimental study, which
uses a matching technique that relies on a competing-risk duration model to identify the
propensity score, indicates that private subsidies yield better results for the short-term
unemployed, whereas training works better for long-term unemployed youth. Kluve et al. (2007)
further cite a Finnish study that found positive employment and earnings outcomes from “labour
market training” but slightly negative outcomes from “youth practical training,” which is the
largest but least expensive program for unemployed youth in Finland.
The Kluve et al. (2007) literature review goes on to cite no or negative effects of youth
training programs in Sweden, Portugal, Norway, and Italy.
In the United States, the NJS essentially found no earnings impact of classroom training
or OJT/JSA for youth. Orr et al. (1994) state,
The only significant impacts occurred during the first six months of the follow-up
period—a significant earnings loss for female youths in the classroom training
subgroup and a significant earnings gain for those in the OJT/JSA service
strategy. It is likely, however, that . . . this many estimates would be statistically
significant by chance. On the basis of these results, then, there is no evidence that
any of the JTPA service strategies improved the earnings of either female youth
or male youth non-arrestees. (p. 150, emphasis in original)
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Table 2 Summary of Studies That Provide Skill Development Impacts by Subgroup
Study/subgroup

Country(ies)

Impact

Youth
Brodaty et al. (2002)
Kluve et al. (2007)

France
Finland

Kluve et al. (2007)
Orr et al. (1994)

Sweden, Portugal, Norway, Italy
United States

Hollenbeck and Huang (2003)

United States

Hollenbeck and Huang (2006)

United States

Positive in 1986–88; negative in 1995–98
Positive for “labour market training”
Negative for “youth practical training”
Negative or insignificant
Negative for female youth; insignificant for
all others
Insignificant earnings; negative short-term
employment; positive long-term
employment
Negative short-term earnings; insignificant
short-term employment; positive long-term
earnings and employment

Gender
Nicholson (2010)

Canada

Card, Kluve, and Weber (2009)

26 countries

Orr et al. (1994)

United States

Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins
(2003)
Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2008)

United States

Race/ethnicity
Orr et al. (1994)

Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins
(2003)

Impacts for men often exceeded those of
women
Program outcomes similar for women and
men
Impacts for adult women substantially larger
than for adult men
Earnings effect largest for women and quite
modest for men
Women’s employment and earnings impacts
larger than men’s

United States

United States

Earnings impacts for Hispanic women less
than for whites or blacks; no racial/ethnic
differences for men
Nonwhite men and youth have higher
earnings impacts than whites; no racial
difference for women

United States

Disability
Aakvik (2003)

Norway

Hoglund and Holm (2002)
Hollenbeck and Huang (2006)

Denmark
United States

Geographic region
Biewen et al. (2007)

Germany

Nicholson (2010)

Canada

Educational background
Orr et al. (1994)

United States

Positive, but not significant, employment
impacts
No impact
Positive employment and earnings impacts,
but uncertain because of potential selection
bias
Positive impacts in western Germany; no
impact in eastern Germany
Earnings and employment variation across
provinces and territories
No difference in impact between high school
graduate and GED equivalence

SOURCE: Various.
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For readers unfamiliar with the NJS, it should be pointed out that Orr et al. disaggregated
the results that they found for youth into individuals with and without an arrest record. The
overall impacts for youth were estimated to be negative and significant, but the impacts for
nonarrestees were insignificant.
Hollenbeck and Huang (2003, 2006) estimated the short-term (three full quarters after
program exit) and longer-term (9–12 full quarters after exit) net impacts of the JTPA Title II-C
Youth program and the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) Title I-B Youth program, respectively,
using data from the state of Washington. Unfortunately, no analyses were done looking strictly
at those youth who received training. In the earlier study examining the JTPA program, these
authors find no significant earnings gain and a (significant) short-term employment loss and
longer-term employment gain. In the later study examining the WIA program, the short-term
earnings and employment impacts were negative, although the employment impact was not
significant. Notably, the longer-term earnings and employment impacts of the WIA Youth
program turned positive. Again, it is not known the extent to which these impacts can be
attributed to skill development. Both of these studies used a propensity score matching
technique with a rich specification of preprogram education and labour market experience
measures.
Sex. Many studies examine the differential impacts from training for women and men.
In Canada, Nicholson (2010) reports that even though his review of the literature suggests that
SD-type programs appear to help adult women but are not especially beneficial for adult men,
the evaluations of the EBSM delivered under the LMDA that were able to estimate genderspecific impacts for SD participants found gains for men often exceeding those for women.
If the conventional wisdom is that training helps adult women but not men, then Card,
Kluve, and Weber (2009) also seem to contradict that convention. They note,
This feature allows us to perform a simple but powerful “within-study”
comparison of program effectiveness by gender: we simply compare the
sign/significance of the program estimates for women and men. For the 28
studies from which we can extract both a short term estimate for women and a
short term estimate for men, we found that the estimates were the same . . . in 14
cases (50%); the women had a more positive outcome in 8 cases (29%); and the
women had a less positive outcome in 6 cases (21%). This comparison provides
further evidence that the program outcomes tend to be similar for women and
men. (pp. 20–21)
This citation is mainly summarizing European evidence. In the United States, as noted in
the citation above, the NJS found that classroom training was ineffective at raising earnings for
either men or women; however, on-the-job training contracts significantly increased earnings for
women in both the first and second follow-up periods, and increased earnings for men in the
second follow-up period. The effects for women were substantially larger than for men. (See
Orr et al. 1994.)
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In a meta-analysis of the findings from 31 evaluations of 15 voluntary U.S. governmentfunded training programs that operated between 1964 and 1998, Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and
Robins (2003) report,
On average, the earnings effects of the evaluated programs seem to have been
largest for women, quite modest for men, and negligible for youths. For men and
women, the earnings effects of training appear to have persisted for at least
several years after the training was complete. (p. 31)
It has been suggested that since the United States provides custodial single parents (mostly
women) with income maintenance support through the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF) program (formerly Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or AFDC), women may
benefit more from training because of the regular financial support.
Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2008) report significant earnings and employment impacts
of training for the WIA adult program. In this nonexperimental evaluation, the results for
women are larger than for men, as in the NJS. In the third year after program entrance, the
impact of training on women’s quarterly earningswas approximately $850 per quarter, compared
to about $420 for men. The employment rate net impact estimates for the same time period were
7.5 percent for women and 2.0 percent for men. This study, in general, found insignificant
employment or earnings impacts for training for dislocated workers in the WIA program;
however, it might be noted that the point estimates for women are more positive (or less
negative) than for men.
Race/ethnicity. U.S. studies have examined the effect of training on earnings or
employment by race/ethnicity. Exhibit 5.8 of Orr et al. (1994, p. 135) displays impacts of the
JTPA, as estimated in the NJS, on women by ethnicity subgroups. White and black nonHispanic adult women have significant 30-month earnings impacts, whereas the impact for
Hispanic women is insignificant. However, the authors of the study warn that the F-test of
whether the impacts are different across the three groups is not significant. Exhibit 5.9 (p. 137)
shows that there are no significant differences for men by ethnicity.
Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins (2003) find contrary results. The meta-analyses
presented in this report show that nonwhite men and youth receive higher payoffs from training,
whereas there is no difference by race/ethnicity for women. They conjecture,
Perhaps, surprisingly, government-funded training seems to have been less
effective for white men and white youths than for nonwhite and racially mixed
groups of men and youth. One possible explanation for this finding, which did
not occur for women, is that white workers faced fewer employment barriers than
nonwhite workers did and could more readily find jobs on their own without the
aid of training. (pp. 50–51)
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Disability status. Estimating the returns to skill development for individuals with
disabilities is difficult because most programs are targeted solely to such individuals, and so it is
difficult to isolate the impact of the training. Nevertheless, an extensive literature on vocational
rehabilitation programs has arisen. Annex IV in HRSDC (2011) has an extensive bibliography
for this literature.
In programs that serve individuals with and without disabilities, the problem of
unobserved heterogeneity arises. Aakvik’s study of the employment effects of education on
disabled workers in Norway (2003) uses econometric selection models and finds that the
employment impacts of education are substantial (8 percentage points); however, they are not
statistically significant.
Kluve et al. (2007) summarize a study by Hoglund and Holm (2002) that found that
education had no significance in explaining whether Danish workers participating in vocational
rehabilitation programs for long-term sick-listed workers returned to employment at either their
former or a new firm.
Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) found quite large and significant employment and earnings
impacts for vocational rehabilitation programs provided to disabled individuals in the state of
Washington in a nonexperimental study that compared participants to individuals who applied
for services but did not participate. However, without detail on the makeup of the comparison
group, these results should be considered tentative.
Geographic region. Within a country, or within a political jurisdiction such as a
province or state, skill development interventions may vary in their effectiveness if there are
substantial differences in access to the interventions or in resources used to provide the
interventions. For example, Biewen et al. (2007) used German administrative data in their study
of training program effectiveness and found positive employment impacts of short-term and
medium-term programs in West Germany, but no positive treatment effects in East Germany.
Not surprisingly, Nicholson (2010) found earnings and employment variation across
provinces and territories in his summary of the SD impacts of EBSM under the LMDA.
However, that summary report did not attempt to find a systematic explanation for the substantial
provincial variation.
Educational background. Presumably, a trainee’s preprogram educational experiences
will interact with the training that is provided, so it is difficult to identify the training effect
because of its endogeneity. In our review of the literature, the only study that seemed to provide
direct evidence was the NJS, and its findings suggest that whether or not a participant had their
high school diploma or GED equivalence did not make a statistically significant difference in
earnings or employment impacts (Orr et al. 1994).
Dislocated workers. Cavaco et al. (2005) analyzed the impact of retraining for displaced
workers in France using a competing risks duration model. They found an increased likelihood
of reemployment of 8 percentage points for participants in the program. However, they also
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found that the program was not well targeted. Impacts would have been much larger—perhaps
as great as 28 percentage points—if the program had been taken up by those who would have
benefited the most, which according to their analyses would have been younger, more highly
educated displaced workers.
In a careful nonexperimental analysis using administrative data from 12 states in the
United States, Heinrich et al. (2008) estimate that retraining dislocated workers through the WIA
program has no impact on earnings or employment. Sixteen quarters after entering WIA as
dislocated workers, the difference in earnings and employment rates between individuals who
went through training and those who did not is essentially zero for both men and women.
In a study using Washington data, Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) find results that are
somewhat more sanguine. Dislocated workers who received training had a 4-percentage-point
employment advantage and an approximately $300 quarterly earnings advantage over a
comparison group that did not receive training. Hollenbeck (2009a) posits four hypotheses as to
why the results from both Hollenbeck and Huang (2006) and Heinrich et al. (2008) differ for
dislocated workers, whereas they are broadly consistent for training disadvantaged adults. These
hypotheses include 1) treatment point, 2) source of comparison group data, 3) matching
technique, and 4) estimator differences.
3.4.1.2 Conclusions
Many studies have been undertaken that provide estimates of the impacts of publicly
provided skills development (i.e., training) programs. The studies use data from many different
countries and pertain to many different types of programs offered under differing labour market
contexts. Abstracting from the heterogeneity, the studies generally suggest that skills
development delivers positive labour market impacts for adults. Training or education tends to
improve the likelihood of employment and to increase earnings, if employed. However, in
general, very little support exists in studies for similar positive impacts of skills development for
youth.
While impacts on the labour market are positive (for adults), authors who have attempted
to calculate the social and private costs of training question whether the benefits of skills
development activities exceed their costs. The general consensus here is that positive net
impacts on employment and earnings must last several years in order for the benefits to exceed
the costs.
Skills development activities vary widely in their characteristics—content, instructional
modality, duration, use of technology, and so forth. Very few studies have rigorously analyzed
these characteristics, although some evidence exists about content and modality. This evidence
suggests that classroom skills training and on-the-job training activities have better labour market
impacts for participants than short-run classroom training, basic skills training, or longer-run
(greater than two-year) educational programs.
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The broad conclusion that skills development is found to have generally favorable
impacts for adults begs the question of how those impacts might vary across subgroups of the
population. Results for training youth through the workforce development system tend to be
discouragingly low, although there are a few studies that find positive outcomes. All but three of
the studies reviewed here that examined programs in European countries and the United States
find no positive or negative impacts for youth. The three studies that report positive impacts for
youth have important qualifications to them to discount those findings.
The general convention, particularly based on studies conducted before the year 2000, is
that SD has its strongest impacts on adult women, and that it has weaker but usually positive
impacts on adult men. However, this convention seems to be somewhat challenged by more
recent studies. The meta-analysis by Card, Kluve, and Weber (2009) suggests that outcomes are
quite similar for men and women. Nicholson (2010) notes that the evaluation results for EBSM
delivered in Canada under the LMDA in which gender-specific results were reported found gains
for men that often exceeded those for women.
A couple of studies relying on U.S. data examine the impacts of skills development by
race/ethnicity. Orr et al. (1994) report very weak evidence that Hispanic women may not have
benefited as greatly from the JTPA program as other women, but there was no difference by
race/ethnicity among men. Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins (2003) report somewhat
more solid evidence that nonwhite men and youth receive higher payoffs from training than
white males, whereas there is no difference by race/ethnic group for women. In short, there is no
recent evidence about differences across these subgroups, and the evidence that does exist is
somewhat conflicting.
In terms of other subgroups, the evidence presented here suggests at best weak support
for positive labour market impacts for individuals with disabilities, no impacts by educational
background, and no systematic variation by geographic area.
Even though there have been many empirical studies of the impacts of training, there are
still areas where little seems to be known. Most of the studies treat training as a “black box”;
observations either participated or not. Little is known about the impacts of characteristics such
as seriousness of purpose, engagement, attendance, or even completion of the training
intervention. Furthermore, inadequate sample sizes seem to have precluded much analyses of
personal characteristics, such as age, race, educational background, disability status, or place of
residence (urban versus rural).
3.4.2

Targeted Wage Subsidies

Wage subsidy and wage supplement programs offer tax credits or other financial
incentives to businesses or individuals to improve earnings and employment prospects. These
programs are seen as more flexible and less expensive alternatives to direct income support or
direct government employment. The private sector bears a share of the cost by paying that
portion of the wage bill that businesses consider equals the value of the marginal product of the
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subsidized workers they hire. In theory a subsidy to a business or to an individual yields
identical employment and earnings results; in practice that has proven not to be the case. The
equivalence of employer- and employee-based programs requires that the existing labour supply
(those already employed when the subsidy is implemented) and the new labour supply (those
who were not previously employed) be the same, in that they respond in the same way to market
incentives and are otherwise interchangeable (Dickert-Conlin and Holtz-Eakin 2000). However,
programmatic and behavioral issues arise with respect to participation rates, program costs,
efficiency, deadweight loss, and unintended stigma effects on targeted populations.
Most programs that incentivize employment focus on wage subsidies to employers.
Subsidies in this case affect the demand for labour, expanding an employer’s demand for labour
by reducing the cost of employing a worker. Many wage subsidy programs target
subpopulations that have difficulty obtaining employment. If the subsidy is large enough to
compensate employers for hiring someone they would not otherwise have employed, the subsidy
increases employment for that specific subgroup. It may also be the case that wage subsidies
could benefit a subgroup by providing incentives that move individuals in the targeted group
from part-time to full-time status. Furthermore, employment and/or earnings gains for a targeted
subgroup of workers may be achieved at the expense of another subgroup of workers.
Consequently, evaluations of targeted wage subsidies should consider the displacement effects.
Wage subsidies can be in the form of cash paid directly to the firm or through a voucher
to the worker. Other subsidy schemes involve a tax credit to firms or a reduction in payroll
taxes. Many programs provide a wage subsidy only, but others provide the subsidy in
conjunction with training, such as on-the-job training (OJT), apprenticeship programs, or
internships. In rare cases, wage subsidies are used to encourage qualified workers to enter an
occupation in short supply, such as Illinois’s Great START (Strategy to Attract and Retain
Teachers) program for early childhood providers and educators. Other examples are Nova
Scotia’s Film Industry Tax Credit, which subsidizes wages paid to Nova Scotia residents
working on film or TV productions, and New York City’s subsidy of green jobs.
In contrast to wage subsidy programs, wage supplement programs provide financial
incentives directly to employees. They typically are targeted at economically disadvantaged
populations, who because of a low level of skills or lack of work experience have difficulty
finding jobs that pay above a worker’s reservation wage. The wage supplement fills the gap
between the wage rate an employer would be willing to pay to hire that person and the wage the
worker believes he or she must receive to make working worthwhile. When the take-home wage
of the employee increases, the labour supply increases, in theory. Wage supplements are
typically paid to individuals through the income tax system, as a credit or reduction in their
taxes. Although the number of wage supplement programs offered is small compared with wage
subsidy programs, in some countries wage supplements reach more participants and distribute
more money than wage subsidies. In the United States, for example, the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) distributes more than $35 billion annually to low- and moderate-income workers.
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3.4.2.1 Subpopulations targeted by wage subsidies
Wage subsidy programs target a wide variety of subpopulation groups. In Canada, for
example, Canada Business’s Web site lists 72 separate wage subsidy programs. While many
programs focus on economically disadvantaged and marginalized populations, there are some,
albeit far fewer, programs that seek to encourage the expansion of employment in targeted
occupations and industries, such as green jobs or in high-tech sectors. We, however, will
concentrate primarily on programs that help to improve employment prospects for the harder-toemploy populations.
Table 3 provides examples of the various target groups included in the more prevalent
past and present wage subsidy programs. Some of the programs listed offer wage subsidies to a
long list of eligible groups. For example, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC), a wage
subsidy program currently operating in the United States, subsidizes employers for wages paid to
12 groups of job seekers. The groups include long-term TANF recipients, other TANF
recipients, veterans, 18- to 39-year-old SNAP (food stamp) recipients, 18- to 39-year-old
designated community residents living in disadvantaged areas, 16- to 17-year-old summer youth,
vocational rehabilitation referrals, ex-felons, SSI recipients, Hurricane Katrina employees,
unemployed veterans, and disconnected youths.
Additional programs target other subgroups. For example, Australia’s Indigenous Wage
Subsidy program targets unemployed Aboriginals or Torres Strait Islanders. The subsidy is
worth up to AUS$6,600 over 26 weeks for a full-time ongoing job of at least 25 hours per week,
or up to AUS$3,300 over 26 weeks for a part-time job of at least 15 hours per week. For
employers that provide career development assistance, an additional reimbursement of up to
AUS$550 is available.
Some wage subsidy programs combine subsidies with additional services. On-the-job
training programs, which are offered in several countries, provide wage subsidies for the explicit
purpose of reimbursing firms for providing on-the-job training. The wage subsidy compensates
employers not only for direct training costs but also for the lower productivity of workers while
they receive training. The U.S. On-the-Job training program (the portion funded through
Recovery Act dollars) uses a sliding scale for determining the wage subsidy, depending upon the
size of the firm, with the consideration that training is a relatively larger burden for smaller firms
than for larger firms. Another example is the United Kingdom’s New Deal for Lone Parents,
which combines an earnings subsidy provided by the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) with
case management, information, referrals, and other limited financial support.
Although several of these programs have been evaluated, these evaluations rarely
estimate the effect of subsidies on each of the subgroups served. In several cases, the number of
participants in a particular group is simply too small for an accurate assessment. Evaluations of
the WOTC and of other wage subsidy programs typically differentiate participants only by
gender and race.
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Table 3 Selected Wage Subsidy Programs that Target Specific Subgroups
Subgroups

Programs

Country

Description

Evaluation

Disadvantaged youth

TJTC, WOTC

U. S.

TJTC: employers claim a tax credit for up Katz (1996)
to 2 years (50% subsidy first year, 25%
second year) on the first $6,000 earned
annually by newly hired employees

Summer youth
16–17-year-olds

WOTC

U.S.

WOTC: firm receives a tax credit up to a Evaluated in
maximum subsidy of 40%, depending Hollenbeck (1986)
upon hours worked, up to $6,000 in
earnings for a max. subsidy of $2,400

Public assistance

TJTC, WOTC, WtW

U.S.

WtW: firm receives tax credit (35% first
year, 50% second year) up to the first
$10,000 in wages each year, w/ max.
subsidy of $8,500 over two years

SNAP recipients,
18–39-year-olds

WOTC

U.S.

See above

Ex-felons

WOTC

U.S.

See above

Disabled

WOTC, TJTC

U.S.

See above

Evaluated in
Hollenbeck (1986)

Disabled

Flexjob

Denmark

Subsidy based on severity of disability

Gupta & Larsen (2010)

Disabled

Ticket-to-Work

U.S.

SSDI recipients receive voucher to
exchange for job or support services

Disabled

Austrian Employment Austria
Act for Disabled

Subsidizes employment of severely
disabled and grants employment
protection

Disabled

FAS Wage Subsidy
Scheme

Ireland

General subsidy for a perceived
productivity shortfall in excess of 20%,
maximum of €10,000/yr.

Indigenous

Indigenous Wage
Subsidy

Australia

Older workers

Reemployment Trade U.S.
Adjustment Assistance

None

Single mother welfare
Recipients

TJTC

U.S.

Katz (1996)

Long-term unemployed JobStart

Australia

None

Dislocated workers

U.S.

New Jersey
Experiment

OJT

Hamersma (2008)

Humer et al. (2007)

Hunter et al. (2003)

Long-term unemployed Danish Wage Subsidy Denmark
Scheme

Subsidizes 50% of minimum wage for a
max. of one year, with restrictions to
minimize displacement

Low-income working
families

Working Families Tax UK
Credit

Low-income working families receive
Brewer et al. (2005)
reduction in welfare payments the more
they work

Hard-to-place persons

German Wage Subsidy Germany
Program

As much as 50% of the monthly salary
for at most 12 months

General population
under age 65

Swedish Regional
Sweden
Payroll Tax Reduction

Firms in northern part of Sweden are
Bohm & Lind (1993);
allowed to cut payroll taxes by 10 ppts. Bennmarker,
Mellander, & Ockert
(2008)
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Rotger & Arendt
(2008)

Stephan (2009)

3.4.2.2 Factors in evaluating wage subsidy and supplement programs
The efficacy of wage subsidy programs depends upon several factors. One is the ability
to target only those populations that are considered in need of a subsidy. Providing a general
subsidy to all workers greatly inflates the cost of the program and reduces its efficiency.
Another related issue pertaining to employer subsidies is whether the subsidy should cover the
entire workforce or merely new hires. Marginal employment subsidies are provided only for a
firm’s additional employment over some baseline level of employment. Included within
marginal employment subsidies are subsidies to new hires. They are less costly per job created,
but they may provide some incentive for firms to increase turnover. Some firms, however, may
not find such subsidies attractive unless the subsidy is more than enough to cover training costs.
Also, hiring subsidies do not completely eliminate deadweight loss, since it is still difficult to
disentangle those people whom the firm would have hired only with a subsidy from those whom
the firm would have hired anyway. And among all these concerns, one cannot forget the issue of
stigma, which increases the more narrowly a population group is defined.
Evaluations need to take into account these behavioral and programmatic differences.
Five criteria are typically used to assess the effectiveness of these programs:
1) Job creation: Did more people from the targeted group get jobs?
2) Earnings: Were earnings the same or higher compared with similar unsubsidized
jobs?
3) Displacement: Did the new hires crowd out or displace others from getting a job?
4) Deadweight loss: Would firms have hired these individuals without the subsidy?
5) Participation: Do firms find the subsidy adequate to compensate them for the
additional costs of hiring a subsidized worker?
Most evaluations of wage subsidies and supplements are based on nonexperimental
design. We highlight below several evaluations that use various matching techniques to
construct comparison groups. We include the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project as an example
of an evaluation based on random assignment design.6
Table 4 summarizes the results from evaluations of the programs listed in Table 3. These
evaluations are selected because they, more so than most evaluations, consider the net impact of
the programs on subgroups of the population and because they use rigorous methodologies to

6

A few evaluations of the UK’s Working Families Tax Credit have used structural labour demand and
supply models which, when calibrated, simulate the effects of the program (e.g., Brewer et al. 2005).
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Table 4 Examples of Evaluations of Wage Subsidy and Wage Supplement Programs
Targeted
Evaluation
Employment
Deadweight Displacement
Program/evaluator
group
type
effect
loss
effect
TJTC (U.S.)

Disadvantaged
youth

Comparison
7% in the short run
group
constructed
from change in
program

Disadvantaged
youth; welfare;
veterans;
handicapped

Comparison
group of
eligible but
noncertified
workers

Displaced
workers

Random
assignment

Welfare
recipients

Participation rate

40–52% of
TJTC
certifications
created jobs for
group targeted.

-

8% of TJTC
certificates
hired because
of their TJTC
status

Youth and handicapped generally
gained, with real
earnings gain of
$462 (1998$) and
$1,940 for handicapped. Most
earnings gains came
from an increase in
employment. White
females gained
most .

-

Displacement
greatest among
black male
youth, black
males, black
females, and
white females
on welfare.
Also black
veterans.

-

-

-

60%

-

Comparison
group
constructed
from change in
program

5.9% higher
probability of
employment in 2nd
quarter; no
difference in
probability in 4th
quarter and into
second year.

38% of tax
credit is passed
through to
workers in
higher wages.

-

< 10%

Disabled

Comparison
group of
closely
matched
ineligibles

Probability with
subsidy is raised
33ppts from base of
44%; does not
reduce exit to
disability pension.

-

-

-

Austrian
Disabled
Employment Act for
the Disabled
(Austria)

Fixed-effect
regression

Employment
protection has
greater impact on
employment than
subsidy.

-

-

-

Longer duration of
employment;
shorter duration of
unemployment

-

-

-

Katz (1996)

TJTC (U.S.)
Hollenbeck et al.
(1986)

JTPA OJT (U.S.)
Orr et al. (1996)
WOTC (U.S.)
Hamersma (2008)

Flexjob (Denmark)
Gupta and Larsen
(2010)

Humer et al. (2007)
Indigenous Wage
Subsidy (Australia)
Hunter et al. (2003)

Aboriginals and Comparison
Torres Straits
group of those
Islanders
who did not
complete
program
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Program/evaluator
Danish Wage
Subsidy Scheme
(Denmark)

Targeted
group
Long-term
unemployed

Rotger aand Arendt
(2008)

Finland Wage
Subsidy Scheme
(Finland)
Venetoklis (2004);
Kangasharju (2005)
Swedish Regional
Payroll Tax
Reduction (Sweden)

Firm-based
evaluation;
comparison
group includes
eligible but not
participating
firms; firms
with < 10
employees

Subsidy contributed
0.71 jobs per
subsidized firm; net
creation is 0.26 jobs
per subsidized firm
after taking into
account separation
rate

-

Disadvantaged
region

Compared
employment
changes in
disadvantaged
region and
nearby counties
Matched
comparison
group by
similar region
and similar
firms within
region

Korkeamaki and
Uusitalo (2008)

Hard-to-employ Matched
persons
comparison of
subsidized and
unsubsidized
workers

Self-Sufficiency
Long-term
Program Experiment welfare
(Canada)
recipients
SDRC

Deadweight
loss

6–9% increase in
payroll

Finnish Regional
Disadvantaged
Payroll Tax
region in
Exemption
northern Finland
Experiment (Finland)

Stephan (2009)

Employment
effect

Difficult-toComparison
employ workers group of
eligible firms
that do not
participate

Bohm and Lind
(1993)

German Wage
Subsidy Program
(Germany)

Evaluation
type

Random
assignment
experiment

Displacement
effect

Participation rate

Separation rate < 7%
of 0.45 per
subsidized firm

No evidence of
displacement

-

-

No evidence of
statistically
significant
employment effects

-

-

-

No evidence of
statistically
significant
employment effects

-

-

-

Initially subsidized
workers have higher
employment rates,
but wage rates were
not statistically
different from
comparison group

-

-

-

Those receiving
supplement were
twice as likely as
control group to
work full-time;
increased earnings
by > 20%; no diff.
when supplement
ran out.

-

-
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33%

Program/evaluator
EITC (U.S.)
Eissa and Liebman
(1996)

Working Families
Tax Credit (UK)
Brewer and others
(2005)

Targeted
group

Evaluation
type

Employment
effect

Deadweight
loss

Displacement
effect

Participation rate

Long-term
welfare
recipients;
women with and
without children

Constructed
comparison
group from
change in
program

LFP rate increase
between 2.4 ppts
and 6.1 ppts for
least-educated
women with
children; no
evidence that it
increases hours of
those already
working.

-

-

-

Low-income
working
families

Microdata used
to estimate
structural
labour supply
model

Compared with
previous program:
increased labour
supply of lone
mothers by 5 ppts.;
slightly reduced
labour supply of
mothers in couples;
slightly increased
labour supply of
fathers in couples.

-

-

-

construct counterfactuals. Most use propensity score matching techniques to construct
comparison groups, but a few utilize random assignment and structural modeling techniques.
The evaluations reviewed above found generally modest gains in employment and labour force
participation of participants in wage subsidy programs. The net effects range from 3 to 9
percentage point increases in employment compared with their counterfactuals. For those
evaluations that consider earnings effects, none found a decline in earnings associated with the
employment gains, which suggests that participants are not sacrificing earnings for an increase in
the prospect of finding employment. Only a few studies reported deadweight loss estimates and
participation rates. Those that did found deadweight loss to be greater than 50 percent,
suggesting that at least half—and probably more than half—of the money spent on subsidies
goes to workers that would have been hired without the program. Participation rates are low,
with evaluations showing less than 10 percent of eligible hires typically claimed by employers.
Wage supplement programs, on the other hand, appear to have higher take-up rates than
wage subsidy programs. Evaluations also show that their employment effects are comparable to,
if not greater than, many of the wage subsidy programs. The Canadian and U.S. programs show
positive effects on labour force participation rates. Evaluation results of Canada’s SelfSufficiency Project experiment found that those receiving the supplement were twice as likely as
the control group to work full-time, and their earnings increased by 20 percent.7 The U.S. results
were not as large but were still positive: researchers found a 2.4 percentage point increase
overall and a 6.1 percentage point increase for less-educated women with children.
7

Because the earnings supplement applied only to full-time jobs, part of the increase in full-time
employment came from workers changing from part-time to full-time jobs in order to obtain the subsidy.
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3.4.2.3 Summary of wage subsidy and wage supplement evaluation results
Subgroup Effects. These positive employment effects are shared by various subgroups
of participants: disadvantaged youth, particularly white females; disadvantaged adults,
particularly lone mothers and hard-to-place individuals; the disabled; dislocated workers; and
indigenous populations. However, it is difficult from the evaluations to surmise whether wage
subsidy and wage supplement programs are more effective for one group than for another. The
estimated net impacts of these programs on employment are similar across evaluations for
different subgroups. For example, Katz (1996) finds a 7 percentage point increase for
disadvantaged youth for the Targeted Job Tax Credit (TJTC) program. Hamersma (2008) finds a
5.9 percentage point increase for welfare recipients in the U.S. WOTC program. Venetoklis
(2004) also finds around a 6 percentage point increase in employing hard-to-employ workers in
Finland. However, Hollenbeck et al. (1986) find no statistically significant effects of the TJTC
program for female youths or for black and Hispanic veterans. They also find greater
displacement effects for black male youth, black adult males and females, black veterans, and
white female welfare recipients.
The ability to compare the relative effects of wage subsidy and wage supplement
programs on population subgroups is complicated by the fact that specific programs target
different population subgroups and that these programs differ in design and external context. By
external context, we mean that the programs are administered across different countries and their
impacts are influenced by different cultures and various types of other social and workforce
programs and different economic environments.8
To offer a richer perspective on the types of programs provided and the design and
findings of evaluations conducted on these programs, we offer in the next several sections brief
descriptions of evaluations of programs in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, and the United
States. We selected these programs and evaluations because they offer examples of programs
that target different population subgroups. The evaluation of the U.S. Targeted Job Tax Credit is
particularly noteworthy because the program targeted several different subgroups and the
evaluation was designed to estimate the relative effects of the program on these groups.
3.4.2.4 Examples of wage subsidy programs in Finland, Denmark and the Unitred States
Finland. Venetoklis (2004) evaluates Finland’s wage subsidy program by using
propensity score matching to construct the comparison group of firms and by using differencein-differences to estimate the net impact of the wage subsidy program, drawing from a data set of
18,000 firms. The Finnish legislation provides subsidies to profitable firms that take on
unemployed workers who find it difficult to find unsubsidized jobs. Typical subsidized jobs are
8

The use of comparison groups helps to mitigate possible external contextual effects, since both the
treatment and comparison groups are supposedly subject to the same “environment.” However, even when
programs are evaluated using random assignment experiments, it is unclear how generalizable the results of those
evaluations might be when placed in different contexts.
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for janitorial workers, clerks, secretaries, and unskilled manufacturing workers. The purpose of
wage subsidies is to improve the human resources development of the unemployed and to
encourage firms to increase employment. Wage subsidies are based on an amount of up to
approximately 770 Euros per month for up to 10 months (in 2002). Workers in subsidized jobs
are usually paid according to the prevailing wage rate. The subsidy fills the gap between the
prevailing wage rate and what the firm would be willing to pay to hire that person.
Venetoklis analyzes the financial statements of business firms that submitted tax returns
to the Finnish tax authority from 1995 to 2001. These data were linked to information on the
annual amount of wage subsidies participating firms received during the same seven-year period.
The data set covered nearly all firms in Finland. A comparison group was constructed using
propensity score matching, with five financial variables and the industrial classification of the
firm as the identifying variables. The results, derived under three matching techniques and
regression adjustment and for various lengths of time, show that wage subsidies are associated
with a 6 percent increase in payroll. In another study of the Finnish wage subsidy program,
which used the same data set and similar methodology, Kangasharju (2005) estimated a 9
percent increase in payroll as a result of the wage subsidy program. He also finds no evidence of
a displacement effect.
Denmark. Rotger and Arendt (2008) used a similar approach to evaluate the Danish
wage subsidy program. The Danish program targets long-term unemployed and subsidizes 50
percent of the minimum wage for a maximum of one year, with restrictions to minimize
displacement. Rotger and Arendt considered only small firms (1–10 employees) in their
analysis. Using matching techniques to form a comparison group of similar firms, their analysis
finds that after the completion of the subsidized period, the subsidy contributed 0.71 jobs per
subsidized firm. Taking into account a separation of 0.45 per subsidized firm, the net job
creation attributed to the subsidy is 0.26 jobs per subsidized firm. Obviously, with respect to
total employment creation, the take-up rate is important. They find that less than 7 percent of the
eligible firms in this size range have a subsidized employee.
United States. Hamersma (2008) examines the effects of WOTC/WtW wage subsidies
on employment, wages, and job tenure. She uses unique administrative data from Wisconsin to
identify subsidy-eligible and subsidy-certified workers. Her evaluation focuses on one of the
targeted populations under WOTC—short-term welfare recipients. Hamersma finds a positive
effect of WOTC on employment near the time eligibility occurs (a 5.9 percent higher probability
of employment over the comparison group in the second quarter after eligibility), but this effects
does not extend to the fourth quarter after eligibility. Hamersma attributes the negligible longrun effects to low rates of participation in the WOTC/WtW programs. Fewer than 10 percent of
eligible individuals were claimed by their firms in order to collect the subsidy. Hamersma does
find a positive earnings effect, with subsidized workers earning $105 (or 9 percent of the average
quarterly earnings for a relevant job). However, she does not find any evidence that subsidycertified workers have longer job tenure than comparable uncertified workers. Therefore, it
appears that the primary earnings gains due to WOTC came through the subsidized job itself and
not through changes in the worker’s broader future employment following the subsidized jobs.
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3.4.2.5 Evaluating subgroups served by U.S. wage subsidy programs
The U.S. federal government has implemented two major wage subsidy programs. The
Targeted Job Tax Credit was authorized in 1978 and was in effect until 1996, when it was
replaced by the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, which was augmented in 1998 by the Welfare-toWork Tax Credit. Several evaluations of these programs were conducted; none, however, used
random assignment. The Hollenbeck et al. (1986) study, conducted for the U.S. Department of
Labor, is worth highlighting because it provides separate analyses of four subgroups. The
evaluation uses administrative data, including UI wage records and program data, to construct
the treatment and comparison groups. The treatment group in this case is TJTC-certified
workers, and the comparison group is other noncertified workers. Instead of using matching
techniques, Hollenbeck et al. used regression analysis and selectivity-corrected regression to
control for demographic factors. They used two methods to correct for selectivity bias: The first
was to exclude all post-hiring vouchers from the sample, since those who were admitted to the
program after receiving a positive outcome—that of being hired—obviously had a smaller
likelihood of having been randomly selected into the program. The second method was to use
the Barnow, Cain, Goldberger (1980) approach of including in the outcome equation a predicted
variable of program participation based on a subset of explanatory variables not included in the
outcome equation.9 The general findings of this evaluation are that subsidies increased the
length of employment but reduced the mean wages relative to comparison groups.
Table 5 summarizes the results for various subgroups. Following Hollenbeck et al.’s
(1986) notation, “+” denotes positive and statistically significant, “0” denotes an effect of nearly
zero, and “−” denotes negative and statistically significant. A second entry of “0” indicates that
the coefficient was not statistically significant. According to the table, welfare recipients benefit
from subsidies by being employed more quarters than their comparison group, and the greater
number of quarters results in higher average wages throughout the period studied. These
benefits accrue without a significant decline in average wages during employment or
displacement. The results are similar for males and females and for white and nonwhites, with
white females (and to some extent white males) exhibiting slightly stronger results with respect
to average wages during employment. Gender differences were noticeable for youth and the
handicapped. For youth, females fared better than males; for the handicapped, males did better
than females. The most typical impact of TJTC is to increase quarters of employment but to
have negative effects on mean wages, conditioned on employment relative to comparison groups,
which suggests that wages are relatively lower than in the comparison group. Furthermore,
while the results are not shown in the table, the authors find displacement effects in many of the
subgroups, with the magnitude being no more than a one-to-one substitution effect.

9

Including the selection-correction equation in the outcome equation suggested nonrandom selection. The
authors conclude that in general these results suggest that white males who are vouchered tend to be the least
employable, while “creaming” is exhibited for white females and nonwhites (p. V-1). The authors comment that
several of the estimates are implausibly large.
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3.4.2.6 Comparing the effect of wage subsidy programs on indigenous people with the effect
of other programs
A report commissioned by Australia’s Department of Employment and Workplace Relations
(now called the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations) evaluated the
effectiveness of wage subsidies on Australian indigenous job seekers relative to other programs.
This report, Hunter et al. (2003), used a longitudinal survey to follow the employment outcomes
of job seekers who participated in five different programs: 1) employment support, 2) training,
3) job creation, 4) wage subsidy (including apprenticeship and traineeships), and 5) job search
training. To control to some extent for selection bias, Hunter et al. compared the outcomes of
those who completed the program with those who did not complete the program. Using this
methodology for each of the five program types, they found that wage subsidies stood out as the
most effective ALMP treatment. Wage subsidies were associated with a longer duration of
employment, a shorter duration of unemployment, and a greater number of spells of employment
than the other programs. The authors, however, point out that comparing program completers
with those who did not complete the program can introduce bias into the estimates because of
differences between the two groups, and it is unclear whether the bias overstates or understates
the effect of the program. For example, if noncompleters are less motivated than completers,
then the comparison may overstate the effects of the program. On the other hand, as the authors
point out, if the noncompleters who did not indicate a reason are more likely to leave a program
because they secured employment or reentered education, then the difference between
completers and noncompleters may understate the effect of a program (p. 66). The evaluators
were not able to account for displacement or substitution effects (Hunter, Gray, and Chapman
2000).
3.4.2.7 Evaluation of two wage supplement programs: Canada’s SSP and the U.S.’s EITC
Wage supplement programs have a similar purpose as wage subsidy programs: to
encourage low-income workers to find jobs and expand their hours of work. The difference is
that wage supplement programs provide tax credits (or other income assistance) directly to
employees, whereas wage subsidy programs provide tax credits directly to employers.
Theoretically, the difference should not matter in encouraging employment, but evaluations have
shown that differences do exist, particularly the possible stigma effect when workers are
identified as low-income and possibly low-productivity workers. Canada conducted and
evaluated an experiment, the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP), which provided wage supplements
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Table 5 Estimated Effects of TJTC Subsidies on Selected Subgroups
Outcome
Race/Sex

Avg. wages during Avg. quarters of
employment
employment

Avg. wages

Avg. quarters per
employer

Displacement

Youth
White males

+/0

+

+

-

-

Nonwhite males

-/0

+

+

-

-/0

White females

+

+/0

+

-

-/0

Nonwhite females

+

0

+

-/0

-/0

White males

+/0

+

+

-/0

0

Nonwhite males

-/0

+

+

+/0

-

White females

+

+

+

+/0

-/0

Nonwhite females

-/0

+

+

+/0

-/0

Welfare

Veterans
Whites

-/0

+

+/0

-

-

Blacks/Hispanics

+/0

+/0

0

-/0

-

Males

+

+

+

-/0

-

Females

-/0

+

+/0

-/0

-/0

Handicapped

Source: Hollenbeck and others (1986).

to long-term welfare recipients. It was evaluated using a random assignment research design.
The United States enacted a major wage supplement program, the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), which was evaluated using a quasi-experimental research design. Whereas the SSP was
never implemented into a large scale program; the EITC has evolved into the United States’
largest welfare assistance program.
The results from the SSP evaluation show a relatively large take-up rate, increasing
employment and earnings and reducing welfare use and poverty. One-third of the long-term
welfare recipients who were offered the SSP earnings supplement took up the supplement and
worked full-time. Results also showed that those receiving the supplement were twice as likely
as control group members to be working full-time. As a result, SSP increased earnings by
$3,400 per person, more than 20 percent over the earnings of the control group. However, the
effects of SSP were not long-lasting. After the supplement ran out, there was no difference in
employment outcomes between the control and treatment groups.
Since no provision was made to evaluate the United States’ EITC program using random
assignment, researchers have had to construct comparison groups using various methods. Most
have looked at the effect of changes in program design at various times in its history by
comparing the effects on those individuals affected by the change with those not affected.
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Examples of this approach include the evaluation by Eissa and Liebman (1996). To construct a
comparison group, they used the increase in subsidy rate in 1986 from 11 percent to 14 percent
and an increase in the maximum income to which the subsidy rate was applied. The change
affected single women with children only. Therefore, the study compares the change in the
labour supply of single women with children (the treatment group) to the change in the labour
supply of single women without children (the comparison group).
Results from difference-in-differences estimation shows that the labour force
participation rate of the treatment group increased from 0.729 to 0.753, a statistically significant
increase of 2.4 percentage points. In contrast, there was no change in the participation rate of the
control group. For the least educated women with children, the participation rate increased 6.1
percentage points. However, there is no evidence that EITC induces those already in the labour
market to work more hours. Moreover, there is no strong evidence that the EITC depressed
wage rates significantly. Eissa and Liebman’s results are consistent with those of other
researchers who have examined the various effects of EITC.
3.4.2.8 Summary of evaluation effects on population subgroups
The evaluations reviewed above found modest gains in the employment and labour force
participation of participants in wage subsidy programs. The net employment effects range from
around 3 to 9 percent increases. Wage supplement programs appear to have larger take-up rates
and induce significant increases in participation rates. Many wage subsidy programs target
specific populations. The programs for which we selected evaluations targeted upwards of 15
population subgroups. The net employment effects across these population subgroups are mostly
positive, and for those that obtained statistically significant estimates, the magnitudes of the net
impact estimates are quite similar. This assessment of wage subsidy and wage supplement
evaluations is similar to that provided by Kluve (2010) in his meta-analysis study of European
programs. Of the 22 European wage subsidy programs in the study, 17 found positive and
statistically significant employment effects.10 Nine of these studies evaluated programs that
targeted youth, and of these nine evaluations, six found positive and statistically significant
results. Kluve concludes from his meta-analysis that wage subsidy programs can be “effective in
increasing participants’ employment probabilities.” Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar (2004) are less
favorable in their critique of 17 evaluations of wage subsidy programs in developed countries.
Their conclusion is that the results are mixed, with only six showing significant long-run
employment effects. This is consistent with our assessment with respect to long-term effects, but
we find that several more estimate short-term employment effects. Our list includes more recent
programs or more recent evaluations.
Bartik (2001) offers a favorable assessment of wage subsidies in the United States. His
critique of two dozen or so evaluations of U.S. programs leads to the conclusion that properly
designed programs can be effective in increasing the employment and earnings of the
disadvantaged. This applies to both wage subsidy and wage supplement programs.
10

Not all of the 22 programs are wage subsidy programs, since Kluve combines wage subsidy programs
with self-employment programs in his analysis.
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Evaluations also found significant inefficiencies in the programs, although not all
evaluations included estimates of deadweight loss. Bartik (2001) concludes from his critique of
the various studies that the windfall wastage is somewhere within the range of 50 to 92 percent,
with a midpoint of around 70 percent. This means that seven out of every ten dollars spent on
subsidies goes to subsidize hires that would have occurred anyway. The wastage inflates the perparticipant cost beyond the amount of the wage subsidy. Also, it appears that programs that
target a narrow population subgroup are less inefficient. One study found significant
displacement effects for specific subgroups such as black male youth and black adult males and
females.
Another issue with wage subsidies paid directly to employers is the low take-up rates.
According to Bartik, this may be the biggest limitation. Evaluations show that less than 10
percent of eligible hires are typically claimed on employers’ tax returns. Employers complained
of high compliance costs, even when much of the paperwork was handled by consultants. Some
evaluations surmised that employers did not want to be encumbered by government regulation
and oversight and that the benefits of the subsidies did not exceed the perceived costs of such
intrusion. However, even when the required paperwork associated with the programs is handled
by other organizations, firms are still reluctant to participate. It is not clear whether larger
subsidies to cover the fixed cost of compliance would make a difference.
Yet another unintended effect of wages subsidies that concerns some evaluators is their
negative effect on skill formation. They argue that wage subsidies (to both employers and
employees) targeted at the economically disadvantaged discourage the acquisition of skills,
because higher skills lead to higher wages, which in turn reduces the likelihood that such
employees will be entitled to wage subsidies. One study shows that wage subsidies actually
reduce the accumulation of skills (Heckman, Lochner, and Cossa 2003).
Subsidies paid directly to employees have proven more effective. Dickert-Conlin and
Holtz-Eakin (2000) concur that employer-based programs have been characterized by low
participation rates and relatively little success. An employee-based approach, such as the EITC,
appears relatively more successful in targeting the desired population, inducing additional labour
force participation, and raising earnings (p. 263).
3.4.3

Self-Employment (SE)

Self-employment assistance is an active labour market program (ALMP) to promote
reemployment for a small proportion of UI recipients. Unlike most other ALMP, which operate
through the supply side of the labour market by increasing the quantity or value of job seeker
skills, self-employment assistance is designed to boost labour demand through direct job creation
for unemployed workers. Before discussing the effectiveness of SEA as a reemployment
program option, we start by reviewing related literature on the effects of self-employment spells
on future labour market experiences.
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3.4.3.1 Background on self-employment
In 2009 there were 32.5 million self-employed in the 27-nation European Union. These
workers accounted for nearly 15 percent of total employment, or more than one job in seven
(European Commission 2010a). In the United States in 2009 about 15.3 million people were
self-employed, constituting nearly one out of every nine jobs (Hipple 2010). The self-employed
are a heterogenous group including building trades workers, home-based craft and piece workers,
proprietors of small farms, cosmetologists, and professional services providers like physicians,
attorneys, and accountants. A summary of self-employment studies is given in Table 6.
Information on self-employment patterns for subgroups is given in Table 7.
Branchflower (2000) presented a survey of self-employment in OECD countries at a
Burlington, Ontario, conference sponsored in 1999 by the Canadian Employment Research
Forum. He presented evidence that since 1966 the trend in self-employment has been down in
most OECD countries (except Portugal, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom).11 In most of
the countries he studied, Branchflower (2000) finds that the rate of self-employment declines as
the unemployment rate rises; that the self-employed are more likely to be male and older; that
both the least-educated and the most-educated have higher probabilities of being self-employed;
and that the self-employed are less willing to move from their neighborhoods, towns, and regions
than are wage and salary employees.12 Branchflower (2000) attributes this last result to the pull
on the self-employed of their customers.
There is a wide range of estimates concerning the effect of self-employment on
subsequent income and employment stability. Some transitions to self-employment are
permanent and result in secondary job creation through hiring within microenterprises. For
many others, self-employment is transitory and is followed by lower future employment rates
and earnings in wage and salary jobs.
Bruce and Shuetze (2004) examine the effect of self-employment experiences in the
United States using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics dating back to 1979. They
estimate regression models on earnings controlling for observable characteristics.13 They find
that, relative to continued wage employment, brief spells in self-employment do not increase—
and probably actually reduce—average hourly earnings upon return to wage employment.

11

While net self-employment has been down, Branchflower (2000, p. 488) estimates a U-shaped time trend
with a minimum toward the end of the 1980s and a gradual recovery in self-employment rates since that time.
12
Branchflower’s (2000, p. 489) analysis of determinants in Canada suggested higher self-employment
rates for those who are less educated (but not higher educated), older, males, and have dependent children. He also
found a slight upward time trend in Canadian self-employment from 1975-1996.
13
Control variables include months of job tenure, union membership, local area (county) unemployment rate,
educational attainment, race, age, marital status, number of children under age 18, household asset income,
residence in a metropolitan statistical area, and geographic region of residence (Northeast, South, and West, where
North-Central is the reference category). To control for the potential endogeneity associated with self-employment
and unemployment experience, they add the log of hourly wage sector earnings recorded at the start of the five-year
period as an independent variable.
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Table 6 Summary of Studies of Self-Employment Experience on Subsequent Earnings
Authors (year)

Countries

Method

Sample

Intervention

Bruce and
U.S.; SE rates: Control for
Schuetze (2004) males 6%,
differences in
females 3%
individual,
household, and
occupational
characteristics in
OLS models of
outcomes.
Moore and
Canada
Control for
Mueller (2002)
observable
characteristics in
probit models of
transition from
WS to SE.

Observational study of Neither SE nor WS earn >
labour force transitions. SE earn > unemployed
Any SE or
earnings
unemployment in 5-year
period vs. steady
employment

Zissimopoulos
and Karoly
(2007)

Observational study of
labour force transitions
from WS to SE, retire,
or out of LF

U.S.

Panel Study of
Income Dynamics:
7 cohorts each with
800 men, 300
women. Inflow:
1979 to 1985;
Outflow: 1984 to
1990
Canadian Labour
Market Activity
Survey, 1988 to
1990. Transitions
within a year from
WS to either WS
or SE. SE: 650;
WS: 9182
Control for
Health and
observable
Retirement Study:
characteristics in Five survey waves
multinomial logit of persons over 51
models of
years of age in
transition from years 1992 to 2000
WS to SE or
other labour
market states.

Earnings

Observational study of IF UI receipt less earnings
labour force transitions from SE

-

NOTE: SE = self-employment, WS = wage and salary employment, LF = labour force

Table 7 Summary of Studies of the Effect of Self-Employment Experience on Earnings: Subgroups
Authors (year)

Subgroups

Subgroups

Features

Bruce and Schuetze
(2004)

More males in SE, Males higher avg.
similar effects
wages, similar
percentage effects

Moore and Mueller
(2002)

Longer-run
increases SE

Zissimopoulos and
Karoly (2007)

Pension coverage Wealthier older
reduces movement workers moved into
in SE
self-employment

Other

SE also increased 1984 to 1990
prob. of PT vs.
expansion
FT at terminal

Involuntary sep. more Pers. rea. sep.
likely SE
most likely SE

Vol. sep. less
likely SE

Flexible earnings No diff. M or F
arrangements
lead to SE

Net benefits
-

-

Furthermore, those who experience self-employment have difficulty returning to the wage sector.
However, these consequences are small compared to similar experiences in unemployment.
Bruce and Schuetze (2004) examined seven cohorts over five-year periods with inflows between
1979 and 1985 and outflows between 1984 and 1990. In Bruce and Shuetze’s samples, about 6
percent of men and 3 percent of women experienced self-employment. They found that on
average those who experienced a spell of self-employment had subsequent income that was
above those who experienced unemployment during the five years, but below those who were
neither unemployed nor self-employed. Additionally, self-employment increased the likelihood
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that future work would involve part-time jobs. Overall men fared better following a spell of selfemployment than did women.
Moore and Mueller (2002) studied transitions from wage and salary employment into
self-employment in Canada. They hypothesize that some workers may be pushed into selfemployment because of inadequate demand for wage and salary workers. Examining transitions
from paid work to self-employment using data from the Labour Market Activity Survey for the
years 1988 to 1990, Moore and Mueller find evidence of their self-employment push hypothesis.
They estimate probit models of the change from wage and salary employment to selfemployment, controlling for observable characteristics.14 They find that the likelihood of selfemployment is typically influenced by five factors. It is 1) increased by longer spells of
joblessness(and this effect is stronger for women), 2) reduced by the receipt of cash
unemployment benefits between jobs, 3) higher for workers involuntarily laid off because of lack
of work than for workers who undergo voluntary separations, 4) lower for job separations due to
personal reasons, and 5) unaffected by labour market conditions. Overall, Moore and Mueller
(2002, p. 800) conclude that “few of the individuals in the sample, however, appear to be pushed
into self-employment.”
Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007) studied self-employment among older workers in the
United States. They use five waves of data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
panel—every other year from 1992 to 2000—and estimate multinomial logit models of transition
from wage and salary employment to self-employment, retirement, or not working, while
controlling for observable characteristics. This HRS survey sample of older Americans has
higher average rates of self-employment than a sample of younger Americans surveyed in the
Current Population Survey. Indeed, Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007, p. 275) compute that on
the HRS survey date, 39 percent of male respondents aged 66 who reported working full-time
were in self-employment. In estimating models of transition to self-employment, Zissimopoulos
and Karoly (2007) control for four categories of observable factors: 1) demographic
characteristics; 2) wealth, pensions, and inheritance; 3) health status; and 4) job characteristics.
They find that among older workers, movement into self-employment is more likely to occur
among those with the following characteristics: pension coverage, higher levels of personal
assets, and more flexible employment arrangements. Their evidence also suggests that poor
health—as measured by the presence of a work-limiting health condition—appears to push older
workers into self-employment. Since health-limiting factors do not increase movement into selfemployment for younger workers, they argue that older workers with a work-limiting health
condition are better able to accommodate their condition and continue working if they are selfemployed, as compared to having wage or salary employment.

14

Control variables include the regional unemployment rate, weeks between jobs, UI benefit receipt, involuntary
job separation, voluntary job separation, separation for personal reasons, gender, region (Atlantic, Quebec, Prairies,
British Columbia), number of family members in labour force, marital status, number of children, age, visible
minority, immigrant, educational attainment, union membership, pension coverage, months of job tenure.
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3.4.3.2 Background on self-employment assistance (SEA)
Through the self-employment assistance (SEA) program, unemployed Canadian workers
are provided assistance in setting up their own businesses. Those eligible for EI cash payments
through Part I, if granted SEA assistance, are not required to search for a new job. Instead they
are able to collect their remaining cash EI entitlements though Part I, and may receive additional
Part II benefits. Earnings while in SE are not insurable under EI and therefore do not renew EI
eligibility (Nicholson 2010, p. 4). Total spending on SEA in Canada amounted to about $145
million in 2005/2006, with approximately 12,000 individuals starting this intervention during the
year. Hence, on a per-participant basis, this is an expensive intervention—averaging over
$12,000 per client (Nicholson 2010, p. 14).
France provided the first self-employment assistance to the unemployed in 1979. By the
early 1990s there were SE programs in 17 member countries of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD). The French and UK programs are examples of the two
main alternative SE assistance designs. The French program provides clients with a lump sum
payment for business start-up, whereas in the UK, clients receive weekly “Jobseeker’s
Allowance” payments but are granted a work-search waiver while self-employment is pursued.
In addition to France, the lump sum approach is used in Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
and Sweden. The periodic payments approach is used in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Selfemployment programs are used by a small fraction of the unemployed, but they can account for a
large share of new business formation. In France, SE constituted nearly 25 percent of new
businesses in the early 1980s, and in the UK, it constituted about 20 percent in 1987 (Messenger
and Wandner 1994).
Various forms of SEA programs operate in most OECD countries, although many of
these are relatively small. Overall, OECD countries devoted only about 2 percent of total active
labour market spending to self employment, so, by this standard the Canadian program is quite
large (Nicholson 2010). Among the 27 European Union (EU) countries, 19 have SEA programs.
The numbers include 10 of the 15 countries that were EU members before 1996 and 9 of 12 who
joined after 1996. SEA spending constitutes on average 2.5 percent of ALMP spending for the
older EU members and 2.0 percent for the newer members (European Commission 2010b).
In the United States, an SEA program was established in 1993 on a temporary basis as
part of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and was made a permanent part of
federal UI legislation in 1998. Federal legislation followed directly from the design of a
successful Massachusetts demonstration project. To participate, UI claimants must be determined
to be likely to exhaust their UI benefits, based on the worker profiling mechanism that is used for
the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services system. The SEA program has remained very
small, with only seven states choosing to have active programs. Only five states typically have
more than 100 participants per year, and no state has had as many as 1,000 participants in any
year. Participation has been mainly in the states of New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania,
with fewer participants in Maine and Oregon. The small size of SEA can be seen in various
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types of measures. The number of workers entering SEA has only risen as high as 7,300 per
year, and annual payments have amounted to no more than 50,000 weeks compensated and $17
million in benefits paid. These are very small numbers compared to the regular UI program,
which paid $32.7 billion to 7.5 million beneficiaries in 2007 (Wandner 2010). Participation in
SEA rose sharply during the recent severe recession: for example, Oregon SEA cases rose from
319 in 2008 to 716 in 2009. Still, no states even come close to approaching the federal cap, set
at 5 percent of a state’s pool of regular UI beneficiaries (Haislip 2011).
3.4.3.3 Effectiveness of self-employment assistance
The LMDA evaluations in Canada suggest that SEA increased hours worked after
participation, but there was no evidence about whether the added hours were in self-employment
or wage and salary employment. The Canadian SEA was also found to decrease EI receipt, but
estimates of impacts on earnings were mostly negative. The negative impacts on earnings and the
decreased use of EI may have reduced total annual income; however, this was not assessed in the
evaluations. Nicholson (2010) suggests the deadweight loss for the Canadian SEA program may
be high, because offers are typically made to older people with more work experience and to
those with above-average educational attainment. That is, people with a high propensity to
become self-employed anyway are more likely to receive SEA. He also notes that the take-up
rate is low, and most employment is in low-skill, low-wage sectors.
Our review of self-employment assistance and microenterprise evaluations includes
studies of programs in Canada, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, and the United States. A
summary of these SEA evaluations is given in Table 8. Evaluation results for SEA subgroups,
program features, and labour market conditions are given in Table 9.
Canada. Other evaluations of SEA in Canada were done by Graves and Gauthier
(1995); Wong, Henson, and Riddell (1998); and Finseth (1999). The latter was not a formal
comparison group design evaluation, but rather a survey of self-employment activity, prior
evaluations of SEA, and the adequacy of financing systems to support microenterprise
establishment and development in Canada.
Graves and Gauthier (1995) performed a nonexperimental evaluation of SEA in Canada
with a sample of 1,479 participants and 2,700 comparison-group subjects contacted in telephone
surveys. The participant sample resulted from a 62 percent response rate when attempting to
interview the census of SEA participants in program year 1992/93. The comparison group
resulted from strategic selection on observable variables from the register of UI beneficiaries and
their 28 percent response rate to the survey. The comparison group was selected to match the
SEA participant survey respondent sample on the dates of beginning UI benefit receipt and
province. When contacted as part of the survey, the comparison group was asked to rate their
interest in self-employment, in the same way that SEA participants are asked during program
screening. The final comparison group was culled to yield a pattern of interest in selfemployment similar to the SEA participant sample. With these participant and comparison
samples, program effects were estimated using regression adjustment on observables. The
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evaluation noted that because of the similar dates of beginning UI receipt and the time spent in
SEA by participants, there was a longer mean post-program period for the comparison group (65
weeks) than for the participant group (40 weeks). The net result of matching and response rates
yielded a comparison group that was younger, less likely to be married, less likely to own a
home, and less likely to have educational attainment beyond secondary school. Compared to the
general population of UI recipients, SEA participants tend to be older, with more labour market
experience, more education, and higher levels of personal financial assets.
Graves and Gauthier (1995) attempted to overcome sample selection issues by computing
program effects in regression models, controlling for observable characteristics. They estimated
logit models on binary outcomes and OLS models on continuous outcomes, controlling for
observable variables such as age, sex, education, geographic region, marital status, and attitudes
toward risk-taking. They assert that efforts to correct for selection bias by using Heckman twostep procedures suggested that selection bias was not an issue. The report would have benefited
from a fuller exposition of these results, since some of the results suggest that selection was a
key problem in the evaluation. In particular, the SEA program effect estimates were much larger
when contrasted to the full comparison group than when compared to those who actually started
self-employment. About 83 per cent of SEA clients were still operating their SEA venture at the
time of their evaluation interview, an advantage of 7 percentage points over the average of those
in the comparison group who started their own businesses. SEA participants experienced an
increase in earnings between the pre- and post-program periods, but in contrast to the
comparison group had lower earnings in the first year after SEA and significantly higher
earnings in years two and three after SEA. SEA participants were 4 percentage points less likely
to receive cash social assistance than those in the comparison group, and, measured on average
eight months after completing the program, they also had drawn $2,632 less from the UI account.
Graves and Gauthier (1995) estimated that, from a governmental perspective, UI benefit
savings do not outweigh the substantial $13,000 of additional UI resources which were invested
in workers’ SEA participation. The savings from SEA were estimated to pay back the
government costs within an average of three years and nine months. Considering all values and
costs in a full social accounting framework, the average break-even point could be reached
within 18 months. However, it was estimated that about half of program participants would have
entered self-employment even without government SEA. This deadweight estimate doubles the
average payback costs to around 7 years for the government and 3 years for society. Participant
versus nonparticipant contrasts among subgroups, controlling for characteristics, revealed that
SEA impacts for social assistance recipients (SARs) were positive but smaller. SAR participants
had smaller investments in SE and used public instead of private financing. However, the
business survival rate for SAR participants was about 85 percent on the survey data, which is on
par with the full participant group. Compared to other SEA participants, SAR participants had
higher reported earnings, business profits at the same level, were less likely to have paid
employees, and made less use of EI after SEA. There were no statistically significant differences
in outcomes across age groups. Canadian equity groups, including visible minorities, disabled,
and aboriginals, did not show significant differences in self-employment survival, earnings,
income, EI use, or hiring. There were no differences across regions in survival rates, but self45

employment start-ups in Quebec and Atlantic Canada had more favorable outcomes compared to
SEA start-ups in Ontario and Western Canada. These included higher values of business
revenues and profits and more hiring of paid employees. Participant versus nonparticipant
contrasts among subgroups, controlling for characteristics, revealed that SEA impacts for social
assistance recipients (SARs) were positive but smaller. SAR participants had smaller
investments in SE and used public instead of private financing. The business survival rate for
SAR participants was about 85 percent. Compared to other SEA participants, SAR participants
had higher reported earnings, business profits at the same level, were less likely to have wage or
salaried employees, and received less EI after SEA. There were no statistically significant
differences in outcomes across age groups. Canadian equity groups, including visible minorities,
the disabled, and aboriginals, did not show significant differences in self-employment survival,
earnings, income, EI use, or hiring. There were no differences across regions in survival rates,
but self-employment start-ups in Quebec and Atlantic Canada had more favorable outcomes
compared to SEA in Ontario and Western Canada. These included higher values of business
revenues and profits and more hiring of paid employees.
Wong, Henson, and Riddell (1998) examined whether self-employment assistance in
Canada increased the earnings of program participants during the years 1987 to 1996. The selfemployment incentive (SEI) program operated under the Community Futures program from
1987 to 1991 in about 200 nonmetropolitan areas experiencing labour market adjustment
difficulties. The SEI was funded from general revenues and provided a weekly taxable allowance
of $180 (rising to $230 in 1991) for up to 52 weeks to successful applicants in lieu of UI or
social assistance while they attempted to start self-employment. The SEI also provided access to
free business counseling. From 1992 to 1995 the self-employment assistance (SEA) program
operated as part of the UI program. Entrepreneurship training remained free but became
mandatory under SEA. The SEA start-up allowance was equivalent to the weekly UI benefit
amount and was paid from the UI fund. Additionally, the SEA required a personal investment of
at least 25 percent of start-up costs, up to a maximum of $4,000.
The evaluation relied on program administrative records maintained by Human
Resources Development Canada and earnings records maintained by Revenue Canada. From the
Status Vector of the social insurance benefits master file, detailed information was drawn on
work history, insurable earnings, and UI claim history. The Canadian Jobs Strategy (CJS) file
provided records of program interventions financed from general revenues. The T1 tax filer
administrative data gives annual individual income by source.
More than 66,000 persons participated in self-employment between 1987 and 1998,
amounting to about 2 percent of regular UI claimants. An initial comparison group of 160,205
individuals was randomly selected from the UI inflow, evenly distributed across years and
amounting to one-half of one percent of regular UI claimants. About one-quarter of the initial
comparison sample was randomly selected for analysis. Relative to the SEI period, the SEA
program enrolled a significantly higher share of UI beneficiaries, topping out at around 11,000
annual participants at the end of its period, or three times the level of SEI.
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Table 8 Summary of Self-Employment Assistance Program Evaluation Mean Effects Estimates
Authors (year)

Method

Country/sample

Benus et al. (2008)

RA: participants got 13 USA/Inflow at one-stop
hours more SE training centers: 2003 to 2005; 7
than comparison group sites: Pennsylvania (2),
Minnesota (2), Maine (3)

Benus et al. (1995)

RA: among profiled
high-exhaustionprobability UI
beneficiaries

Benus et al. (1995)

Intervention
Assessment, classroom
training, 1-on-1 business
counseling, help with loan
applications

Self-empl.

Any empl.

EI/UI Receipt

At 3 quarters +6%;
at 6 quarters +3%

No significant effect, but +1 week, +2 weeks if
more in SE than in WS
on UI first

USA/Massachusetts Inflow British style SEA: weekly
1990–93, treatments: 614, UI pay with work search
controls: 608
waiver

at 19, 31 mos.
+11%, +5%

at 19, 31 mos. +1%, −4% −1.8 weeks

RA: among profiled
high-exhaustionprobability UI
beneficiaries

USA/Washington State
Inflow 1989–90,
treatments: 755 controls:
752

at 21, 33 mos.
+16%, +12%

at 21, 33 mos. –9%, −8% −7.6 weeks

Carling and
Gustafson (1999)

NE : controlling for
observable
characteristics in
hazard models

Sweden/Inflow census
Policy to target se to
6/95–12/96 follow-up at 27 women and foreign-born
months, se: 9,043,
ws:14,142

reduces unempl.
after SE vs.
subsidized job

SE double WS for male
and female natives of
Sweden

—

Graves and Gauthier
(1995)

NE: matching on
observables plus
regression adjustment

Canada/Telephone survey, UI-type payments continued
se participants: 1,479,
an extra 52 weeks once
comparison: 2,700
SEA starts, and participant
finances 25% of project

8% higher rate vs.
those in comparison
group who started
SE

18.3% vs. those in
comparison group who
started SE (regressionadjusted)

−8.6% v full comp
group (reg adj)
−7.3 weeks v comp gp
started SE (reg adj)

O’Leary (1999)

NE: matching on
observables plus
regression adjustment

Hungary/Inflow in 1996,
participants: 1067,
comparison: 3,338

O’Leary (1999)

NE: matching on
observables plus
regression adjustment

Poland/Inflow in 1993–94, French style: lump sum, but
participants: 709,
must repay
comparison: 10,000

Pfeiffer and Reize
(1998)

NE: instruments for
SEA in probit model

Germany, Oct. 1993 to
August 1995 census

UK-type after 4 weeks ui; 6 Survival gain, East
to 24 months
0.0197 West 0.0080

—

—

Wong, Henson, and
Riddell (1998)

NE: regression
adjustment for
observable differences,
diff-in-diff models

Canada, 1987 to 1995
census SEI and SEA;
comparison random
sample UI inflow

SEI 1987–91: $180/wk. to
$230 not UI 52 wks.; SEA
92–95 = UI from UI
account 52 to 156 weeks

—

—

French-style SEA: Lump
sum balance of UI
entitlement

British style: monthly UItype payments for 18 mos.

—

WS employment 0.16
−1.6 months
percentage point increase
9 months after SE

—

+3.65 months
WS employment 0.27
percentage point increase
about 36 months after SE

Increased SE+WS
earnings

NOTE: RA= random assignment experiment, NE= nonexperimental, SE = self-employment, WS = wage and salary employment, FE = fixed-effects estimator.
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Table 9 Summary of Self-Employment Assistance Program Evaluation Subgroup Effects Estimates
Authors (year)

Earnings

Subgroups

Benus et al.
(2008)

−$200 WS in
the year after
SEA

No impact on public
assistance receipt

Benus et al.
(1995)

SE $1,219,
WS $3,053

Males less likely in WS
employment

Benus et al.
(1995)

SE $2,157,
WS –$1,744

Carling and
Gustafson
(1999)

—

Subgroups

Features

—

—

No rise in SE earnings, fall
in WS earnings, bigger
effects on UI recipients

Males less likely in SE
Add jobs at 19, 31 mos.
Males gain in total earnings minus 0.4, 0.9
(SE+WS)

UN89–93: 4.1, 6.0,
8.2, 7.6, 6.2

$13,843 to individuals,
$2,089 to government

Males less likely in SE

Whites, males, expect
Add jobs at 21, 33 mos.
recall: SE+WS earnings up plus 0.1, 0.3

UN89–93: 5.5, 4.4,
6.0, 7.3, 6.9

$696 to individuals,
−$1,246 to government

No diff. in effects by sex for
Swedish-born

Not effective for foreignborn unemployed

Increase in supply of
skilled unemployed

Rising unemployment
rate 1990–2000

Added jobs higher by 6.5
percent vs. comp. group

Quebec and Atlantic
more likely to hire
others

Social assistance recipients’
No diff. by age; equity
effects on par or stronger than groups 5% lower survival
average participant
& $300 less earnings

O’Leary (1999) −$26/mo.

+Older

+Vocational education
+School graduate

O’Leary (1999) $69/mo.

+Females +work experience
less than 3 yrs.

+Blue-collar occupation
+Not long-term unempl.

Pfeiffer and
Reize (1998)

Employment growth
east Ger 0.02, west Ger 0.03

Wong, Henson, SEI 19K to
and Riddell
27K per yr.
(1998)
SE+WS

Net benefits

Economic recovery
period

Graves and
−1,139 1 yr. +
Gauthier (1995) 3,911 2 yr. 3
yr.

—

Labour markets

Prime age males SE higher
earn. than comp.

—

—
Effect increases with size
of own investment
—

Women had higher SE
income; older and Quebec
worse (lower)

NOTE: SE = self-employment, WS = wage and salary employment.
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SE superior to UI alone;
SE earnings effect
declines yr. 2 and yr. 3

—

6 years to recover SEA
costs per participant

+High unemployment
areas

—

—

—

—

—

Recession 1991–92

—

The Wong, Henson, Riddell (1998) research design boils down to regression correction
for differences in observable characteristics. The first step is to compute differences in earnings
before and after the program period separately for program participants and the comparison
group. These computations are intended to remove effects on earnings due to characteristics that
do not change over time, including unobservable factors such as innate ability and motivation.
These first difference earnings data are then used as dependent variables in regression models
with indicators for program participation and other variables to correct for differences across the
two groups in observable characteristics. In addition to a dummy variable for participation, the
explanatory variables include gender, age, experience (and experience squared), and regional
labour market controls.
The empirical evidence provides support for the hypothesis that combined earnings from
market work and self-employment are increased by adding a self-employment experience
through either SEI or SEA. The basic fixed effect estimates of the SEI effect on gross earnings
from self-employment are large and positive, ranging from $19,000 to $27,000 per year,
depending upon the cohort. These mean estimates increase somewhat when other controls are
included. Control variables suggested that women had higher self-employment income, while
older persons and those in Quebec had lower income. The impacts are much stronger in the first
year after the program, with self-employment earnings estimates tapering off in the second and
third postprogram years. These estimates of earnings effects range from $1,000 to $2,000 per
month and are large compared to results found in other countries. This study would have
benefited from matching participants with nonparticipants in the very large random comparison
group before impact estimates were computed by difference in differences, with controls for
observable characteristics.
Finseth (1999), with support from the International Labour Office, conducted a survey of
SEA and microenterprise/microfinance programs in Canada. For evaluation results he relied on
Canadian performance measurement and prior evaluation studies. He documented sources of
business start-up assistance and asserted that the Community Futures model is the best channel.
He stated that at the end of the 1990s about 1,200 borrowers were served by microenterprise loan
funds, but that these constituted only 3.8 percent of such loans. The vast majority borrow from
private financial institutions while relying on government loan guarantees. Finseth (1999)
asserts that the SEA program has a number of positive impacts on the target clientele and on
government, including a greater level of business success, reduced reliance on unemployment
benefits, increased savings for social assistance, increased income for SEA participants, greater
job satisfaction, increased levels of induced employment, and increased tax revenue
contributions. From the point of view of cost-effectiveness, the SEA Program is not appealing.
Finseth argues that the institutional framework for self-employment assistance delivery is
inefficient. Nonetheless, he asserts that Canada’s SEA program is a good thing. It is achieving its
purpose and making a difference to a significant group of people, turning them into net producers
and thereby reducing the number of people who act as a continuous draw on the resources of
Canadian society.
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Germany. Pffeifer and Reize (1999) compare firm survival and employment growth in
subsidized start-ups by unemployed persons with firm survival and employment growth in
subsidized start-ups by nonunemployed persons. The study was done using data from four
länder in eastern Germany and eleven länder in western Germany soon after reunification. The
start-up subsidy for the unemployed was provided by the Work Support Act. The empirical
analysis is based on a sample of new start-ups established between 1993 and 1995. Data on
German start-ups was compiled from administrative records by the research institute of the
German public employment service (IAB/BA) and included 9,613 start-ups, of which 618
received a start-up allowance for the unemployed; of these, 4,311 and 395, respectively, were in
the eastern länder. The model for empirical estimation is a survival equation including an
endogenous indicator variable for receipt of a start-up subsidy. The auxiliary equation predicting
receipt of a start-up subsidy includes the following as instruments: legal form of ownership;
industry type; and sex, age, and age squared of the business leader. In eastern Germany, firm
survival is longer among subsidized start-ups, and receipt of the subsidy is correlated with a
slightly higher mean hiring rate. In the western part of Germany, subsidized start-ups survive at
a rate similar to unsubsidized start-ups but have a slightly higher mean employment growth rate.
Hungary. O’Leary (1998) evaluated the effectiveness of self-employment assistance to
the unemployed in Hungary based on a census of more than 1,000 SEA recipients during the first
three calendar quarters of 1996 in half of the twenty counties in Hungary. Opposite this
population was a comparison group created as matched pairs from a larger random sample of
more than 3,000 unemployed persons registered as job seekers with the public employment
service at the same time.15 Matching was done without replacement by the minimum sum of
squared distance on characteristics. The variables used for matching were age, sex, educational
attainment, job separation reason, occupation, and county of residence. The SEA in Hungary was
provided as a series of up to 18 monthly payments in amount and procedure similar to
unemployment compensation, like in the British model for SEA. Follow-up surveys were
conducted about 24 months after inflow to UI and about 12 months after completion of SEA.
Impact estimates computed in regression models adjusting for observed characteristics suggest
that SEA raised the probability of being employed on the survey date by 21 percentage points
and shortened UI receipt by 1.6 months, but lowered earnings by an equivalent of $26 per month
relative to the comparison group mean of $142. In Hungary, SEA was more effective for those
who were older, were vocational or high school graduates, or were working in high
unemployment areas.
Poland. O’Leary (1998) evaluated the effectiveness of self-employment assistance to the
unemployed in Poland based on a census of 709 SEA recipients in 8 of the 49 voivodships in the
country. These eight included four of the most populous voivodships and one-quarter of the
nation’s population. SEA participation occurred during 1993 and 1994. Interviews were
conducted with participant and comparison samples between February and April 1997, so the
results reflect a longer term follow-up than observed in other evaluations. The comparison group
was created as matched pairs from the inflow to the public register of unemployed at the same
15

The nation of Hungary includes a total of 20 counties (megye) as political administrative districts.
Samples were drawn from 10 counties chosen to span the range of economic conditions in the country.
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time. Additional variables used for matching were age, sex, educational attainment, job
separation reason, occupation, and county of residence.16 The SEA in Poland was provided as a
lump sum as in the French SEA model, except the sum is a loan that must be repaid to the
national labour office. Impact estimates computed in regression models adjusting for observed
characteristics suggest that SEA raised the probability of being employed on the survey date by
29 percentage points and lengthened UI receipt by 3.65 months, but raised monthly earnings by
an equivalent of $69 per month relative to the comparison group mean of $193. In Poland SEA
was more effective for females, those with less than three years of work experience, blue collar
workers, and those who were unemployed fewer than six months. In addition to having to repay
the loan, the personal contribution to start-up funds was tracked, and outcomes were found to be
improved for those contributing more to the self-employment project.
Sweden. Carling and Gustafson (1999) estimated the effects of SEA relative to
subsidized jobs in Sweden. They used a census of data from administrative records on all
participants in SEA and subsidized work for an 18-month period starting in June 1995.
Controlling for participant characteristics, they estimated that SEA participants had a
significantly lower risk of reunemployment compared to those who got subsidized jobs. The
1990s rise in unemployment in Sweden induced the government to increase enrollment in SEA
relative to subsidized work, on the premise that the newly unemployed included a large share of
skilled workers. Furthermore, SEA was targeted at women and immigrants, in hopes of helping
those particular groups. Carling and Gustafson (1999) studied the census of 18-month program
inflows for SEA and subsidized jobs starting in June 1995. To identify the effect parameter,
Carling and Gustafson (1999, p. 21) first estimated a simple model with the endogenous program
indicator for self-employment relative to subsidized work. They estimated a huge effect for selfemployment to reduce the hazard of unemployment (–0.927),; the effect estimate gets smaller in
magnitude as the effect is incrementally identified by sequentially adding covariates to reach a
final estimate at (–0.752). The control variables included individual demographic characteristics,
geographic region of Sweden, labour market conditions, and local employment office indicators.
They tracked outcomes through March 1999 and found the beneficial effects of SEA to be
similar for men and women who were native Swedes, but they found no reliable evidence of
beneficial effects of SE for unemployed immigrants in Sweden.
United States. A recent microenterprise evaluation study, Growing America through
Entrepreneurship (GATE), studied the value of helping new entrepreneurs in rural and urban
communities start and expand their own small businesses (Benus et al. 2008). Evidence from the
GATE evaluation added to information about providing self-employment assistance through the
UI program that was tested through field experiments in Massachusetts and Washington State
during the late 1980s (Benus et al. 1995).
GATE enrollment was done between fall 2003 and summer 2005 in seven urban and rural
sites in the states of Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Maine. GATE was available to any person
16

Matching was done without replacement by the minimum sum of the squared distance measure. The
characteristics used for matching were age, educational attainment level, gender, months of work experience, date of
registration with the employment office as unemployed, and local labour office where registered as unemployed.
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over age 18 who was lawfully able to work in the United States, whether employed or
unemployed, and who was interested in starting or expanding a small business. GATE
participation required three things: 1) registration either at a GATE kiosk at a One-Stop Career
Center, at the GATE Web site, by mailing a postcard, or by calling a toll-free number; 2)
attendance at an orientation session at a One-Stop Career Center; and 3) completion of an
application package mailed to the evaluation contractor. GATE offered three services: 1) an
individual assessment session; 2) training in a variety of relevant topics, including general
business, legal and personnel issues, and business accounting computer software; and 3)
individual meetings with business counselors about business plans and loan applications. Each
participant could decide to receive any or all of the three services.
A total of 4,198 GATE applicants were randomly assigned to either the treatment or the
control group. Control group members were not prevented from receiving other self-employment
services available in the community. Therefore, this evaluation addresses the policy-relevant
question: What is the effect of adding GATE to the array of self-employment services already
offered in the community? Outcomes were measured through telephone follow-up surveys
conducted at 6 and 18 months after random assignment. A total of 3,450 interviews were
completed after 6 months (with an 82 percent response rate); of these, 3,039 were interviewed 18
months after enrollment. For the evaluation, the follow-up survey data were merged with
administrative records on UI payments and quarterly wage records covering the 12 months
before and after random assignment.
Project GATE generated a small but significant impact on business ownership in the 18month follow-up. By the third quarter after random assignment, 43 percent of the program group
reported owning a business, a statistically significant 6 percentage points more than the
comparison group. The advantage for participants dwindled to 3 percentage points (statistically
significant at the 10 percent level) at the 18-month follow-up. There were no significant effects
on total employment (self-employment plus wage and salary employment), with rates at about 70
percent in the first quarter after random assignment and 85 percent 18 months after random
assignment. However, compared to the control group, GATE participants were more likely to be
self-employed and less likely to be employed in wage and salary jobs.
Control group members earned slightly more than participants from wage and salary jobs
and about the same through self-employment, so that GATE participants earned somewhat less
during the 18-month follow-up. The wage and salary difference was $1,800 based on the survey,
but only $200 less based on UI quarterly wage records (not statistically significant). Both groups
earned about $6,000 over the 18-month follow-up period. GATE increased receipt of UI benefits
by about one week, or about $340 per person for all participants and $605 for those already
receiving UI benefits when they applied to GATE. There were no program impacts on the
receipt of public assistance or other income.
The GATE design in Minnesota was similar in many respects to Self-Employment
Assistance (SEA) provided in some states through the UI program. While the Minnesota sample
size was quite small (n = 459), GATE dramatically increased the probability of owning a
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business during the 18-month period after random assignment. There was also a strong positive
effect on total employment. During the second half of the follow-up period (Q4–Q6), recent UI
claimants in Minnesota experienced strong and statistically significant employment gains relative
to the control group (7 to 9 percentage points). Control group members earned more than
participants from wage and salary jobs, with an average quarterly difference of $350 in the first
three quarters but no difference in the next three quarters. There was no impact on selfemployment earnings, but there was increased receipt of UI benefits.
In Minnesota, GATE increased UI receipt by three weeks over the follow-up period and
increased the amount of UI benefits received by about $1,240 per person. GATE had no impacts
on the receipt of public assistance or other income. Furthermore, GATE had no impacts on the
likelihood of receiving public assistance, the amount of public assistance benefits received,
household income, or the earnings of the entrepreneur’s spouse. In total, the results for recent UI
claimants in Minnesota indicate positive impacts on business formation and employment but
negative effects on earnings and UI receipt.
Overall, the GATE study suggests the following: self-employment services can be
effectively offered at One-Stop Career Centers; self-employment services are readily available
even in the absence of GATE; increased business ownership might not lead to increased selfemployment earnings in the short run; self-employment can lead to a loss of earnings from wage
and salary jobs in the short run; self-employment programs have larger impacts on UI recipients;
and 18 months is too short for a follow-up to determine the long-term effectiveness of GATE.
The Massachusetts UI Self-Employment Demonstration evaluated the effectiveness of
SEA for unemployed workers who are likely to exhaust their UI benefits (Benus et al. 1995).
The evaluation involved random assignment, with half the eligible UI claimants receiving selfemployment services (the treatment group) and the other half receiving regular UI services (the
control group). Enrollment in the experiment started in May 1990 and ended in May 1993. Only
about 2 percent of targeted UI claimants met the initial demonstration requirements of attending
an orientation and submitting an application. A total of 614 UI claimants were assigned
treatment, and 608 assigned to the control group. Following the British model, the
Massachusetts experiment provided weekly cash payments at the level of regular UI for the
remainder of the entitled duration if self-employment efforts were continued. Follow-up
telephone surveys were conducted at an average of 19 and 31 months after random assignment.
Compared to the control group, the treatment group was more likely to have the following
results: at least one self-employment experience during the observation period; about 1.5 months
more in self-employment; no significant difference in earnings from self-employment; no
significant difference in the likelihood of having a wage and salary job during the observation
period; approximately one month more of having worked than controls in wage and salary
employment; significantly more earnings than controls from wage and salary employment;
positive impacts on the likelihood of employment (in either wage and salary or self-employment)
during the follow-up period; positive impacts on the likelihood of employment (in either wage
and salary or self-employment) at the time of the follow-up survey; positive impacts on total
time employed (in either wage and salary or self-employment) during the observation period;
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positive impacts on combined wage and salary and self-employment earnings; positive impacts
on employment; reduced length of the first unemployment spell; reduced UI benefit receipt
during the benefit year; increased likelihood of self-employment and accelerated entry into
employment; and positive effects on total earnings, largely driven by large, positive impacts on
wage and salary earnings, rather than by impacts on self-employment earnings.
Self-employment assistance in the Massachusetts experiment increased business start-ups
among project participants, reduced the length of their unemployment, and increased their total
time in employment—which includes self-employment plus wage and salary jobs. The
experiment also had a substantial positive impact on participants’ earnings. When placed into a
benefit-cost framework, the self-employment assistance program model proved to be costeffective for project participants and society as a whole. It proved cost-effective to the
government sector as well. Overall, the self-employment assistance provided in the
demonstration significantly increased participants' total time in employment (i.e., the
combination of self-employment and wage and salary employment) after having been randomly
assigned to the project. Including time spent both on self-employment and wage and salary
employment, participants were employed 1.9 months longer than the control group. Total
earnings from all sources for the comparison since random assignment averaged $10,056.
Controlling for differences in observable characteristics, the self-employment treatment
increased average earnings for participants by $5,940 over the thirty-one month follow-up
period.17
The Washington UI Self-Employment Demonstration (SEED) involved randomassignment enrollment to treatment and control groups in Washington State between September
1989 and September 1990, with business services available to participants through March 1991
(Benus et al. 1995). A total of 755 new claimants were enrolled in SEED at the six sites and were
offered demonstration services; 752 new claimants who applied to SEED were assigned to the
control group. The SEED treatment followed the French-style lump sum, with the offer being the
remainder of a UI beneficiary’s entitlement at the start of self-employment efforts along with
business start-up and development efforts. The first Washington telephone survey was
conducted, on average, 21 months after random assignment.
Only about 4 percent of targeted Washington UI claimants met the initial eligibility
requirements of attending an orientation and submitting an application. Compared to the control
group, treatment subjects had the following results: they spent about 4.0 months more in selfemployment; earned more than controls from self-employment during the follow-up period; had
reduced likelihood of wage and salary employment; spent about one month less in wage and
salary employment.; earned significantly less from wage and salary employment; had similar
earnings from wage and salary and self-employment during the observation period; had higher
rates of employment; reduced the length of the first unemployment spell; excluding the lump17

Impacts were estimated in regression models controlling for observable characteristics: age, race, sex,
educational attainment, on employer stand-by awaiting job recall, prior earnings quartile, prof/tech/mgr occupation,
service industry, site location, quarter of UI benefit year begin (BYB) date, local unemployment rate at BYB (Benus
1995, p. B-214).
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sum payment, had reduced UI benefit receipt during the first benefit year; and including the
lump-sum payment, had higher total UI payments during the first benefit year.
3.4.3.4 Summary of Self-Employment Assistance
Self-employment accounts for about 15 percent of total employment in Europe and 10
percent in the United States. Some transitions to self-employment are permanent and result in
secondary job creation through hiring within microenterprises. For others, self-employment is
transitory and is followed by lower future employment rates and earnings in wage and salary
jobs. In the United States, relative to continued wage employment, brief spells in selfemployment do not increase average hourly earnings, reduce the chances of returning to
employment in the wage sector, and increase the likelihood of future part-time work. However,
these consequences are small compared to similar experiences in unemployment. Overall, men
fared better following a spell of self-employment than did women.
Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) programs operate in most OECD countries.
However, only about 2 percent of total active labour market budgets are spent on selfemployment. In the United States, only seven states have active programs, and no state has had
more than 1,000 participants in any year. Several countries conducted evaluations of SEA
operated as an alternative to continued receipt of UI benefits. Some evaluations identified the
program treatment by random assignment, while others were observational studies that used
either or both, matching on characteristics and regression adjustment for observables. Nearly all
evaluations found positive impacts of SEA. These included a higher rate of engagement in selfemployment activity and higher earnings from self-employment. Many studies also found
evidence that SEA was associated with higher total income after participation; this was often due
to wage and salary income. This finding suggests that SEA had benefits for regular employment
in the job market. The SEA intervention was not always associated with lower UI benefit
payment costs, but targeting to those expected to be long-term unemployed improves this
outcome. SEA tended to be most successful for its typical target population: older, experienced,
more educated, and having higher levels of personal assets. Indeed, programs requiring personal
contributions for partial costs of business start-up tended to be successful.
A main shortcoming of existing evaluations is the short duration after intervention when
outcomes were measured. Just as for measuring small business start-up success, business
survival, income, and hiring should be checked annually for at least five years. Proprietorships
lasting at least five years have a high probability of achieving long-term success.
3.4.4

Job Creation Partnerships (JCPs)

Other countries have tried direct job creation efforts in various forms. Generally, the
programs operated as public works or public service employment have income transfer as the
main objective. Corollary aims may be to develop workplace behavior skills, arrest the
deterioration of such skills, and contribute to social capital or public welfare. Program
participants are commonly either long-term unemployed or at high risk of long-term
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unemployment, these include youths and minorities potentially facing discrimination. A key
question for measuring outcomes of direct job creation is whether the work experience can
qualify one for unemployment compensation.
Public service employment (PSE) programs provide a fixed amount of funding to a
government agency or not-for-profit organization to employ unemployed individuals, typically
disadvantaged persons who have difficulty finding unsubsidized employment. These programs
are also referred to as direct job creation programs. There are two primary differences between
PSE programs and wage subsidy or supplement programs. The first is that PSE programs are
typically for government or not-for-profit jobs, although there are exceptions, whereas wage
subsidy programs target primarily private-sector jobs. The second is that PSE programs provide
funding to support the entire employment cost of an individual, whereas wage subsidy programs
provide funding for only a portion of it. It should also be mentioned that in many cases PSEsupported workers are paid minimum wage and usually do not receive benefits.
Some countries place a greater emphasis on PSE programs than others. For example, of
the 27 OECD countries for which data are available for 2007, four countries—the Netherlands,
Ireland, Belgium, and France—spent the highest percentage of GDP on direct job creation
(OECD, 2009). Belgium emphasizes direct job creation much more than the others, spending
0.34 percent of GDP on PSE programs. In contrast, in 2007 the United States and Canada spent
only 0.02 percent of GDP on these programs.
There are typically three types of PSE programs. The first is designed to provide
employment during severe economic downturns or in severely economically distressed areas.
The purpose in both cases is to reduce unemployment and provide workers with the means to
support their families. Improving long-term earnings or employment prospects is not the
primary goal. In its purest form, this category of PSE program is generally open to anyone
having difficulty finding employment. However, rarely does this type of program have such an
open-door eligibility policy; more typically, it is restricted to hard-to-employ populations. One
example of a program that falls into this category is the Summer Youth Employment Program in
the United States, which provides minimum-wage, subsidized jobs to economically
disadvantaged youth throughout the country. The program began in 1964 as part of the War on
Poverty initiative and continues today under the Workforce Investment Act. Another example is
the German public employment program (PEP), which was instituted to help reduce the high
unemployment rate in the former East Germany after reunification occurred in 1990. PEP
participants were employed by government agencies as well as private-sector establishments in
various industries.
A second type of PSE program is targeted to specific population subgroups who have
great difficulty finding unsubsidized employment. Here the goals are to provide work
experience and perhaps skills training, along with short-term aid and income, through subsidized
employment. An example that combines this category with the previous one is the New Hope
Project in Milwaukee, which guarantees work to anyone living in a very poor section of the city.
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The third category includes mandatory work programs. These programs are usually
associated with welfare programs, which offer cash benefits to employable recipients over a long
period of time. In response to public concern that some able-bodied persons are living off the
taxpayer’s dollar, some states have required beneficiaries to participate in mandatory work
programs while they receive benefits. The goal is to ensure that aid recipients meet their social
obligation to earn their income, while still providing aid to those who need it. An example of
such a program is New York City’s Work Experience Program, which assigns welfare recipients
to subsidized positions in sponsoring New York City agencies (Ellwood and Welty, 1999).
The advantage of PSE programs is that they are simple and direct. The limitation is that
by their very nature, they do not necessarily increase the attractiveness of employing
disadvantaged persons. Consequently, the likelihood of PSE participants transitioning into
unsubsidized jobs after they leave PSE programs is minimal, unless the work experience and
perhaps training (if offered) enhances their employability. Another disadvantage is the potential
worker substitution, or displacement effect. Government agencies or not-for-profit organizations
have an incentive to use the PSE funds to hire disadvantaged workers they may have hired
anyway. PSE workers also have the potential to crowd out (displace) private-sector workers.
While having no direct effect on private-sector employers, PSE programs may have an indirect
effect by reducing the availability of disadvantaged workers for private-sector jobs and by
increasing their wages as the pool of unemployed persons shrinks. In addition, if PSE programs
are financed through taxes, higher tax rates may indirectly affect firm behavior. Another indirect
effect of PSE is the low output and productivity of the workers filling these positions, since the
primary purpose of PSE jobs is to employ those who are not likely to be employed in an
unsubsidized job. In some cases, the PSE job positions are designed to do work that government
agencies or not-for-profit organizations need done, and thus place value on that work. Ideally,
the person filling the position can meet the qualifications of the job—maybe not immediately,
but quickly enough to be of value to the organization. At the other extreme, the job is a makework job, which has little value to the company but which gives the position holder some
experience in a workplace setting and occupies his or her idle time.
3.4.4.1 Program design
PSE program design differs considerably across programs. Some PSE programs are
confined to creating jobs in the government and not-for-profit sectors, while others include the
private, for-profit sector (e.g., Germany’s PEP and Belgium’s Progression to Work program).
Some programs include training and labour market support along with the subsidized
employment (e.g., France’s New Start program and the Netherlands’ “Offer for All” strategy).
PSE programs also differ in the population groups they target. Some programs, particularly
those that are implemented in recessions or in economically distressed areas, include a broad
range of participants. Others target narrow subpopulation groups, such as disadvantaged youth
in the case of the United States’ Youth Summer Employment Program. Another dimension of
program design is the time in a worker’s unemployment spell in which he or she enrolls in a PSE
program. Typically programs target the longer-term unemployed. Evaluation results offer
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insight into the design of PSE programs that improves the effectiveness of the programs and
minimizes displacement effects.
3.4.4.2 Employment effects of PSE
Since the primary purpose of most PSE programs is to find employment for the
unemployed, the outcome of interest for PSE programs is the employment of participants. Most
evaluations consider two types of employment effects on participants: in-program and afterprogram. There is no doubt that a participant of a PSE program is employed during his or her
period of participation. The issue is whether PSE programs contribute to employment of
participants after they exit the program. There is also a macro or general equilibrium dimension
to the employment effects of PSE programs, and that is the possibility of positive or negative
interactions between program participants and other employed or unemployed workers. These
were described earlier as displacement or substitution effects. However, the focus of most
evaluations has been on estimating the short-term employment effects of PSE programs for the
treated populations, disregarding the possibility of general equilibrium effects.
Employment effects on the treated. Results from more than two dozen evaluations of
the PSE programs, mostly within European countries, suggest that participation in PSE programs
reduces the likelihood of unsubsidized employment after exiting the program. 18 Of the 25
evaluations of PSE programs in 12 European countries, nearly four-fifths find negative or
statistically insignificant results. Roughly half of these 25 studies used matching techniques to
construct comparison groups. The other half used either duration models or OLS regression
adjustment. None of the European studies used experimental design. However, the evaluation
methodology did not appear to influence the results. For each method, about three-quarters of
the evaluations yielded negative or statistically insignificant results. Kluve (2010), in conducting
a meta-analysis of 139 evaluations of European active labour market programs, concludes that
“evaluations of direct employment programs are significantly less likely to estimate significant
positive impacts, and more likely to estimate significant negative results,” relative to training
programs (p. 913). A World Bank study came to a similar conclusion, particularly with respect
to after-program effects, when considering PSE programs in developed countries: “The majority
of evaluations show that participants are no better off, and may be worse off, in terms of finding
employment after the program” (Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar 2004, p. 48). Their critique of 20
studies of programs in developed countries found that only 7 of the studies showed positive
impacts on employment and none showed positive impacts on earnings.
German Reunification Work Support. Probably one of the more studied PSE
programs is the attempt by the German government to reduce high unemployment in eastern
Germany after reunification.19 Disparities between the labour markets in the western and eastern
18

One explanation for the negative postprogram effect is the stigma placed on workers for participating in a
direct employment program. This is likely similar to the stigma effect associated with participating in wage subsidy
programs.
19
At least eight evaluations have been conducted to date, including Steiner and Kraus (1995), Hubler
(1997), Bergemann et al. (2000), Kraus, Puhani, and Steiner (2000), Eichler and Lechner (2002), Cliendo, Hujer,
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regions of Germany prompted the government to provide public service employment in eastern
Germany through the reform of the Work Support Act. Potential participants in the public
employment program (PEP) have to be long-term unemployed (more than one year) or
unemployed for at least six months within the last twelve months and have to be eligible for
unemployment compensation. Participants in PEP are not directly employed as a regular
employee nor paid by the labour office. Rather they have an employment contract with a
program-supporting employer, which can be a public institution, a private non-profit
organization, or a firm. Normally, between 50 and 75 percent of the wages are covered, with
100 percent covered in special cases. Such special cases are common in eastern Germany, and
because of the high or complete subsidies, the PEPs in this case look more like PSEs than wage
subsidies.
Participation in a PEP is typically limited to 12 months, although both shorter and longer
(up to 24 months and, under special conditions, up to 36 months) durations are observed. During
their time in the program, participants are paid the going wage for that particular position, which
in nearly all cases is higher than unemployment benefits. PEP also pays social security
contributions, which could create new rights for unemployment benefits. An individual leaves a
PEP when it ends, and it is possible, and desired, that the firm subsequently employs that person
without a subsidy. Furthermore, an individual must leave a PEP immediately to take up a job
offer in an unsubsidized job if one is proposed by the labour office.
The evaluations use a variety of methods, including discrete hazard rate models,
matching, and hybrid approaches. Most studies look at the employment status of participants
after they have left the program. The length of time the evaluations follow their employment
status varies but can be as long as 36 months after the treatment.
Results vary across evaluations. Steiner and Kraus (1995) find that relative to
nonparticipants, male PEP participants have a higher employment probability 12 months after
PEP participation. Eichler and Lechner (2002) also find positive results: their findings suggest
that individuals participating in PEP substantially reduce their risk of unemployment in both the
short run and long run and for both men and women. For men, the majority of the reduced
unemployment risk results from an increased employment probability; for women, it is because
women drop out of the labour market. The other studies find negative or insignificant results.
For example, Kraus, Puhani, and Steiner (2000), in a later paper than Steiner and Kraus’s above,
and using a different methodology, find a significant negative effect to PEP participation.
Hubler (1997) concludes that PEP participation does not create the expected positive effects,
although results differ according to the methodologies and specifications used. Hujer, in several
papers coauthored with Caliendo and Thomsen, generally finds negative or statistically
insignificant effects for PEPs.
U.S. National Supported Work Demonstration. Random assignment experiments
involving PSE programs are very limited and are basically confined to programs in the United
States. The three programs that were evaluated using this methodology—1) the Supported Work
and Thomsen (2004), Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen (2004), and Hujer and Thomsen (2006).
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Program, 2) the AFDC Homemaker Home Health Aide Program, and 3) the Community Work
Experience Programs—were conducted in the 1970s and 1980s and are no longer in operation.
The results of the evaluations suggest that PSE programs are generally more effective for adult
women than for adult men and for youth.
To highlight the nature of supported work programs and their impacts, let us consider the
National Supported Work Demonstration in more detail. The supported work program provided
individuals who had severe employment problems with work experience of a year or so under
close supervision in work groups. Four hard-to-employ groups were included in the national
demonstration: 1) women on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (the U.S. welfare
program, now called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), 2) ex-addicts, 3) ex-offenders,
and 4) young school dropouts, often with criminal records or histories of delinquency. The goal
of the program was to provide work experience to these groups so that they would be better
prepared to join the labour force and do productive, meaningful work, cease engaging in socially
destructive or dependent behavior, and become self-supporting members of society. The
program was a five-year demonstration operated by nonprofit organizations at 15 sites beginning
in 1975. During the period of operation, 10,000 participants went through the program.
To evaluate whether this program accomplished these goals, a random assignment
experiment was performed. A total of 6,616 individuals were included in the random
assignment experiment: 3,214 were participants and 3,402 were controls. Each person in the
sample received a baseline interview and up to four successive interviews at nine-month
intervals. The results are reported by the four subgroups listed in the preceding paragraph:
AFDC Group. To be eligible for this program, a person had to be female, on AFDC for
30 of the last 36 months, and have no children under 6 years old. The average age of AFDC
participants was 34, all but 5 percent were black or Hispanic, and fewer than one-third were high
school graduates. The evaluation showed that in months 25–27 the experimental group’s
employment rate was 20 percent above that of the control group, hours worked by participants in
the experimental group were 35 percent higher, and their earnings exceeded those of the controls
by almost 50 percent. This differential persisted for wage rates even during the time the
experimentals were employed in supported work programs. After month 12, when increasing
numbers left the program, the difference between the wage rates of the experimentals and the
controls began to rise.
Ex-Addict Group. Both the participants and the control group were selected from those
participating in drug treatment programs. Almost all had used heroin, and the majority were
young black or Hispanic males who had dropped out of high school. The evaluation found that
during and after their time in the supported work program, the experimentals were substantially
less involved in criminal activity than were members of the control group. Employment and
earnings of the experimental group improved perceptibly over those of the control group after the
27th month. The reason that this improvement did not occur earlier may be related to the
difficulty and, hence, delay that many ex-addicts experienced in finding employment after
leaving the supported work program.
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Ex-Offender Group. Eligibility for the ex-offender group required an individual to have
been incarcerated as a result of a conviction within the past six months. Participants were
predominantly young black or Hispanic males, nearly half of whom had not worked in a fulltime job in the previous 24 months. The evaluation showed that the program had little effect on
the participant group over the control group. Participants had a somewhat better employment
and earnings record after 27 months, but the difference was not statistically significant. Unlike
the ex-addicts, the ex-offenders who had participated in the program did not show any reduction
in criminal behavior. Furthermore, ex-offenders dropped out of the program at a relatively high
rate; their average length of stay was 5.2 months.
Youth Group. Eligibility was limited to young people between the ages of 17 and 20
years who had dropped out of school. Half of the enrollees had a record of delinquency or crime.
For the youth group, supported work had no long-term impact on the earnings, employment,
criminal activity, or drug abuse of the participant group over the control group. The evaluation
results did suggest that the program was more beneficial for younger youth than for older youth.
One reason for the lack of success was the difficulty in engaging youth in the program. Many
youths found it difficult to decide what kind of work to do, and they seemed to quickly tire of
their jobs and left the program.
Effects by subgroups from other studies. Several studies of PSEs have examined their
effect on subgroups, mostly on youth and on men and women. Five of the 25 European studies
looked at the effects of PSE programs that focus on youth. Only one, a program in France in the
1980s, showed positive effects. The other four programs yielded negative or statistically
insignificant results. Several U.S. PSE programs focused on youth, but also with mixed results.
Participants of the Summer Youth Employment Program were slightly more likely to work the
following year, but no long-term gains were observed (Crane and Ellwood, 1984). Evaluations
of the Youth Corps found no statistically significant postprogram earnings or employment
impact. However, there was some evidence of positive effects for African American, Hispanic,
and white female participants (Jastrzab, Masker, Blomquist and Orr, 1997).
Effects of PSE by gender are generally more favorable for women than for men. For all
four evaluations of European programs, listed in Table 10, the estimated effects for men never
exceed those for women. However, only one study, by Eichler and Lechner (2002), actually
showed positive results for women, in that their unemployment rates declined after leaving the
program. Yet in the long run this was due more to their leaving the workforce than to their
increasing employment, and this result is hardly the program’s intent. The other three studies
found that the negative effects were not as strong for women as for men. Evaluations of U.S.
programs in general show stronger results for women than for men, in terms of both youth and
adults. For example, adult and young women in the CETA PSE program had higher earnings
after leaving the program, but adult and young men had lower earnings. For the Support Work
Program, AFDC recipients, who were nearly all women, experienced much higher postprogram
earnings impacts than did ex-offenders and ex-addicts, who are mostly men, although obviously
the latter two groups have additional employment barriers to overcome.
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Table 10 Summary of Evaluation Results of European PSE Programs
Country
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Finland
France
France
France
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Ireland
Netherlands
Norway
Norway
Norway
Poland
Slovak Rep.
Sweden
Sweden
Switzerland
UK

Evaluation study

Target
group

Graversen (2004)
Rosholm (1999)
Rosholm & Svarer (2004)
Natti et al. (2000)
Bonnal et al. (1997)
Youth
Brodaty et al. (2002)
Youth
Brodaty et al. (2002)
Youth
Bergemann et al. (2000)
Bergemann (2005)
Caliendo et al. (2004)
Eichler & Lechner (2002)
Hujer, Caliendo, & Radi (2004)
Hujer, Caliendo & Thomsen (2004)
Steiner and Kraus (1995)
Kraus, Puhani, & Steiner (2000)
Hubler (1997)
O’Connell & McGinnity (1997)
Youth
Ridder (1986)
Hardoy (2001)
Youth
Lorentzen & Dahl (2005)
Zhang (2003)
Kluve et al. (1999)
Van Ours (2001)
Frederiksson & Johansson (2003)
Sacklén (2002)
Gerfin & Lechner (2000)
Payne et al. (1996)

Observation
period
1994–1998
1983–1990
1998–2002
1990–1995
1986–1988
1995–1998
1986–1988
1990–1998
1990–1999
2000–2002
1992–1997
1995–1999
2000–2002
1990–1994
1990–1994
1990–1994
Early ’90s
Early ’80s
1989–1993
1992–1999
1990–2000
1992–1996
1993–1998
1993–1997
1991–1997
1997–1999
Early ’90s

Evaluation
method
Duration
Duration
Duration
OLS/selection
Duration
Matching
Matching
Matching
Matching
Matching
Matching
Matching
Matching
Matching
Duration
Matching
OLS/selection
Duration
OLS/selection
Matching
Duration
Matching
Duration
Matching
OLS/selection
Matching
Matching, early

Program effect
Overall
Subgroup
Negative
Insignificant
Negative
Negative
Insignificant
Negative
Positive
Negative
Positive
Negative
Positive
Insignificant
Negative
Positive
Negative
Negative
Insignificant
Positive
Insignificant
Insignificant
Insignificant
Negative
Insignificant
Negative
Positive
Negative
Insignificant

F>M

F>M
F>M
F>M

NOTE: Most studies cited in Kluve (2010). The notation “F>M” denotes that treatment is more effective (or less detrimental)
for females than for males.

3.4.4.3 Substitution and displacement effects
As previously mentioned, PSE participants may displace workers who are not in the
program. The extent of displacement depends upon the design of the program, particularly the
degree to which the program targets specific subgroups. The importance of the size of the
displacement effect depends upon the intent of the program. If the program is intended to effect
a countercyclical employment policy or one that targets workers in distressed areas for the
purpose of reducing unemployment, such as the German PEP program, then the size of the
displacement effect matters. A one-for-one displacement would negate any impact of the
program of putting more people to work. If the program is viewed as enacting an antipoverty
policy or one that targets hard-to-serve individuals, such as the National Supported Work
program, then as long as the targeted group is employed through the program, the displacement
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effect is of small consequence. However, after the individual leaves the latter type of program,
the displacement effect becomes a larger concern. If the program helps a hard-to-serve person
find employment after leaving the program, and the firm hiring the program leaver hires that
person instead of another hard-to-serve person who never went through the program, the
displacement reduces the long-run benefits of the program. On the other hand, if the firm hires a
hard-to-serve “graduate” of the program instead of hiring a higher-skilled person who did not go
through the program, then the intent of the program is served even though a more highly skilled
person is displaced.
Two methods have been used to estimate substitution. One involves asking questions of
program operators and supervisors and the other involves using econometric analysis. The more
rigorous and accepted approach is the latter. Unfortunately, only a relatively few studies have
examined substitution rates, far fewer than those that have evaluated participant outcomes.
Johnson and Tomola (1977) was one of the first studies to examine substitution rates using an
econometric approach. They examined possible displacement caused by the CETA PSE
program from 1966 through 1975. They found that for every 100 PSE slots, 31 existing workers
were displaced by the third quarter and 97 by the sixth quarter, which results in full displacement
after 18 months. Borus and Hamermesh (1978) disputed these results, showing that they were
unstable and sensitive to functional form. Yet the basic finding of high displacement remained.
After CETA was revised in 1976 to narrow the eligibility rules to include only low income and
longer-term unemployed, subsequent studies found somewhat lower substitution rates (Adams,
Cook, and Maurice 1983). A field study, chaired by Richard Nathan, concluded that substitution
rates were between 10 and 20 percent (Nathan et al. 1981). These estimates were based on
conversations with providers and examinations of fiscal patterns, not on econometric analysis.
The other program that has received considerable scrutiny with respect to substitution
effects is the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects (YIEPP), which offered high school
students a guaranteed part-time job during the school year and a full-time job during the summer.
The demonstration project was administered in the late 1970s. Two approaches were used to
estimate substitution rates: field research and econometric methods (Unicon 1982). Both
yielded consistent results. The field research found substitution rates of 57 percent in the private
sector, 28 percent in the nonprofit sector, and 21 percent in the public sector. The econometric
analysis found substitution rates of 47 percent in the private sector, 45 percent in the nonprofit
sector, and negligible displacement in the public sector.
A few studies outside the United States also estimate the displacement effects of PSE
programs. The two highlighted here examine Swedish PSE programs from the 1960s through
the 1980s, and both find displacement effects. Gramlich and Ysander (1981) focus on the two
largest categories of public relief expenditures and employment: 1) health and welfare workers
and 2) road construction workers. They find evidence of considerable displacement in road
construction, but not in health and welfare. Forslund and Krueger (1994) investigate the
displacement effects of public relief workers from 1976 to 1991 for construction workers, and
from 1982 to 1990 for health and welfare workers. Results for construction workers show a
negative and statistically significant effect: for every additional 100 public relief workers hired,
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69 fewer private construction workers are employed. However, the results for health and welfare
workers are much less clear.
3.4.4.4 Total displacement and private crowd-out effects
Most studies do not consider the other form of displacement, which is private crowd-out,
particularly for programs that provide subsidized jobs in only government or not-for-profit
sectors. One reason may be that PSE programs focus primarily on unemployed workers, who are
predominantly economically disadvantaged and are unlikely to be in demand in the private
sector. The private crowd-out effect is difficult to estimate. It requires estimates of the
economic parameters of supply and demand, which in turn depend on the target group and the
economic conditions. MDRC attempted to estimate the total displacement effect of the YIEPP
program for youth. They compared the employment and unemployment rates of youth in the
program with those for similar youth in comparison sites where the program was not instituted.
Before the program began, youth employment rates were comparable in the treatment and
control sites. MDRC found the total displacement rate averaged about 40 percent over the
course of the program. The rates differed by site. MDRC decomposed the total displacement
effect by sector and estimated a 55 percent displacement rate for the private sector and a 29
percent one for the public sector.
3.4.4.5 Value of output
For PSE programs that focus on creating jobs for individuals that firms are reluctant to
hire, either because of poor economic conditions or the participant’s lack of qualifications, the
issue is whether the program is simply paying for make-work jobs, or does it add value in the
products or services produced by the program participant? This issue is more important from a
benefit-cost standpoint, but it has been a consideration in gaining support for implementing a
PSE program and perhaps in providing relevant work, and thus work experience, for program
participants. Estimating the value of work is difficult when an outside entity, a government
program, is paying the wage bill. For public works programs, such as the Works Progress
Administration (WPA) of the 1930s which used the funds to build roads and bridges, as well as
the New York City Work Experience of the 1990s which used the funds to maintain city parks,
the answer is fairly simple. Many miles of roads were built under the WPA, and tangible
measures of cleaner and better-maintained parks were recorded as a result of the New York
program (Ellwood and Welty 1999). Other attempts at estimating the value of output involved
asking employers, assigning quantitative value to output produced, and using the retail value of
the good or service produced, if it is actually sold. Estimates have also been based on comparing
wages of regular employers with those of the program participants,. when it can be determined
that they perform similar tasks. Studies that have used this last method, such as the evaluation of
Youth Corps, came up with rather implausible results, as they found that the wages paid to youth
through the program were almost double the wages paid by the private sector.
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3.4.4.6 Summary
Public Service Employment programs provide subsidized employment to individuals who
have difficulty finding work in unsubsidized jobs. Europe emphasizes this form of active labour
market intervention more than the United States or Canada. Evaluations generally find that PSE
programs are not effective in helping program participants find unsubsidized jobs after they
leave the program. In addition, there are sizable displacement effects with many of the
programs. However, the program appears to be more effective for adult women than for adult
men and for youth. There are some features of the program that work better than others. In
some studies, participants with less work experience tend to have greater postprogram benefits.
Shortening the length of time participants are enrolled in the program appears to increase their
likelihood of finding unsubsidized employment. PSE programs tend to get better results when
they place participants with regular employers in jobs similar to unsubsidized ones. Evaluation
results also indicate that displacement effects can be mitigated by narrowing the eligible group to
those who are less likely to find regular employment, which may decrease the chances of those
persons to find unsubsidized employment after completing the program.
3.4.5

Employment Assistance Services (EAS)

In Canada, Employment Assistance Services (EAS) are normally used by job-ready
clients who need information about labour markets, help with job search, and access to tools
such as resume writing software and the Internet. These and other services are commonly
offered through public employment services in most developed countries. Access to such
services is normally unrestricted for any citizen legally entitled to work in a country. In
particular, access is not limited to eligible unemployment insurance (UI) beneficiaries.
Nonetheless, some evaluations of employment services (ES) do measure effectiveness in
conserving UI funds. This section provides a survey of results from studies evaluating the
effectiveness of widely accessible public employment services. The magnitudes of the net
impact are typically small, however—but then so too are the costs, making many of these
interventions socially beneficial.
Our survey of public employment services divides evaluation studies into the following
ten topic groups: 1) Job Interview Referrals and Job Placements, 2) Counseling, 3) Job Search
Assistance, 4) UI Work Test, 5) Mandatory Services, 6) Sanctions, 7) Targeted Job Search
Assistance, 8) Reemployment Incentives–Bonuses, 9) Reemployment Services to UI
Beneficiaries, and 10) Youth Employment Services. A summary of selected research evidence
on these topics is presented in Table 11.

65

Table 11. Summary of Evidence on the Effectiveness of Employment Services
Service
Employment Service
(ES) job interview
referrals

Evaluation method
NE: Controlled for observable
characteristics in regression
models.

Impact estimates
Increased earnings

Study location
Sites in 27 U.S. states

Authors (year)
Johnson et al.
(1983, 1985)

ES job search assistance NE: Controlled for observable
(JSA)
characteristics in regression
models.

Acts as a backstop
Pennsylvania
against long term U

Katz (1991)

ES referrals

NE: Controlled for observable
characteristics in regression
models.

−2.1 weeks UI

Washington

Jacobson & Petta
(2000)

ES referrals

NE: Controlled for observable
characteristics in regression
models.

−1.1 weeks UI

Oregon

Jacobson & Petta
(2000)

Job search counseling

RA: Among ES customers judged No impacts
in need of counseling, some
were randomly assigned to it

Florida, Minnesota,
Utah

Benus et al. (1977)

Job search counseling

NE: Controlled for observable
characteristics in regression
models.

No impacts

Sites in 27 U.S. states

Johnson et al.
(1981)

Job search counseling

NE: Controlled for observable
characteristics in regression
models of unemployment
duration.

7-percentage-point
France
reduction in 1-year
return to
unemployment

Job search counseling

RA: ES registrants referred or not, Increased search
Netherlands
with tests for homogeneity.
intensity and rate of
job finding
Impacts in duration models
with control variables.

Gorter and Kalb
(1996)

Job search assistance

RA: ES registrants referred or not, No impacts on exit to Netherlands (only
with tests for homogeneity.
employment, no
Amsterdam and
Impacts in duration models
differences between Rotterdam)
with control variables.
subgroups

Van den Berg and
van der Klaauw
(2006)

Stronger work test

RA: Regressions with controls.

−0.55 weeks UI

Charleston, SC

Corson et al.(1985)

Stronger work test plus
placement

RA: Regressions with control
variables for observables.

−0.61 weeks UI

Charleston, SC

Corson et al.(1985)

Stronger work test plus
placement and JSW

RA: Regressions with control
variables for observables.

−0.76 weeks UI

Charleston, SC

Corson et al.(1985)

Report 4 employer
contacts

RA: Regressions with control
variables for observables.

−0.70 weeks UI

Maryland

Klepinger et al.
(1998, 2002)

Make 2 employer
contacts but no
reporting

RA: Regressions with control
variables for observables.

0.40 weeks UI

Maryland

Klepinger et al.
(1998, 2002)

Make 2 employer
contacts plus JSW

RA: Regressions with control
variables for observables.

−0.60 weeks UI

Maryland

Klepinger et al.
(1998, 2002)

Make 2 employer
contacts, both
verified

RA: Regressions with control
variables for observables.

−0.90 weeks UI

Maryland

Klepinger et al.
(1998, 2002)
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Crepon et al. (2005)

Table 11. Summary of Evidence on the Effectiveness of Employment Services
Service

Evaluation method

Impact estimates
3.30 weeks UI

Study location

Remove the work test

RA: Regressions with control
variables for observables.

Remove the work test

Natural experiment, temporary
5.28-week increase in Northern Ireland—Job McVicar (2010)
closure of employment offices,
duration of JSA
seekers allowance
suspended reporting
(JSA) replaced “the
requirement.
dole”

Delay job search
assistance call-in

RA: Regressions with control
variables for observables.

Mandatory services

NE: Matching on observable
5.0-percentage-point
characteristics in similar labour
increase in job
market areas.
finding

Sanctions

NE: Selection bias correction for
endogenous sanction on exit
rate from employment

Job search assistance
(JSA)

RA: Regressions controlling for −0.47 weeks UI
individual characteristics local
offices, timing of enrollment.

New Jersey

Corson et al. (1989)

JSA plus training

RA: Regressions controlling for
observables, offices, timing.

−0.48 weeks UI

New Jersey

Corson et al. (1989)

JSA plus reemployment RA: Regressions controlling for
bonus
observables, offices, timing.

−0.97 weeks UI

New Jersey

Corson et al. (1989)

Structured job search

RA: Regressions controlling for
observables, offices, timing.

−1.13 weeks UI

D.C.

Decker et al. (2000)

Individual job search

RA: Regressions controlling for
observables, offices, timing.

−0.47 weeks UI

D.C.

Decker et al. (2000)

Individual job search
plus training

RA: Regressions controlling for
observables, offices, timing.

−0.61 weeks UI

D.C.

Decker et al. (2000)

Structured job search

RA: Regressions controlling for
observables, offices, timing.

−0.41 weeks UI

Florida

Decker et al. (2000)

Individual job search

RA: Regressions controlling for
observables, offices, timing.

−0.59 weeks UI

Florida

Decker et al. (2000)

Individual job search
plus training

RA: Regressions controlling for
observables, offices, timing.

−0.52 weeks UI

Florida

Decker et al. (2000)

Connecticut WPRS

NE: Regressions controlling for
observable characteristics.

−0.25 weeks UI

Connecticut

Dickinson et al.
(1999)

Illinois WPRS

NE: Regressions controlling for
observable characteristics.

−0.41 weeks UI

Illinois

Dickinson et al.
(1999)

Kentucky WPRS

NE: Regressions controlling for
observable characteristics.

−0.21 weeks UI

Kentucky

Dickinson et al.
(1999)

Kentucky WPRS

RA: With matching on
observables.

−2.20 weeks UI

Kentucky

Black et al. (2003)

Earlier call-in had
slightly shorter
unemployment
spells, and higher
earnings after five
years.

Tacoma, WA

Authors (year)
Johnson &
Klepinger (1991,
1994)

U.K. national sample
in the new “restart
program”

Dolton & O’Neill
(1996, 2002)

U.K. new deal for
young people

Blundell et al.
(2004)

58% male,
Netherlands response Abbring et al.
67% female increase in to 5–30% reduction
(2005)
job finding
in UI benefits
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Table 11. Summary of Evidence on the Effectiveness of Employment Services
Service

Evaluation method

Impact estimates

Study location

Authors (year)

New Jersey WPRS

NE: Regressions controlling for
observable characteristics.

−0.29 weeks UI

New Jersey

Dickinson et al.
(1999)

Maine WPRS

NE: Regressions controlling for
observable characteristics.

−0.98 weeks UI

Maine

Dickinson et al.
(1999)

Illinois UI bonus

RA: Regressions controlling for
observable characteristics.

−1.15 weeks UI

Illinois

Woodbury &
Spiegelman
(1987)

New Jersey UI bonus

RA: Regressions controlling for
observable characteristics.

−0.50 weeks UI

New Jersey

Corson et al. (1989)

Pennsylvania UI bonus

RA: Regressions controlling for
observable characteristics.

−0.69 weeks UI

Pennsylvania

Corson et al. (1992)

Washington UI bonus

RA: Regressions controlling for
observable characteristics.

−0.47 weeks UI

Washington

Spiegelman et al.
(1992)

Targeted UI bonus

RA: Regressions controlling for
observables, office, timing.

−0.75 weeks UI

Pennsylvania and
Washington

O’Leary et al.
(2005)

Reemployment and
eligibility
assessments (REA)

RA: Matching and regressions
controlling for observable
characteristics.

−1.2 weeks UI

Minnesota

Benus et al. (2008)

UI and ES in one-stop
centers

NE: Matching on observables and −1.8 weeks UI
regression adjustment using
other relevant variables.

Wisconsin

Almandsmith et al.
(2006)

Portugal

Centeno et al.
(2009)

NE: A natural experiment plus
Active labour market
programs for younger
regression adjustment on
and older
observables (after difference
unemployed
over time of dependent
variable).

Smaller effects for
youth, older, low
education

NOTE: RA= random assignment experiment, NE= nonexperimental , JSW means job search workshop. WPRS means
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services.

Job Interview Referrals and Job Placements. In the early 1980s, the U.S. Department
of Labor sponsored a nationwide evaluation of the effectiveness of the Employment Service:
Johnson et al. (1983, 1985) evaluatedES referrals to job interviews. The authors conducted
interviews with 8,000 new applicants in 30 ES offices in 27 states between July 1980 and May
1981, and did in-home follow-up interviews six to nine months later. Their strategy was to
compare those referred to an ES job interview with other ES registrants. They focused on the
following five outcomes: 1) time from ES application to first job, 2) earnings during the six
months after ES contact, 3) employment at the time of follow-up interview, 4) usual work hours
per week on the new job, and 5) wage rates.
Johnson and his colleagues recognized that receipt of an ES job interview referral is
likely a consequence of both individual and ES agency actions. They suggested that individual
motivation may distinguish who seeks out a service, and efforts by agency staff to achieve high
reemployment rates may amount to cream-skimming. Both these actions may cause the
participant samples to differ from nonparticipant samples. They asked baseline survey questions
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to permit construction of three indices: work ethic, lack of confidence, and efficacy in carrying
out plans. They used local office factors to create controls for staff referral practices.
Preliminary analysis comparing recipients of an ES job interview referral with
nonrecipients suggested differences among men as to prior earnings patterns, but no significant
differences in prior earnings among women. Those referred by the ES to job interviews also
scored higher on the baseline test of individual motivation, while those not referred were slightly
more advantaged in terms of having higher pre-ES earnings. Impact estimates were computed in
regression models controlling for the influence of demographics, financial resources, work
history, motivation, local office characteristics, and local labour market conditions.20
Large positive earnings gains were estimated for unemployed women, including all
subgroups of women. Among women an ES job referral was estimated to speed return to work
by 2.8 weeks, with an 11.1-percentage-point increase in the probability of employment on the
survey date six months after ES referral. Women with a referral were 7.4 percentage points less
likely to have dropped out of the labour force, and their earnings in six months were $325 more
than the $1,400 mean for the nonreferred. Among men, an ES job interview referral was
estimated to speed return to employment by three days, but the estimate was not statistically
significant. Men over age 45 and men in urban areas also had positive but statistically
insignificant effects. There were no estimated impacts for either sex on reemployment wage
rates. About the effects for women, the authors speculate that “part of the reason may be that
women have less labor market experience and less access to the traditional network of job
finding methods and that an ES referral constitutes more of a service for women” (Johnson et al.
1985, p. 136).
The National Commission for Employment Policy sponsored research that exploited an
uncommon feature of UI to estimate the effectiveness of ES for dislocated workers in
Pennsylvania (Katz 1991). The study used data on UI recipients in Pennsylvania during the
period from 1979 to 1987. Unlike in most states, in those years Pennsylvania claimants were not
required to register for job search with the ES. Program effects were estimated by comparing
labour market outcomes of ES users against those of nonusers of ES, so that program effects
were subject to selection biases. This study examined job search assistance (resume assistance,
job search workshops, job finding clubs, labour market information, and job search planning)
and job placements. Net impact estimates were computed in regression models controlling for
differences in observed characteristics.21 Job search assistance was most effective right after the
start of a spell of joblessness. Both job placements and referrals were found to be most effective
two or three calendar quarters after commencement of joblessness. The key insight gained from
this study has to do with the response to interventions at differing times in the jobless spell. The
20

They also tried Heckman selection bias correction procedures, but lacked instruments to predict receipt
of an ES service that were not also correlated with outcomes.
21
Error! Main Document Only.In addition to the indicator for ES service receipt, regression models
included control variables for age, sex, quarters of prior work experience, prior work in manufacturing, SMSA
unemployment rate, weekly UI benefit amount, exhausted UI benefits, number of weeks of UI benefits, and used ES
before joblessness.
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pattern that emerged led the study’s author to describe the ES as a “backstop,” or a job finding
path followed when others have yielded no appealing prospects: “The effectiveness of the ES
appeared to be much less a function of the characteristics of individual workers than the overall
length of their joblessness.” (Katz 1991, p. 21.)
Jacobson and Petta (2000) did an evaluation in Washington and Oregon that found
employment service job placements most effective for those with a strong record of job
attachment, affording evidence that job search assistance would be an appropriate intervention
for dislocated workers. The data for Washington consisted of survey data on 587 job seekers
who used the public labour exchange in the first half of 1998, plus administrative data on
328,815 jobless spells that occurred between 1987 and the middle of 1995. The Oregon data
were based on administrative records for 138,280 jobless spells in 1995. An analysis of job
placements using the Washington survey data suggested differences in impacts across ES
customers depending on their recent pattern of job attachment. For job seekers characterized as
having a spotty work record, the impact of a job placement was estimated to be large, while the
impact estimate was even larger for those with a strong work record. The analysis of
administrative data was done in regression models controlling for observable variables including
demographic characteristics, work history, history of recent UI claims duration and exhaustion,
and local labour market conditions. The impact of job referrals based on the Washington
administrative data was estimated to be −2.1 weeks, and the estimate based on the Oregon data
was −1.1 weeks. Concern about the degree to which the Washington and Oregon ES evaluations
were externally valid regarding displacement led to a related study. Davidson and Woodbury
(1993, 2000) used a computerized simulation model of the labour market called a general
equilibrium search and matching model. They calibrated the model with labour market data from
Washington state and with impact estimates of Washington public labour exchange (PLX)
services (Jacobson and Petta 2000). “The crowding-out effects of PLX referral and placement
activities are small both absolutely and relative to the increases in employment that result from
PLX activities . . . the benefits generated by PLX referral and placement activities outweigh the
costs. The benefits, again, are twofold: shorter unemployment spells for PLX users and general
improvements in the labour market that result from PLX activities” (Davidson and Woodbury
2000, pp. 19–20).
Counseling. Benus et al. (1977) conducted the first scientific evaluation of employment
counseling in the United States as a small field experiment in which individuals judged to be in
need of counseling were randomly assigned to receive it or not; both groups received normal
placement services, and the treatment group received additional counseling. Study sites (and
sample sizes) were Minneapolis (215), Salt Lake City (278), and West Palm Beach (204). The
study authors concluded that counseling had no significant impact on duration of unemployment,
employment earnings, job search effectiveness, job satisfaction, or occupational prestige.
The results from Benus et al. (1977) are consistent with evidence from a national survey
of the counseling program conducted by Johnson et al. (1981). Terry Johnson and colleagues
surveyed ES staff in 30 offices around the country in 27 different states. Counseling supervisors
reported that counselors were primarily evaluated on the quality of the counseling records kept,
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the size of their caseloads, and their communication and relationship skills. Many fewer
supervisors indicated that counselors were evaluated on ES services provided to job seekers or
the results of those services. Johnson et al. (1983) reported impact estimates from their national
evaluation of several employment services in the United States. Impact estimates were computed
in regression models controlling for the influence of demographic, financial, work history,
motivation, local office characteristics, and local labour market conditions.22 They concluded
that employment counseling produced no significant impact on duration of unemployment,
earnings, or job satisfaction.
Crépon, Dejemeppe, and Gurgand (2005) evaluated the effects of intensive counseling
schemes provided to about 20 percent of the unemployed in France since the 2001
unemployment policy reform (PARE). Several of the counseling schemes amount to a kind of
qualitative profiling, intended to improve the quality of assignment of workers to jobs. The
authors use a nationally representative one-in-twelve sample of newly unemployed persons for
all new spells of UI receipt between July 2001 and September 2003. They only analyze the first
observed spell so as to avoid correlation of unobservable variables over consecutive spells. Data
end in June 2004, and unemployment spells are arbitrarily truncated at 900 days. In estimating
duration models they control for a large number of individual characteristics and unemployment
history traced back to 1993. In particular they control for gender, nationality, children, marital
status, educational level, age, region of residence, reason of entry into unemployment,
unemployment history (cumulative unemployment duration since July 1993 and since July
1999), unemployment recurrence (number of spells since July 1999), welfare transfer (RMI), and
type of unemployment benefit eligibility. They find significant favorable effects of counseling on
both unemployment duration and cycling back to unemployment. In particular, the program
reduces the likelihood of new unemployment from 33 to 26 percent. This suggests that screening
customers by subjective factors, using professional employment counselors, can reduce cycling
back to unemployment.
Counseling-and-monitoring is a service offered in the Netherlands that consists of
monthly meetings with an employee of the local UI agency for a period of six months, starting
immediately after inflow into UI. During these meetings, recent job search activities are
evaluated and a plan for the next period's job search activities is made. A distinguishing feature
of this program is the random assignment nature of its operational design. Unemployed job
seekers (who are entitled to receive unemployment benefits) are randomly divided into two
groups (treatment and control). Moreover, the program is implemented as part of the regular
contact that unemployed people receiving benefits are obliged to maintain with the Joint
Administration Office (JAO). At these meetings, the control group is dealt with in the
“traditional” way: progress in finding a job is discussed (for example, the number of applications
made and whether invitations are obtained for job interviews), and occasionally the information
an unemployed person provides is checked. The basic approach of having regular meetings and
the exchange of information is exactly the same for the treatment group. The difference is,
however, in spending more time with each unemployed person in the treatment group than is
22

They also tried Heckman selection bias correction procedures, but lacked instruments to predict receipt
of an ES service that were not also correlated with outcomes.
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common in the “traditional” approach. The following two paragraphs summarize two separate
evaluations that found differing results for the Dutch program’s counseling and monitoring.
Gorter and Kalb (1996) estimated the effects of counseling and monitoring in the
Netherlands on unemployment using random assignment, in a sample drawn from the registered
inflow to unemployment from November 1989 through January 1990 at seven regional
administrative offices (located in Haarlem, Maastricht, Arnhem, Vlaardingen, Apeldoorn, Venlo,
and Rijswijk). After necessary restrictions, the usable analytic sample included 722
observations. The evaluation focused on outcomes for the job finding rate, application intensity,
and the matching probability. In the authors’ job search model, the job finding rate is equal to
the product of the application intensity (frequency of applications in a period) and the matching
probability. The assumption is that ES counseling and monitoring boost the application intensity,
thereby increasing the likelihood of finding a job. A sample of the inflow into unemployment
was randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. The search activities and labour market
events of the sample were recorded through interviews every four weeks for a total period of
about one year. For analysis Gorter and Kalb retained only those observations that provided full
information on the "search history" of the individual—that is, 743 of 1,631. Furthermore, they
restricted the period between becoming unemployed and being assigned to CM to less than 60
days. This reduced the sample to 722 cases. The homogeneity of participant and comparison
groups was confirmed by simple tests which show that the sample means and standard errors of
the "labour market history" variables for those receiving and those not receiving CM are not
significantly different. Impacts were estimated in duration models controlling for observable
variables such as age, educational attainment, sex, prior job—permanent or temporary, years of
work experience, years unemployed, days unemployed before registration as unemployed,
occupation, and indicator variables for local area of residence. The empirical results suggest that
both counseling and monitoring reduce the time required to find a job because of increased job
search intensity—i.e., people given these services make more job applications than the
comparison group.
Van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) also examined the Netherlands program for
counseling and monitoring of unemployed workers. They theoretically analyze these policies in
a job search model with two search channels and endogenous search effort. Their empirical
analysis uses administrative data generated by random assignment plus follow-up survey data on
new UI registrations in Amsterdam and Rotterdam between August 24 and December 2, 1998, at
two local branches of the public employment service. The experiment ended on February 8,
1999. The randomization process in the experiment prevented crossover between treatment and
control groups in assignment or afterwards. The participants in the experiment were not informed
in advance about the fact that the experiment was going on. None of the individuals in either
group complained about their status. Since treatment assignment was compulsory, there was no
noncompliance, and therefore no self-selection into or out of the assigned treatment or control
group. The authors estimated average treatment effects across the population of UI entrants in
duration models of exit from unemployment to work. In estimation they controlled for
observable characteristics including age, sex, prior UI receipt, UI benefit amount, marital status,
and city of residence. They find no evidence that counseling and monitoring affect the exit rate
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from unemployment to work. They find instead that monitoring causes a shift from informal to
formal job search. They assert that low-intensity job search assistance programs, such as the
counseling component of the Dutch counseling and monitoring program, have small effects at
best. They suggest that high-intensity job search assistance programs may have a more positive
effect on the exit rate to work, and that monitoring of relatively well-qualified individuals in
favorable macroeconomic conditions leads to inefficient substitution of search methods or
channels. Individuals with worse prospects may have less scope for substitution, and monitoring
of their search activity may lead to an increase in the exit rate to work. The null hypothesis of a
zero treatment effect is never rejected, not even for specific subgroups or specific time intervals.
However, the results suggest that transition rates to employment were somewhat higher for
younger individuals and those who collected UI benefits before, those who did not vary at all by
gender or marital status, and those who differed slightly across the two cities; and that transition
rates were lower for those who had lost part-time jobs.
Comparing the random assignment evaluations and results from the similar studies in the
Netherlands, the differences can be partly explained by the fact that the intervention examined by
Gorter and Kalb (1996) was more intensive, and labour market conditions were generally more
favorable, than was the case for the Van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) study. In
particular, the Gorter and Kalb treatment may be considered an add-on to the Van den Berg and
van der Klaauw treatment, hence the stronger positive impacts found by Gorter and Kalb.
UI Work Test. The U.S. program for UI has a strong focus on reemployment. The UI
work test is a critical program feature for promoting reemployment. The work test normally
requires both registering with the public employment service and contacting potential employers
on a weekly basis. Once initially eligible, claimants must be able to work, available for work,
and actively seeking work in order to continue collecting weekly UI benefits. Nearly all states
waive the work search requirement for workers on temporary layoff with a definite recall date in
the near future. Workers who find their jobs through union hiring halls also are commonly
excluded from the work search requirement. These workers are not expected to search for work
independently, as long as they are registered with the placement service of their union hiring
hall. Finally, workers are excluded from the work search requirement for those weeks during
which they are enrolled in training approved by the state UI agency.
A work test field experiment in Charleston, South Carolina, involved random assignment
of 5,675 new initial UI claimants to three treatment groups and a control group between February
and December 1983 (Corson, Long, and Nicholson 1985). The experiment evaluated three
treatments representing successively larger bundles of services. Claimants assigned to the
control group were given the customary work test, which involved informing claimants that ES
registration was required. However, there was no systematic monitoring of this requirement.
The three treatments were 1) a work test requiring that an ES registration notice be sent after the
first UI benefit check was paid, with payment of the second check suspended for failure to
register with the ES; 2) a work test plus enhanced placement services, a personal placement
interview within one week of the first UI check, a job referral or an outreach attempt to contact a
prospective employer (job development), training in using the job vacancy listings, and special
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additional services again once the claimant drew nine weeks of benefits; and 3) enhanced
placement services, plus job search workshops: a three-hour JSW, and after four weeks of UI
benefits a JSW on labour market information. Treatment impacts on earnings and weeks of UI
benefits were computed in regression models controlling for observable characteristics: age,
race, sex, educational attainment, potential duration of UI benefits, UI wage replacement ratio,
and base period earnings. The first treatment had the largest impact. It alone shortened the
duration of compensated joblessness by more than half a week. The additional services did not
lead to significantly larger impacts. Impacts of the treatments were concentrated among men who
averaged impacts of greater than 1.0 weeks for all treatments, and among workers in the
construction industry, who had impacts of more than 4.0 weeks.
A field experiment on the work test conducted enrollment between July 1986 and August
1987 in Tacoma, Washington, job service centers. It involved a total of 6,763 UI claimants
assigned to one of three treatments; 2,871 claimants were assigned to the control group (Johnson
and Klepinger 1994). The control group faced the standard work search rule requiring three
employer contacts per week, plus an eligibility review interview (ERI) 13 to 15 weeks after the
initial claim was filed. The three treatments were as follows: 1) exception reporting—a complete
relaxation of the work test, whereby claimants were not required to file the standard biweekly
continued UI claim form and were told that UI payments would continue until the claimant
reported a change in circumstances such as return to work or an increased level of earnings; (2)
new work search policy—individualized work search requirements including a group ERI
followed by an intensive one-on-one follow-up interview; and 3) intensive services—
individualized work search requirements (Treatment 2), plus a two-day JSW after four weeks
(two days of classroom instruction plus 10 hours of phone canvassing), plus a group ERI after 12
weeks with a focus on employability development, plus individual follow-up. Treatment impacts
on UI receipt and reemployment were estimated using regression and probit models including
the following variables for individual and regional characteristics: a set of age dummies, male
dummy, race/ethnicity dummies, a set of education dummies, veteran status dummy, earnings
and hours worked in each of the three years before filing for benefits, a set of occupation and
industry dummies for the person's most recent job, WBA, maximum number of weeks of UI
benefits payable, a set of dummies for type of UI claim, union member dummy, a temporary
layoff dummy, and the unemployment rate in the county three months after the person filed the
claim. That last variable aimed to approximate labour market conditions at about the mean
duration of the UI spell. Impacts on reemployment earnings were estimated in regression models
controlling for the above listed variables, plus each model included an additional Heckman
variable to correct for selection bias due to estimation on samples of only those gaining
reemployment. Suspension of enrollment into the first treatment was done earlier than planned
because the larger-than-expected response could easily be detected with a sample much smaller
than designed. Claimants relieved of the work test and the continued claim filing increased their
period of UI benefits drawn by a statistically significant 3.3 weeks. This impact was bigger for
women with children and men without children, and for married women and unmarried men.
Treatment 2 had an effect on UI benefit receipt of +0.17 weeks and was statistically
indistinguishable from the existing standard work search rule applied uniformly to all claimants.
Treatment number 3, which was customized and featured a JSW after four weeks and an ERI
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after 12 weeks, had a statistically significant impact of 0.47 weeks. Impacts were bigger for
women without children and unmarried women. An analysis of the timing of the components of
this treatment and claimant response (at 4 and 12 weeks), combined with an analysis of the
timing of the standard treatment given the control group (at 13 to 15 weeks) and the response to
that, provided new insight into claimant behavior. In both cases exit from UI benefit receipt
appeared to be more likely right before a scheduled intervention, rather than after the service was
provided. Such a response might be termed an “invitation effect.” This led to the conclusion
that the timed elements of the work test—JSW and ERI—acted more like a stick, prodding return
to work, than a carrot, providing nourishment for achieving that end.
Enrollment into the Maryland UI work search experiment was conducted in six public
labour exchange offices around the state throughout the entire calendar year of 1994 (Klepinger
et al. 1998, 2002). A combined sample of 23,758 new monetarily eligible UI claimants were
enrolled in the experiment. The standard work search policy was given to the control group.
This required two job search contacts per week, which had to be reported on the biweekly UI
continued claim form but were not verified. The four alternative treatments tested were 1) report
four weekly employer contacts, which are not verified; 2) contact two employers per week, with
no need to report the two contacted; 3) report two weekly employer contacts, which are not
verified, plus attend a four-day JSW early in the unemployment spell; and 4) report two weekly
employer contacts, which will be verified. Impact estimates were computed in regression and
logit models controlling for age, sex, race/ethnicity, employment by a federal agency or the
military, U.S. citizenship, earnings in each of the four quarters preceding the quarter a claimant
applied for benefits, local employment office indicators, entry quarter, and maximum weekly
benefit amount. Estimates were computed on the full sample of all monetarily eligible new
claimants enrolled in the demonstration. The estimates can be interpreted as average effects over
all eligible claimants, regardless of whether they actually adhered to the work search
requirements in the experimental design. Requiring four job search employer contacts per week
reduced the average duration of UI benefit receipt by 0.7 weeks. This reduction in duration
resulted even when the employer contacts were not verified. Telling beneficiaries to make two
employer contacts per week, but removing the requirement to report the two contacts, resulted in
a statistically significant increase in average UI benefit durations of 0.4 weeks. Telling
beneficiaries to make two employer contacts per week, plus requiring attendance at a four-day
JSW early in the unemployment spell, reduced the average duration of UI receipt by 0.6 weeks.
Requiring two employer contacts to be reported, plus telling claimants that their two contacts
would be verified, shortened the average duration of UI benefit receipt by 0.9 weeks. A
verification rate of 10 percent appeared to be an adequate level of threat to generate a statistically
significant response. Notably, the bulk of the response to the fourth treatment occurred during
the first spell of joblessness in the UI benefit year. Similarly, the first treatment generated the
bulk of its response during the first spell of joblessness in the benefit year. The effects of
treatments 1, 3, and 4 were not associated with lower reemployment earnings. However,
eliminating the work search reporting requirement, as in Treatment 2, raised reemployment
earnings by a statistically significant 4 percent. The estimated effects of the treatments are not
significantly different among specific demographic subgroups. In particular, there were no
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differences across subgroups in the effects of the treatments on total UI benefits paid and the
length of the first spell of UI by local office, race, age, sex, or prior earnings.
In the United Kingdom (UK), UI is administered by that country's public employment
service and has a uniform initial duration of entitlement of 12 months. In 1987, a new program
called Restart was introduced nationally. Under Restart, UI beneficiaries nearing six continuous
months of receiving benefits were called in for an appointment at their local public employment
service office and were provided with intensive job search assistance (Dolton and O’Neill 2002).
An evaluation of the UK Restart program estimated short-term effects similar to those observed
in the Tacoma alternative work search experiment (Dolton and O’Neill 1996). Both evaluations
suggested that there was a modest shortening in the duration of compensated unemployment and
that the invitation for intensive job search assistance acted more as a prod than as a support for
reemployment. In a subsequent random-assignment field experiment, the treatment group
received the standard UK Restart services when it was nearing six continuous months of
claiming UI, while the randomly selected control group was given the same services when it was
approaching 12 continuous months of receiving benefits. The researchers found evidence that,
over the short term, required job search assistance prodded both groups of UI beneficiaries to go
back to work but that, over a longer, five-year term, the group that received such support earlier
in its jobless spell had measurably higher earnings.23 This finding suggests that job search
assistance can be a valuable service for job seekers. Long-term impacts by gender were large
and positive for males but were not measurable for females.
Prior to 1996, unemployment benefits in the UK were often called “the dole” because of
the lack of a work search requirement and the low wage replacement rate. The benefit was
renamed Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) because of the strong requirements for active work search.
One requirement for continued benefits under the JSA is for the claimant to report in person
every two weeks to a public benefits office to validate that he or she is making an active search
for work. A problem with this strategy was that public jobs offices were in a separate location
from benefits offices. Starting with a pilot program in 1999, Jobs and Benefits Offices (JBO)
were created to strengthen the link between receipt of JSA and job search in Northern Ireland.
These new institutions would strengthen the fortnightly monitoring interview, providing
additional time and new elements of job search assistance, with advisers now able to suggest—
and submit electronic applications to—suitable registered vacancies during the interview.
Northern Ireland is divided into 35 administrative areas. Jobs and Benefits Offices (JBO) were
established in 25 of these 35 areas by the end of 2008. Refurbishment of each office took
between 6 and 18 months, during which time the reporting requirement was suspended for
continued JSA benefit receipt. T-tests on the sample means suggest no significant difference
between the treatment and control areas in terms of JSA stocks per capita, outflow and inflow
rates, and redundancies and vacancies. In other words, treatments have not been differentially
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Short-term estimates (Dolton and O’Neill 1996) were computed in competing risks models controlling
for the observable characteristics age, sex, race, educational attainment, marital status, children, young children,
driver’s license, home ownership, urban area, working spouse, and local unemployment rate. The long term
estimates (Dolton and O’Neill 2002) were estimated in linear probability models controlling for age, sex, urban area,
past unemployment experience, and change in local unemployment rate.
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imposed on high- or low-unemployment areas, on faster- or slower-falling unemployment areas,
or on high- or low-vacancy or redundancy areas. During the sample inflow period, the aggregate
JSA stock in Northern Ireland fell from over 60,000 in any given month to under 30,000. All
areas of Northern Ireland experienced declining JSA stocks over this period, so labour markets
were improving throughout the region. Identification of the program change was done by the
natural experiment of rolling remodeling efforts to create unified JOB offices in Northern
Ireland. McVicar (2010, p. 311) estimates that “withdrawal of job search monitoring on its own
significantly increases the JSA stock, whether based on simple DID estimates, estimates from
regressions of the JSA stock with various lag structures, or simulations of the JSA stock based on
estimated flow effects.” The magnitude of the effect estimated “—on the order of a 15%
increase in registered unemployment—is similar to that found by Klepinger et al. (2002) when
their zero monitoring and tough monitoring regimes are compared and contrasted” (McVicar
2010, p. 311).
Mandatory Services. Mandatory reemployment services are part of policies for many
public employment services. Frequently the penalty for not participating is a temporary
suspension or reduction in UI benefit entitlement. Blundell et al. (2004) examined the effect of
mandatory reemployment services under the New Deal for Young People in the UK. The
program provides extensive job assistance and wage subsidies to employers. Prior to this
program, young people in the UK could, in principle, claim unemployment benefits indefinitely.
Now, after six months of unemployment, young people enter the “Gateway,” which is the first
period of intensive job search assistance. The program is mandatory, including the subsidized
options part. Blundell et al. (2004) focused on the job assistance and wage subsidy elements.
They used data drawn from administrative records on a pilot test conducted in selected areas
before nationwide program implementation. The comparison group was selected from slightly
older people of similar unemployment duration who lived in areas not involved in the pilot. The
authors applied a number of different econometric techniques, all exploiting the longitudinal
nature of the data set being used but making different assumptions about the structure of the
disturbances. All estimators amounted to difference-in-difference estimators with matching.
They find that the outflow rate to jobs was increased by about 20 percent for young men as a
result of the New Deal—that is, the number of men finding jobs in the first four months of the
New Deal rises by 5 percentage points above a preprogram level of 26 percentage points.
Sanctions. Abbring, van den Berg, and van Ours (2005) used administrative data on new
UI spells in the Netherlands in 1992 to assess the effect of sanctions for failure to comply with
job search requirements. In 1987 a new Dutch law on UI was introduced providing for a
tightening of the eligibility rules and a system of benefit sanctions. The law requires three things
of claimants: 1) avoidance of unnecessary job loss, 2) positive actions to prevent staying
unemployed, including active job search and participation in active employment and training
programs, and 3) efforts to keep the administrative organization informed about everything that
is relevant to the payment of the unemployment insurance benefits. Failure to comply with these
requirements can result in benefit sanctions. The sanctions can be either a temporary or a
permanent reduction—full or partial—of the benefit level. In practice, the temporary partial
reduction of benefits ranges from 5 percent for four weeks to 25 or 30 percent for thirteen weeks.
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The UI administrative agencies are free to choose the sanctions they think are appropriate.
Administrative data was provided on 182,239 unemployment spells starting in 1992. A sanction
was imposed in 2.9 percent of the cases, with the majority, 53 percent, being imposed between 8
and 24 weeks of unemployment. The effect of one random event on another, in the presence of
selectivity, was estimated by a simple graphical procedure that extracts information on the effect
of sanctions from the UI data, and that requires neither multiple spells nor regressors. The
estimator relies on the intuition that, “if a sanction increases the reemployment rate . . . then a
relatively large fraction of those who make this transition [out of unemployment] have been
given a sanction shortly before [they exit unemployment]” (Abbring et al. 2005, p. 618). They
estimate that reemployment rates are significantly increased by imposition of a sanction.
Individual reemployment rates of males increase by 61 percent in the metal industry and by 36
percent in the banking sector. For females, these effects are 98 percent for the metal industry and
85 percent for banking. Estimates on data in which the metal and banking industries are pooled
with other industries suggest economy-wide sanction effects of 58 percent for males and 67
percent for females.
Targeted Job Search Assistance. Targeting of JSA surfaced as a policy option during
the 1990s, following the massive economic restructuring and worker dislocation of the previous
decade. Earlier research had identified JSA as a cost-effective tool for promoting return to work.
The question of whether JSA would be effective for those at risk of long-term unemployment
was evaluated in the context of a major field experiment in New Jersey (Corson et al. 1989).
Together with earlier evidence on JSA cost-effectiveness, results from the New Jersey
experiment supported establishment of the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services
(WPRS) system, which required targeted JSA (Wandner 1994).
Two subsequent experiments have evaluated the effectiveness of targeted JSA. The first
was undertaken around the time of WPRS start-up, with special accommodations made to ensure
experimental integrity (Decker et al. 2000). The second evaluation was done using data from
after WPRS implementation (Black et al. 2003). In this section, we briefly review the design and
findings of these studies.
New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment. Enrollment into the New Jersey UI
Reemployment Experiment was done between July 1986 and June 1987 (Corson et al. 1989).
The sampling frame for random assignment was set to target the evaluation to dislocated workers
claiming UI benefits. Characteristics screens were set to construct the sampling frame.
These screens required that a claimant meet five conditions. The claimant 1) must receive a first
UI payment, and that payment must occur within five weeks of applying for benefits; 2) must be
at least 25 years of age; 3) must have worked for the pre–UI claim employer for at least three
years; 4) may not be on standby awaiting return to the claimant’s previous job with a specific
recall date; and 5) may not be a union hiring hall member.
The first three of these eligibility conditions permitted the offer of an intervention early in
the jobless spell, and of these three, the second and third ensured that subjects of the experiment
were well established labour force members separated from a long job attachment. The fourth
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and fifth conditions provided the potential for interventions to affect job search plans. Claimants
who are awaiting recall to their prior jobs and members of union hiring halls are not required by
the UI system to engage in active job search.
Random assignment sent 2,385 claimants to the control group and 8,675 to one of three
treatment groups. All three treatments included JSA, the first being JSA alone. The second
treatment added job training to JSA; the third treatment added a cash reemployment bonus to
JSA. The bonus was for reemployment within 11 weeks of the claim and was a cash payment of
half the remaining UI entitlement, with the initial offer good for two weeks and then declining by
10 percent per week. The bonus was not paid if return to work was a recall, or if the job was
temporary, seasonal, part-time, or with a relative. For all three treatments, at five weeks into the
claim, all claimants were given JSA orientation, skills and aptitude testing, a JSA workshop, and
an assessment or counseling interview.
During the benefit year, the impacts on weeks of UI benefit receipt were −0.47, −0.48,
and −0.97 for the three treatments, respectively. All of these impacts were estimated to have
statistical significance. The cumulative impacts on weeks of UI benefit receipt over the six years
after the initial benefit claim were −0.76, −0.93, and −1.72 for the three treatments, respectively,
with the impact from the third treatment estimated to have statistical significance (Corson and
Haimson 1995).
The New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment demonstrated that JSA targeted to
claimants likely to be long-term unemployed had the same cost-effective impact as that found for
other groups of UI claimants—about half-a-week shorter UI receipt. The encouraging results for
the bonus treatment led the U.S. Department of Labour to further investigate the ideal design for
a reemployment bonus offer (Decker and O’Leary 1995).
Job Search Assistance Experiment. The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act
of 1991 authorized the U.S. Department of Labour to conduct the Job Search Assistance
Experiment. The experiment was designed to evaluate whether providing early JSA to claimants
identified by statistical models as being likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement would be
cost-effective (Decker et al. 2000). During the planning stages of the evaluation, which was
scheduled to be run in the District of Columbia and the state of Florida, federal legislation
leapfrogged public policy analysis.
In 1993 President Clinton signed Public Law 103-152, which required state employment
security agencies to establish and use a system of profiling all new claimants for regular UI
benefits. The Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system was intended to
identify UI claimants who were most likely to exhaust their regular benefits, so that they might
be provided with early reemployment services to make a faster transition to new employment.
The WPRS established a two-stage process. First, UI recipients who are expecting recall
or who are members of a union hall are dropped. These groups are excluded because they are
not expected to undertake an active independent job search. Second, remaining UI recipients are
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ranked by their likelihood of exhausting regular unemployment insurance benefits. Beneficiaries
are then referred to early reemployment services in order of their ranking until the capacity of
local agencies to serve them is exhausted. The early assistance comprises at least eight hours of
job search assistance, which usually includes an orientation to self-help facilities available at the
public labour exchange and a JSW.
In Florida, the JSA experiment proceeded with enrollment between March 1995 and
March 1996 at 10 sites around the state where regular WPRS operations were temporarily
delayed. Random assignment in Florida involved 8,071 claimants. In Washington, D.C., the
experiment counted as the federal district’s WPRS implementation. Random assignment
enrollment for the JSA experiment was done in all public labour exchange offices throughout the
District between June 1995 and June 1996 and involved 12,042 claimants.
The JSA experiment established an eligible pool of claimants using a two-stage process:
1) exclude job-attached and union hiring hall members, then 2) evaluate claimants’ probability of
exhausting UI entitlement and target those with the highest probabilities for the evaluation.
These claimants were randomly assigned to a control group or to one of three treatments. The
treatments were as follows: 1) structured job search assistance (SJSA): orientation, testing, JSW,
and one-on-one assessment interview. Failure to participate could result in denial of UI benefits.
Two additional visits with staff to report job search progress; 2) individualized job search
assistance (IJSA): orientation and one-on-one assessment interview. Individual plan developed,
which may include additional mandatory services; 3) individualized job search assistance with
training (IJSA+): identical to IJSA, plus a coordinated effort with EDWAA staff to enroll the
customer in training.
The impacts of the three treatments on weeks of UI compensation in the benefit year in
Washington, DC, were −1.13, −0.47, and −0.61, respectively, all estimated to have statistical
significance. Estimates of the same parameters in Florida were −0.41, −0.59, and −0.52, all of
which, again, were statistically significant. Both evaluations indicated that reemployment
occurred at wage rates similar to prior levels. The treatments had generally positive and
significant effects on earnings in Washington, DC, but no impact on participant earnings in
Florida.
Structured JSA emerged as the most cost-effective intervention examined. The authors
of the evaluation report attributed the generally larger impacts observed in Washington, DC, to
stricter enforcement of JSA participation requirements. They recommend making particular JSA
services mandatory and maintaining clear linkages between UI and ES in the new one-stop
environment under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA).
Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer (1999) conducted a six-state evaluation of the Worker
Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system implementation and effectiveness.
Reliable data was available for only five of the six states (Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, New
Jersey, and Maine). Samples were drawn from the top of each state’s profiling score
distribution, with UI beneficiaries near the top compared to those just below the WPRS referral
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threshold. Program impacts were estimated in regression models controlling for observable
characteristics. “The independent variables included in the regression models differed somewhat
across states, but the models generally included variables for personal characteristics (including
age, race, sex, and education), employment characteristics (including earnings, job tenure,
industry, and occupation at previous job), UI entitlement (including weekly benefit amount and
potential duration of UI benefits), and the probability of UI exhaustion calculated using the
state’s statistical model. When possible we included all variables in the state’s statistical model
as independent variables in our model. For some states, we were also able to control for local
unemployment rates. Finally, all models included indicators for local office of initial claim and
the quarter of the first payment” (Dickinson, Decker, Kreutzer, 1999, p. III-11). Estimated
average impacts on weeks of insured unemployment were –0.25, –0.41, –0.21, –0.29, and –0.98
for Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Maine, respectively.
Evaluation of Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services in Kentucky. While
Kentucky was included among the states studied in the national evaluation of WPRS, an
independent assessment of WPRS in Kentucky based on an experimental design arrived at a
much different conclusion. The profiling model used in Kentucky was developed by economists
at the Center for Business and Economic Research at the University of Kentucky (Berger et al.
1997). In working with the Kentucky Department for Employment Services on the WPRS
system, these economists advocated a methodology for assignment to the WPRS that provided
ready data for an experimental evaluation of WPRS effectiveness.
Kentucky divides the predicted UI exhaustion distribution into 20 groups spanning 5
percentile points each. Every week the local WPRS capacity is hit within one of the 20 groups.
That group is referred to as a profiling tie group (PTG). In Kentucky, profiled WPRS customers
within PTGs are randomly assigned to WPRS, or not. This is viewed as an appropriate rule for
referral to the WPRS from a group of UI claimants having scores that are not statistically
significantly different. It also provides the basis for evaluation of the WPRS based on
randomized trials.
From the PTGs, experimental and control groups were formed by the randomized trials to
conduct an evaluation of the WPRS in Kentucky (Black et al. 2003). Data was collected starting
with the very beginning of WPRS implementation in Kentucky, in October 1994, and lasting
through June 1996. The PTGs yielded a total sample of 1,981 claimants, and 1,236 of these were
assigned to mandatory WPRS JSA. Compared to the total population of 48,002 profiled and
referred Kentucky claimants during that period, means of observable characteristics (age,
schooling, gender, race, prior earnings, and weekly benefit amount) for the experimental
treatment group were not statistically significantly different from those in the control group.
The impact estimates for WPRS in Kentucky were dramatic. On three outcomes of
interest, the estimated impacts were −2.2 weeks of UI, −$143 in UI benefits, and a $1,054
increase in earnings during the UI benefit year. The difference in these estimates from the
national WPRS evaluation were most likely due to the fact that Black et al. (2003) essentially
confined their contrasts within PTGs, thereby achieving a closer counterfactual. Dickinson et al.
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(1999, 2002) compared those assigned to WPRS who had the highest probability of benefit
exhaustion against all those profiled but not referred, including many with very low exhaustion
probabilities. This meant the comparison group in the national evaluation was likely to have
shorter mean benefit duration than program participants even in the absence of WPRS services.
Essentially Black et al (2003) estimated local average treatment effects while Dickinson et al.
(2002) estimated average treatment effects for the program. When finely targeted, the WPRS
program appears to be more effective.
The willingness of the Kentucky Department of Employment Services to accept the
recommendation of Professor Mark Berger and his colleagues regarding WPRS model design
and system implementation was a key to producing reliable WPRS impact estimates (Berger et
al. 1997). Professor Berger and his colleagues at the Center for Business and Economic
Research (CBER) at the University of Kentucky recommended randomization on the margin in
assignment to WPRS. This should be standard WPRS practice for all state and local
employment service delivery agencies. In setting up WPRS administrative rules, the Kentucky
agency realized the value of evaluation research and used that orientation to help resolve the
resource allocation problem. When resources are limited, randomization in program assignment
can always be viewed as an equitable mechanism. It has the added benefit of providing for very
strong evaluation evidence.
Reemployment Incentives–Bonuses. Between 1984 and 1989, four reemployment
bonus experiments targeted at unemployment insurance (UI) recipients were conducted in the
United States. These experiments provided various levels of lump-sum payments to UI
recipients who took new, full-time jobs within 6 to 12 weeks of their benefit application and held
those jobs for at least three to four months. Empirical UI research had produced evidence that UI
payments might lengthen jobless durations beyond what they would be in the absence of UI.
The purpose of these interventions was to learn more about the behavioral response of UI
recipients to changes in the UI program. Reemployment bonuses were intended to speed the
return to work in a manner that would benefit employees, employers, and the government, and
would be cost-effective. UI claimants would be better off if they returned to work sooner and
found jobs that were similar and paid similar wages to the jobs they would have taken in the
absence of a bonus offer. Employers would be better off if they experienced lower UI payroll
taxes. The government would be better off if the cost of the bonus was offset by a decrease in UI
benefit payments to unemployed workers and an increase in income and other tax contributions
by workers during their longer period of employment.
Illinois UI Incentive Experiment. The first bonus experiment was conducted in Illinois
during 1984–1985 and was sponsored by the Illinois Department of Employment Security. Its
goal was to examine the theoretical and empirical economic implications of a reemployment
bonus offer to UI claimants and the potential for developing a cost-effective bonus program. The
Illinois design provided a $500 bonus amount, equivalent to about four weeks of UI benefit
payment—i.e., four times the UI weekly benefit amount (WBA). To collect a bonus payment,
treatment group members needed to become reemployed within 11 weeks of filing their UI
claims. The estimated impact of the Illinois reemployment bonus offer to UI claimants was a
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reduction in the duration of UI compensated unemployment by 1.15 weeks (Woodbury and
Spiegelman 1987). This reduction was so great that the reemployment bonus was cost-effective
to the UI Trust Fund, generating a benefit cost ratio of 2.32. At the same time, participants
suffered no reduction in postunemployment wages, which indicated that the bonus offer did not
reduce job quality.
New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration. Independent of the Illinois experiment,
the U.S. Department of Labour (USDOL) sponsored a New Jersey UI experiment that included a
reemployment bonus treatment group. This project was designed and became operational in 1985
and 1986, before the results from the Illinois experiment became available. As such, the New
Jersey experiment was not designed to replicate or validate the Illinois experiment. The New
Jersey bonus offer was designed so that the amount of the offer was tied to a claimant’s
remaining UI benefit entitlement and the amount paid was larger in cases of more rapid
reemployment. The initial bonus offer was one-half of the claimant’s remaining entitlement at
the time of the offer. This offer amount remained constant for the first two full weeks after the
initial offer. Thereafter the amount of the bonus offer declined by 10 percent of the original
amount per week, falling to zero by the end of the eleventh full week of the bonus offer. Initial
bonus offers in New Jersey averaged $1,644, which was about nine times the UI weekly benefit
amount. The evaluation of the New Jersey experiment suggested that the reemployment bonus,
as it was implemented in New Jersey, generated modest savings in UI. Since the cost of offering
and paying the bonuses exceeded the modest UI savings, the New Jersey bonus was not costeffective from the perspective of the UI system.
Pennsylvania and Washington Reemployment Bonus Experiments. In 1987, with the
evaluation of the Illinois experiment completed and the New Jersey experiment operations over,
the USDOL sponsored two additional reemployment bonus experiments, one in Pennsylvania
and the other in Washington State. In contrast to the Illinois experiment, these later trials
generated much more modest results. In the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments the
bonus offers were set as multiples of the worker’s weekly benefit level. This design was adopted
because in the Illinois experiment claimants receiving less than the UI maximum weekly benefit
responded more strongly to bonus offers than those constrained by the maximum (O’Leary,
Spiegelman, and Kline 1995, p. 267). The Pennsylvania and Washington experiments tested
benefit levels that bracketed the Illinois bonus amount (4 × the weekly benefit allowance, or
WBA) and tested qualifications both similar to the earlier offers and about half as great. The
resulting designs provided for four treatment groups in Pennsylvania and six in Washington.
The dimensions of each design were the level of the bonus (high and low in Pennsylvania; high,
medium, and low in Washington) and the qualification period or duration of the bonus offer
(short and long in both states). While half of the 10 treatments in Pennsylvania and Washington
were cost-effective to claimants, society, and the government sector as a whole, only two of the
treatments were cost-effective for the UI system (Decker and O’Leary 1992, 1995).
The relatively weak response to the bonus offer in Pennsylvania and Washington led to a
reexamination of the powerful Illinois results. It was discovered that within the designed
experiment, a second experiment had unintentionally taken place. In 1984, as Illinois was
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recovering from a major recession, the availability of Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC)
was terminated. This resulted in about half of the claimants studied having 38 weeks of UI
benefit eligibility, with the remainder being eligible for only 26 weeks of regular UI benefits. It
turns out that the mean bonus response of −1.15 weeks in Illinois was made up of a response of
−1.78 weeks for those eligible for FSC and −0.54 weeks for those not eligible. The average
response of −0.54 for the non-FSC sample in Illinois is close to the response observed in
Pennsylvania and Washington, where the entitled duration of benefits was also similar.
Among the individual treatments, the impact on weeks of UI benefits ranged from −0.05
for the low bonus amount/short qualification period offer in Washington to −1.78 for the bonus
offer to FSC-eligible claimants in Illinois. Impacts for Pennsylvania tended to fall between those
for Illinois and those for Washington. Overall, a cash bonus can be expected to modestly shorten
spells of insured unemployment—the mean effect of the offers made in the three states yielded
about a one-half week reduction in weeks of UI benefits.
The degree of response to the bonus offer was also examined for important subgroups
within the sample. Results from Pennsylvania and Washington suggest that UI claimants in lowunemployment areas and claimants whose prior employment was in manufacturing tended to
respond more strongly to the bonus. However, close inspection of subgroup results reveals one
main finding: there is no difference between any pair of subgroups shown that is both
statistically significant at conventional confidence levels and consistent across the three
experiments. The implication of this finding is quite striking—the reemployment bonus has a
remarkably even impact on various subgroups of workers, whether delineated by gender, age,
race, industrial sector of employment, level of local unemployment, or level of the weekly
benefit amount.
O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (2005) investigate whether targeting reemployment
bonus offers to UI claimants identified as most likely to exhaust benefits would reduce benefit
payments. They show that targeting bonus offers with profiling models similar to those in state
WPRS systems can improve cost-effectiveness. However, estimated average benefit payments
do not steadily decline as the eligibility screen for targeting is gradually tightened. The authors
find that narrow targeting is not optimal. The best candidate to emerge is a low bonus amount
with a long qualification period, targeted to the half of profiled claimants most likely to exhaust
their UI benefit entitlement.
Two potential behavioral effects might reduce cost-effectiveness for an operational
program (Meyer 1995): First, an actual bonus program could have a displacement effect.
Displacement occurs if UI claimants who are offered a bonus increase their rate of reemployment
at the expense of other job seekers not offered a bonus. Second, there is also the risk that an
operational bonus offer program could induce an entry effect. That is, the availability of a
reemployment bonus might result in a larger proportion of unemployed job seekers entering the
UI system.
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If entry and displacement effects are sizable, actual program cost-effectiveness will be
lowered. However, targeting low bonus amount/long qualification period offers to only those
most likely to exhaust UI should reduce both these risks. Targeting would introduce uncertainty
that a bonus offer would be forthcoming upon filing a UI claim, which should reduce the chance
of a large entry effect. Also, targeting should reduce any potential for displacement, since a
smaller proportion of claimants would receive the bonus offer.
Reemployment Services to UI Beneficiaries. The high unemployment levels and long
durations of UI receipt occurring in the 1975 recession led the U.S. Department of Labor
(USDOL) to renew its emphasis on active job search by UI beneficiaries. Guidelines for an
eligibility review program (ERP) were issued by USDOL to all state employment security
agencies in 1976, and beginning in 1977 states were allotted funds for operating ERPs (Walker
1982). The ERPs required states to do two things: 1) continuously review ability, availability,
and the efforts of beneficiaries to gain reemployment and 2) promote reemployment by
supporting an active job search by UI beneficiaries. Over time the use of ERPs dwindled in
many states, along with federal funding for staff to provide services. Employment Service (ES)
funding fell by half in real terms between 1984 and 2007 (O’Leary and Eberts 2008). In 2005
the USDOL renewed and expanded the ERP concept by dividing $30 million in funding among
18 states to provide reemployment and eligibility assessment (REA) grants. The REA requires
two conditions. First, UI beneficiaries must be required to report in person to a One-Stop Career
Center for staff-assisted services as a part of the REA. Second, assessments must include four
steps: 1) a review of continued eligibility and referral to adjudication, as appropriate, when a
potential issue is identified; 2) the provision of labour market information; 3) development or
review of a work search plan; and 4) a referral to employment services (e.g., job search
assistance workshops or job placement services) or to occupational or skills training, when
appropriate. Funding to states for REA rose to $50 million in 2009 (Small 2009).
Two recent evaluation studies provide additional evidence that work search requirements
and JSA affect the duration of insured unemployment. These studies looked at the
Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment (REA) program and the Wisconsin reemployment
demonstration in One-Stop Career Centers. Both studies found beneficial effects of strengthened
work search enforcement and linkages to reemployment services.
The REA initiative was a U.S. Department of Labor demonstration project with a budget
of $20 million to provide assistance to states establishing new or significantly revamped REA
programs. REAs are an eligibility review program, run within the UI program without the
participation of One-Stop center staff. REA efforts were implemented in 21 states in 2005.
Federal funds for REAs were appropriated with the proviso that research would be conducted in
the pilot states to learn whether REAs could be a model for shortening jobless durations and
reducing insured unemployment. Evidence from a random assignment evaluation in Minnesota
suggests that REAs reduced the duration of UI benefit receipt by 1.2 weeks (Benus et al. 2008).
Estimation of the REA effects for Minnesota involved matching and regression adjustment on
observable characteristics. Recent federal initiatives have pumped millions of dollars into states
to broaden the use of REA programs for UI beneficiaries.
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The Wisconsin demonstration project was also sponsored by the Employment and
Training Administration (ETA) of the U.S. Department of Labor. It brings UI and One-Stop
center staff together to provide reemployment services and eligibility reviews in the One-Stop
center. In this cooperative operations model, UI staff are out-stationed in the One-Stop centers.
The Wisconsin demonstration, with its nonexperimental evaluation design, provides further
information about the cost-effectiveness of ES cooperation in the UI work test. The project
matched demonstration group claimants with up to three claimants from the comparison sites
using an algorithm that linked individuals based on postal zip codes, their propensity to return to
work (as predicted by their WPRS profiling scores), their prior employment history, and other
individual background characteristics. Impacts were estimated on outcomes of interest using
regression adjustment including the following variables: had a disability; limited English
proficiency; single parent; and number of previous UI claims. Those receiving additional
attention for the work test in One-Stop centers shortened UI durations by 1.8 weeks and lowered
benefit year compensation by $468 (Almandsmith 2006, p. 7).
Youth Employment Services. Centeno, Centeno, and Novo (2009) estimated average
treatment effects on unemployment duration of active labour market programs in Portugal
addressing long term unemployment of younger and older workers. The Portuguese labour
market is characterized by extremely high employment protection, long unemployment spells
and generous unemployment insurance, and a low arrival rate of job offers—a rate that is low
even in comparison to other European countries. The youth program (Inserjovem) targets all
young people (less than 25 years old) before they have been registered for six months; the other
program (Reage) attempts to serve all adults before they reach 12 months of unemployment.
Both programs provide job search assistance, including vocational guidance, counseling,
monitoring, and training or retraining options. Potential sanctions—including loss of
unemployment insurance and fee exemption to access the public health services—can result from
failure to comply with the directions of the Employment Office (EO) placement team. The
programs were first introduced in a subset of EOs beginning in June 1998. They were later
rolled out sequentially to the other EOs, fully covering the country by January 2001. The pilot
EOs were chosen for logistical reasons unrelated with the programs’ goals in terms of labour
market outcomes. Centeno, Centeno, and Novo (2009) apply a difference-in-difference
methodology using a natural experiment, resulting in treatment and control groups originating
from the sequential program implementation across the country. They try to achieve
identification by assuming that the average outcomes for treated subjects and controls would
have followed parallel paths over time. They claim that results are robust to a wide variety of
quasi-experimental designs and estimators. They attempt to estimate the effects of the program
compared to the outcome for the individual had he or she continued to search for a job in the
absence of the support provided. Impact estimates were computed while including a vector of
covariates (predetermined with respect to the introduction of the program) that was included to
correct for differences in observed characteristics between individuals in treatment and control
groups. The control variables include age, sex, nationality, schooling, place of residence, and
some variables related to previous labour market experience (e.g., reason for job displacement).
Results suggest the adult program leads to a modest reduction in the unemployment duration of
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workers finding a job upon participation, whereas the impact for youth is generally negative
(extended durations). These results are robust to a wide variety of constructions of
nonexperimental settings and estimators. On the other hand, the results were mixed, and thus less
satisfactory, for young workers, for those over 40, and for the less educated. Women also
benefited less from the programs. The results seem to improve slightly for young workers in the
second semester of implementation, but they deteriorate in the medium term. The lack of wage
subsidies in the Portuguese programs may explain the minor impacts obtained when compared to
similar programs. Gender, age, and schooling seem to play an important role in determining the
programs’ impact. In transitions into employment, the impact is larger for older men (a reduction
of unemployment close to one month). In terms of age, the largest impact is observed for
individuals aged between 30 and 40. Workers with a higher degree of education seem to benefit
more.
Jensen, Rosholm, and Svarer (2003) study a Danish program associated with a dramatic
decline youth unemployment. In 1996, Denmark established the Youth Unemployment
Programme (YUP) for low-educated unemployed youth. The dual aims of YUP are to increase
the employability of low-educated unemployed youth, and to motivate them to undertake further
education. The European Commission has labeled this program a “best practice.” Young
persons under the age of 25 without any formal education beyond secondary school, and who
have been unemployed for 6 months during the last 9 months, are offered 18 months of specially
designed vocational education. Participants in a YUP education program, or other approved
education program, receive UI at 50 percent the normal rate. Refusal to participate in an
approved education program results in loss of unemployment benefit entitlement. Jensen,
Rosholm, and Svarer investigated the impact of YUP on the duration of unemployment spells
and the transition rates from unemployment to schooling and employment. They analyzed three
effects at the very beginning of the YUP: an announcement effect, a direct programme effect,
and a sanction effect; and found evidence that the YUP caused some of the observed reduction in
youth unemployment. Data was collected by interviewing approximately 3,500 individuals aged
16–24 from April 1996 to December 1996. For each individual, they have information about
labor market transitions occurring between the time of selection and the time of the interview,
and about personal characteristics (age, gender, number of children, education, ethnic status).
They also know whether and when the individuals have received an offer from the labor market
office to participate in the YUP. This information was used to construct treatment and a control
groups. They provide homogeniety tests showing the control group was not meaningfully
contaminated, and they argue this is because the sample was drawn early in the YUP
implementation. They estimate impacts on the risk of leaving unemployment for either skill
improvement (education or training), or employment in a competing risks model controlling for
observed and unobserved characteristics.24
The main result is that the transition rate from unemployment to schooling is significantly
raised by the YUP. This results mainly from a direct program effect and partially from the threat
of sanction. These effects are estimated after correcting for the strong seasonality in the
transition rate from unemployment to schooling. In addition, they find somewhat weaker effects
24

They impose a restriction in estimation that unobserved errors in the training equation are perfectly
correlated with errors in the employment equation.
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on the transition rate from unemployment to employment. Their estimates of YUP effects
suggest that aggregate youth unemployment may have been reduced by YUP through shifting
young people away from ‘‘waiting on the dole’’ to ‘‘waiting in the classroom.’’ “Clearly, a
significant increase in the transition to employment would have been more satisfactory.
However, the possible ‘‘scarring’’ effect of unemployment suggests that it could be welfareimproving to move the youth out of unemployment and into the classroom. Thereby, the longterm consequences of unemployment may be mitigated.” (Jensen, Rosholm, and Svarer 2003,
p. 314)
3.4.5.1 Summary of EAS-related evaluations
Our review of the effectiveness of support measures offered by public employment
services around the world that are or could be available in Canada under the category of
Employment Assistance Services (EAS) includes ten subcategories. Evidence from evaluations
in the U.S. suggest that job interviews and referrals can improve return-to-work rates and
earnings, particularly for women and men in urban areas. Evidence from France, the
Netherlands, and the United States found small positive effects from job search counseling.
Several studies in the United States and the United Kingdom testing active work search
requirements for current UI beneficiaries found significantly shorter durations of UI receipt when
the work test is stronger, and much longer durations when the work test is removed. Mandatory
services tested in the United Kingdom for unemployed youth had modest effects similar to the
work test, while sanctions curtailing UI benefit entitlement in the Netherlands produced large
and significant reductions in compensated durations. Targeted job search assistance in the
United States to those at risk of long term UI receipt is found to significantly shorten benefit
durations. Cash incentives for early return to work paid as bonuses after reemployment had
modest effects in the United States, but the cost-effectiveness of such offers was improved when
they were made to those most likely to have long durations of UI receipt. Reemployment
services provided on a regular schedule during a continuous spell of UI benefit receipt was found
to shorten unemployment durations in the United States. Similar favorable results were found
when improving linkages between UI and ES services in One-Stop centers in the United States.
Despite the threat of sanctions, employment services targeted to unemployed youths were not
particularly effective in Portugal, but results were more encouraging in Denmark where
outcomes include further education or training as well as employment.
4

KNOWLEDGE GAPS IN THE EVALUATION LITERATURE

This chapter aims to lay a foundation for future evaluations of active labour market
programs in Canada by identifying gaps in knowledge. Filling these knowledge gaps would help
to identify useful improvements in public employment policy. The chapter is divided into three
sections. The first section summarizes gaps in the international evaluation literature reviewed in
this paper. The second chapter lists knowledge gaps in Canadian evaluations of public
employment programs. The third section lists items missing from the Canadian evaluations that
are not reliably provided by the international literature.
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4.1

Knowledge Gaps in the International Literature

This section provides an overview of informational items not found in the international
literature concerning program impacts by participant subgroup, program features, bundling or
sequencing of services, and labour market context. The five categories of active labour market
programs reviewed in Chapter 3 are discussed in sequence: skills development, targeted wage
subsidies, self-employment assistance, job creation partnerships, and employment assistance
services. The remaining subsections of this chapter each follow the same sequence.
Skills Development. Publicly funded job skill training has been a feature of active
labour market policies in developed countries throughout the world for decades. Nevertheless,
the literature seems to suggest that policymakers and administrators of programs have not been
able to improve outcomes over that time period. While there has been considerable variation in
evaluation findings, the majority of studies find modest positive labour market outcomes for
adults and insignificant results for youth.
However, virtually no evaluation study has dissected the characteristics of the training
that has been provided. Training can be offered in formal educational institutions, on-line, at a
work site, or in some combination of these. Its content can be quite specific in nature or can
integrate several domains of information. It can be offered in a concentrated period of time or
spread out over several months or years. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these various
modalities of training can interact with characteristics of the trainees and with characteristics of
the trainers. With quite limited exceptions, the international literature has not pried into the
"black box" of training.
Given that the evidence to date suggests that the social payoff to skills development, if
any, is derived only after several years, another gap in the literature is that it contains virtually no
papers on the depreciation rates of skills that are acquired through training. This, of course,
would require long-term follow-up. Fortunately, longitudinal databases have been constructed in
a number of European countries. Unfortunately, these data have not been fully exploited for this
type of analysis.
Much of the international evidence stems from European countries that are, relative to the
United States or Canada, densely populated. Skills development traditionally has been offered in
classroom settings, and so it may be hypothesized that rural populations have had access
problems. The literature provides little evidence on differences in training impacts across urban
and rural subgroups.
Finally, the impact of the business cycle on training is not well-known. Theoretical
arguments can be made either way. When unemployment is relatively high, the pool of
unemployed includes relatively higher-skilled and more motivated individuals, which suggests
that more positive outcomes may occur. On the other hand, a soft labour market makes it more
difficult to find employment after being trained.
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Targeted Wage Subsidies. The most notable gap in the international evaluation
literature on targeted wage subsidies has to do with understanding the effectiveness of the design
of the program. Most evaluations treat a targeted wage subsidy program as a "black box," in the
sense that it is known that the program provides a wage subsidy, but little attempt is made to
evaluate the effectiveness of different aspects of the program’s design. An evaluation typically
describes the program it is studying, but rarely does it assess the effectiveness of variations in the
design of the program. Since program design varies significantly across targeted wage subsidy
programs, it is difficult to generalize about the effects of such program features. It would be
useful for policymakers if evaluation reports included more details about the treatment
examined. Consequently, it is hard to piece together results from various studies to try to
understand the marginal effects of program design changes, because of the confounding factors
among them. For instance, the United States’ Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program
provides a tax credit of up to 40 percent on the first $8,890 of earned income. The subsidy
decreases as earned income increases, until the subsidy is phased out. The exact amount depends
upon family circumstances. The United Kingdom’s Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC)
provides a flat amount of roughly £145 for up to £80 of earned income before tax and benefits.
For earned income greater than £80, the person’s income after benefits and taxes jumps to £225,
and then increases proportionally with increases in earned income thereafter. The WFTC also
includes a generous child tax credit for child care; the EITC does not. Clearly, the EITC and the
WFTC are different in design, but the literature does little to determine how much the difference
in generosity affects the outcomes. Furthermore, the frequency of the subsidy payment to
recipients differs between the two programs, depending upon whether the EITC recipient elects
to receive advance payment. The impact of the WFTC on labour force participation is shown to
be around 5.0 percentage points for lone mothers, and the impact of the EITC on the labour force
participation of single mothers is shown to be roughly 2.4 percentage points. Yet a study of the
EITC finds that the program raises the labour force participation rate of least-educated mothers
by 6.2 percentage points (Eissa and Liebman 1996).
It is difficult to know how to think about these results with respect to the design of the
program. Comparing two evaluations done by the black box approach, there are too many
variables changing to attribute an effect estimate to one factor. For example comparing WFTC
and EITC, does a more generous tax credit raise the labour force participation rate from 2.4
percentage points to 5.0 percentage points (to take the average results of the evaluations of the
two programs)? Or could it be that the participants of the WFTC are much less educated on
average than the participants of the EITC, and a more apt comparison would be the average
results of the WFTC of 5.0 percentage points with the results for the least-educated recipients of
the EITC of 6.2 percentage points? Perhaps reimbursement of child care under the WFTC
accounts for the difference? What is missing is the ability to assess how variations in particular
program program features affect outcomes. Such assessments should be done within specific
program evaluations.
Another gap in the literature is that very few programs have been evaluated using random
assignment. The majority of evaluations rely on comparison groups constructed using
propensity score matching. The gap is obviously not the fault of researchers but rather can be
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blamed on the lack of attention or funds from policymakers to conduct demonstration projects or
on their failure to set aside funds from a portion of an existing program to conduct random
assignment evaluation. Obviously, some programs, particularly ongoing programs, are difficult
to evaluate using experimental methods, whether for ethical reasons or because the services are
considered entitlements or essential to the well-being of the individual. Therefore,
nonexperimental methods will always be relied upon to evaluate most of the programs that are in
place. Nonetheless, questions do emerge as to the validity of nonexperimental approaches. For
example, consider that the only recent random assignment evaluation of a wage supplement
program was conducted for the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP), even though the United
States’ EITC and the United Kingdom’s WTFC are extensive and costly programs. The trial
Canadian program is different from the U.S. and U.K. programs in that it has a three-year limit
for receiving the subsidy, whereas the latter two are indefinite as long as applicants qualify
according to their earnings. For any given year, the Canadian and U.K programs are more
generous in the subsidies provided than the U.S. program. The United Kingdom covers child
care, while the other two do not. Despite these differences in program design, it is interesting to
compare the evaluation results of the three programs: one based on random assignment
methodology and the other two based on matching techniques. For lone mothers, the Canadian
random assignment evaluation found an increase of between 6.1 and 12.6 percentage points in
full-time employment (at least 30 hours per week) during the first four years. Two evaluations
of the U.K. program found an impact of between 2.9 percentage points (Leigh 2005) and 5.5
percentage points (Francesconi and Van der Klaauw 2004). The question is whether the
Canadian SSP, since it is an experiment based on random assignment, should be used as the
benchmark for evaluations of the other programs. Obviously, it might be an interesting starting
point for comparison, but the program design features differ so much as to render such a
comparison problematic.
Another issue is the interaction of programs that exist concurrently with those under
study. Most evaluations have a narrow focus, but their participants may participate or have
options to participate simultaneously or sequentially in other programs. The evaluation results
may be influenced by such interactions, even though the evaluation methodology tries to control
for such factors. On the other hand, it is important to understand how programs interact, and by
not explicitly taking this interaction into account, the evaluations leave a gap in our
understanding of those relationships.
Self-Employment Assistance. International evidence on self-employment assistance is
generally positive. Controlling for other factors, evaluations suggest that SEA participants
experience higher rates of self-employment, higher levels of income (from self-employment and
other earnings), and draw less UI compensation. Most evidence comes from programs providing
a weekly or biweekly stipend at the level of UI benefits during the SEA start-up period. The
Canadian SEA program provides periodic payments, but it also requires personal contributions to
the start-up costs. There is little or no international evidence on this last feature. While only the
United States targets SEA offers to those at high risk of long-term UI benefit receipt, compared
to other unemployed job seekers most SEA participants worldwide are older and have more
education, more labour market experience, and more personal assets. This profile probably also
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fits Canadian SEA participants, and these factors are probably positively correlated with SEA
success. Statistical evidence is lacking about SEA success in the dimensions of demographic
characteristics, industrial and occupational settings, and self-funding requirements. Encouraging
evidence suggests that SEA can be a successful intervention in areas of high unemployment.
Since most SEA evaluations have been relatively short term, and business survival is best judged
over the longer term, future evaluations done five or more years after SEA assistance would be
very valuable.
Job Creation Partnerships. Gaps in the evaluation literature of direct job creation using
government funds are similar to those identified for the targeted wage subsidies in Section 3.4.2.
The lack of evaluations that estimate the marginal effects of different program designs leaves
policymakers without a clear road map as to which features of a direct employment program they
may prefer to adopt. Since these programs may be used for different reasons, ranging from a
countercyclical program to a program for employing the hard-to-employ, understanding these
features is important.
In addition, very few programs are evaluated using random assignment methodology.
The only program identified in this critique is the United States’ Supported Work Demonstration,
which was conducted more than three decades ago. The relevance of the findings of that
program for reforming current programs or fashioning future ones could be questioned, since the
labour environment and general attitudes of the groups covered in that demonstration may be
different today, which could affect their response to the services and incentives integrated into
that demonstration.
Employment Assistance Services. Our review of the international literature on
interventions that could fall under the heading of Employment Assistance Services (EAS)
includes ten categories: 1) Job Interview Referrals and Job Placements, 2) Counseling, 3) Job
Search Assistance, 4) UI Work Test, 5) Mandatory Services, 6) Sanctions, 7) Targeted Job
Search Assistance, 8) Reemployment Incentives/Bonuses, 9) Reemployment Services to UI
Beneficiaries, and 10) Youth Employment Services. Evidence from several countries suggest
that general public employment services, including job interview referrals and placements,
counseling, and job search assistance, improve rates of reemployment and often modestly
improve reemployment earnings. These services are uniformly identified as being inexpensive
to provide. Employment service measures taken to assure an active job search by UI
beneficiaries have been shown to be effective in several countries. These studies include
experimental removal of the work test in the United States and the United Kingdom, requiring
mandatory services participation in the U.K., and the imposition of sanctions for failure to
participate in the Netherlands. Early targeting of reemployment services to those with the
highest risk of long-term joblessness is also effective, as are targeted cash incentive payments for
speedy return to work. For unemployed youth who are ill-prepared for the job market, a Danish
study found that withholding or reducing cash unemployment assistance is an effective lever for
motivating return to work or learning. In Portugal, however, requiring participation in
reemployment services combined, with the threat of losing UI for nonparticipation, worked as an
incentive for older workers but not for younger workers.
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4.2

Knowledge Gaps in the Canadian LMDA Evaluations

This section overviews estimates not provided in the Canadian LMDA evaluations of
EBSMs by participant subgroup, program features, bundling or sequencing of services, and
labour market context.
Skills Development. The evaluation evidence from the Canadian LMDA evaluations of
EBSMs mirrors the evidence from the extant literature from other countries. That evidence
shows relatively modest positive employment and earnings impacts, but it has very little to say
about how those impacts vary by training or trainer characteristics. Sample size constraints
furthermore limit the Canadian findings about subgroup impacts, and the follow-up periods have
been too short to estimate depreciation rates.
An advantage of the Canadian evidence vis-à-vis the international evidence is that it is
able to exploit provincial variation in labour market conditions. Thus there is tighter evidence
about the effect of the business cycle on labour market outcomes. Furthermore, the population
densities across the provinces differ considerably, and so Canadian evidence of the effectiveness
of skills development for rural populations should be available.
Targeted Wage Subsidies. Most of the LMDA evaluations estimated significant
employment and earnings gains from targeted wage subsidies, with gains more pronounced for
younger and harder-to-employ customers. The evidence on EI savings was less encouraging,
and most certainly resulted from the definition of insurable earnings under EI that permitted EI
receipt after separation from employment supported by a targeted wage subsidy. The Targeted
Wage Subsidy program is the third largest active labour program in Canada. There is adequate
sample size among participants to do a deeper analysis of subgroup impacts. The collection of
LMDA evaluations has been constrained by budgets for follow-up surveys. Better use of
program administrative data could provide deeper insights into the workings of the program.
Important evidence for Canada is also available from the self-sufficiency experiments. As for
targeted wage subsidies, results suggest that intervention effects are more positive for former
claimants than for active claimants. No evidence is available in the Canadian context for wage
subsidies to employers through the income tax system; this could be a rich area for future policy
and research. The Canadian earnings supplement project (ESP) tested wage subsidies paid to
workers. Such supplements are appealing since they can avoid the stigma resulting from paying
employers for hiring the unemployed. Unfortunately, the very low take-up rate for the ESP did
not yield reliable evidence of effects. Such an intervention could be retried in Canada as an
integral part of EI or the tax system. Either avenue may yield higher take-up than the adjunct
payments system tried in ESP.
Self-Employment Assistance. The Canadian SEA provides weekly income support
payments at the rate of EI benefits, and requires personal contribution of at least 25 percent of
start-up costs. Evidence from the LMDA evaluations suggest that SEA increases annual working
hours by 20 to 30 percent, but that it also results in reduced annual income for SEA participants
relative to proper comparison groups. Evidence from the Wong, Henson, and Riddell (1998)
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evaluation of earlier versions of self-employment assistance was more favorable. Perhaps a
reconsideration of program design features could be undertaken. In particular, the role of the
personal contribution could be evaluated in a random assignment experiment. Furthermore, it
would be useful to have evidence on SEAs in different economic contexts, by demographic
characteristics, by occupational and industrial categories of activity, and with long-term
follow-up.
Job Creation Partnerships. The LMDA evaluations yielded inconsistent and weak
evidence on the effects of job creation partnerships. There were insignificant main effects, and
in most cases reliable impact estimates were not provided for subgroups delineated by participant
characteristics, provider characteristics, labour market conditions, or ownership settings. The
former is not surprising; the latter is disappointing. The main aims of direct job creation
programs are normally to provide income transfer to a disadvantaged population while
preventing further decline in employability skills through work experience. Transition to regular
nonsubsidized employment is not typically the main focus. However, in any evaluation there are
aspects of the intervention with positive outcomes, and detailed subgroup analyses should be
done to reveal such results.
Employment Assistance Services. Evidence about effects of EAS from the LMDA
evaluations is mixed and mostly insignificant. Nicholson (2010) writes that a main challenge to
evaluators is the fact that EAS is usually combined in an action plan with other interventions.
Therefore, evaluations focused on “EAS only" claimants have little statistical precision or power.
These are the most widely used active labour market interventions in Canada, and the least is
known about them. Evaluation studies could estimate incremental effects of services by
comparing bundles delivered in action plans.
4.3

Questions to Be Answered: Overlap in Knowledge Gaps

This section summarizes categories of evidence not provided in either the international
studies or the Canadian LMDA evaluations of EBSMs by participant subgroup, program
features, bundling or sequencing of services, and labour market context.
Skills Development. In the next round of EBSM evaluations, a major contribution could
be made by carefully collecting data on training characteristics. These would include total hours,
hours per day, days per week, trainer(s) background and characteristics, trainee attendance,
certification, technology and equipment used, characteristics of the location(s) of training, and so
forth. If feasible, randomized controlled experiments around some of these features would add
value to the evaluation.
Furthermore, evaluations should plan for long-term follow-ups to track outcomes over
time. While this may be cost-prohibitive for entire cohorts, there may be subsamples of
participants and controls for which longer-term follow-ups could be conducted.
Targeted Wage Subsidies. Larger sample sizes achieved through the use of
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administrative data could support deeper analysis of subgroup effects in the Canadian context on
impacts by participant characteristics, location characteristics, provider characteristics, or source
of support. Detailed records on program features should be kept in administrative data, and these
should be used in evaluation. Important program features include the duration of subsidy and the
amount of subsidy. Other mechanisms for wage subsidies could also be tried in controlled
evaluations. For example, subsidies paid to employers through the tax system for hiring from
targeted groups, or wage supplements paid to job seekers through the EI or tax system.
Additionally, limiting EI insurable earnings to non-subsidized work is an important question for
policy debate; however, current entitlements make evaluation a challenging proposition.
Self-Employment Assistance. Participation in SEA is quite small in Canada. The full
administrative file on all participants should be used for evaluation. Comparison groups could
be drawn from incomplete SEA applications, or from matching on characteristics among EI
beneficiaries or reachbacks in EBSM records. It would be useful to have evidence on SEAs in
different economic contexts, by demographic characteristics, by occupational and industrial
categories of activity, and with long-term follow-up. Much of this analysis could be done with
larger sample sizes available through use of administrative data. A random assignment
experiment could evaluate the role of the 25 percent cost contribution to SEA participation and
success.
Job Creation Partnerships. There is very little reliable evidence about job creation
partnerships (JCP) from the LMDA evaluations. Worldwide there is little evidence that direct
job creation programs like JCP lead to high rates of unsubsidized work. There is some
international evidence that when direct job creation programs are operated by private sector
enterprises, the transition to unsubsidized work is higher. This program design feature could be
tried and evaluated. The main aims of direct job creation programs are normally to provide
income transfer to a disadvantaged population while preventing further decline in employability
skills through work experience. Different metrics for JCP success could be devised—for
example, preventing a rise in social assistance participation and program costs. Such analysis
would require linkage of administrative records across programs. Evaluation of other EBSMs
could benefit from linked program administrative data.
Employment Assistance Services. Evaluations of a wide range of active labour market
programs (ALMPs) across a variety of countries have produced three essential findings: 1) job
search assistance programs are the most cost-effective, 2) large-scale public service employment
programs are the least cost-effective and most costly, and 3) job training programs and
employment subsidies fall somewhere in between, with the degree of cost-effectiveness
dependent on proper targeting of assistance. EAS is the most widely used active labour market
intervention in Canada, and it might be the most cost-effective. However, reliable knowledge on
program effects is lacking. The bundling of services in the action plan has confounded efforts to
identify the effects of separate services. International evaluations have found some services in
the EAS menu more effective for certain categories of customers. Compilation and analysis of
EAS administrative data is invaluable for revealing the Canadian patterns of effectiveness for
services by subgroup, location, and economic context.
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5

IMPROVING THE NEXT ROUND OF LMDA EVALUATIONS

5.1

Increasing Effective Sample Size

Previous evaluations of EBSM under LMDA suffered from insufficient sample sizes.
Larger sample sizes would support more extensive analysis of effects by participant subgroups,
program features, services bundling and sequencing, and labour market context. The main
constraint on sample size was the cost of follow-up surveys conducted by third party survey
agencies. Sample sizes for all EBSM evaluations can be increased by more use of available
administrative data on program participants. When samples are chosen properly, these data can
also be a source of information on very large comparison groups. Supplementary follow-up
surveys can be justified in certain cases. This was requirement in recent years when
administrative data could not be linked to Revenue Canada tax records for outcome measures of
reemployment. Linking to Revenue Canada data for outcome measurement greatly increases the
research potential for program administrative data in Canada.
5.2

Advantages and Drawbacks of Using Program Administrative Data

Use of program administrative data in evaluations has the potential to increase the
effective sample sizes for evaluations at relatively low cost. This section focuses on the
drawbacks of using administrative data for evaluations. There are a number of issues when
working with administrative data records that make use of such data for policy analysis quite
challenging. These include but are not limited to: 1) the volume of data to be extracted, 2)
unique identification of individuals, 3) documentation (or mainly lack thereof), and 4) missing
and altered data.
A census of micro records for policy analysis requires intensive use of computing
resources and should be accomplished on statistical server(s) and input/output (IO) sub-system(s)
dedicated to that purpose. Not only is considerable physical, data storage required but the IO
sub-system attached to statistical server(s) must have the throughput capabilities to deliver the
data and receive it again when modified by statistical processes. Random access memory
(RAM) must also be very large depending upon the statistical software used to process the data.
As an example, the Upjohn Institute has completed many projects over the past 11 years for one
state that involve use of all, state-wide quarterly wage records dating back to 1993. The
expected addition of data in 2011 will result in raw wage record data in excess of 330,000,000
records. Given that our statistical software (Stata) relies heavily on RAM for processing, the
definition of new variables, data sorts and the balancing of the wage record data require over 128
GB of RAM. Furthermore, given a census of data from this state for unemployment insurance
(UI) and the employment service (ES), the compilation all the wage and program data from the
mid 1990s to the present currently requires 45 hours of continuous processing to produce all the
analysis-ready data sets needed.
Another important consideration for data extraction is the question of who will extract the
data and compile it for statistical analysis? The experience of the Upjohn Institute is that data
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programmers for many government agencies are very capable at writing the code needed to
extract data but often do not have the software and statistical knowledge needed to thoroughly
examine the extract to make sure the results are in fact a “census” and that the results produced
“make sense.” Also, it is best practice to rely on experienced statistical programmers to merge
data across data files and programs. What this means is that unless the statistical analyst requests
and receives complete data dumps of all agency data, extracts will often need to be repeated after
the data are examined by experienced analysts and underlying errors are found.
One of the most sensitive and unfortunate issues with regard to administrative data
concerns the unique identification of individuals. Here in the United States that is best
accomplished using social security numbers. However, pervasive fear and multiple headlines
over the past decade concerning “identity theft” have made this a very difficult issue. Another
state with which the Upjohn Institute has completed several projects over the past decade refuses
to release the social security numbers with the micro data, and relies on a system that generates
unique identifiers for each individual. While that is typically not a problem for projects that are
one-time events, data extracts that are repeated several times over a period of years for updates
of the same project or new projects that often involve other agencies, introduce the problem of
consistent identification over time. Currently, the Upjohn Institute is facing this issue with the
state just mentioned. An update of certain data that involve “bogus” identifiers has a period of
overlap from 2006-2008 with the same type of data received previously. A merge of the
“unique” identifiers from both data sources resulted in a successful match rate of just 0.1 percent
upon initial receipt of the data. An agency error was uncovered, the data re-written, and our
successful match rate is currently 63 percent. Obviously, more errors need to be resolved.
An obvious piece of information needed to understand administrative data sets and what
might be possible from a research perspective is documentation. In actual practice, that
documentation is often just a COBOL program or a listing of variable names within a relational
database. Also, on more than one occasion as we have approached agencies to formulate a data
request, we have asked for documentation only to receive the reply, “You tell us what you want
and we’ll tell you if we have it.” The important part of this aspect of acquiring agency data is
developing relationships with the right people who have authority and fully support the project.
Until that happens, be prepared to be greeted with suspicion.
Missing values for many observations of important research variables is common within
administrative data sets. For a recent project with yet another state involving unemployment
insurance data, upon initial examination of the data, we found that 28 percent of all UI records
were missing values for race/ethnicity, 29 percent missing for education and 35 percent missing
data for the length of tenure on the most recent job from which they had separated. Fortunately,
the proper research pool from which we ultimately estimated statistical models was a sub-set of
all UI applicants and this pool had much lower rates of missing data. Nevertheless, we chose to
include binary indicator variables for missing data within certain classes of variables because the
systematic reasons those data were missing were resulting in certain groups failing to receive
agency services. By including the indicator variables in the models that were to be used by the
agency, these persons were re-included in the pool for service receipt.
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Finally, an issue related to missing data is that because agencies use data primarily for
program administration instead of planning for research, things are done that compromise the
research value. For example employment service transactions are commonly over written each
time a customer visits an employment center so that individual transactions histories cannot be
recovered. The Upjohn Institute has also encountered administrative coding of data fields
intended to have other meanings. We worked with two state UI agencies that use the
individual’s prior occupation code data field to instead record other administrative data. One
agency modifies the occupation code to track whether the person is exempt from job search
requirements and whether the client ultimately returns to past employment. Another agency
modifies the occupation code to indicate whether the client had previously registered with the
employment service. Obviously, these modifications transform an important variable for
economic research into something useless, or worse–misleading.
5.3

Filling Knowledge Gaps in Evaluations

The LMDA evaluations produced limited information on differences in program effects
across participant subgroups, labour market conditions, program delivery methods, program
features, program combinations, program sequences, and labour market context. In Chapter 4,
these subgroup impact estimates were the main gaps identified in the Canadian evaluations of
EBSM. Also in Chapter 5, the gaps review of the international literature suggests some
important areas where future Canadian evaluations and policies could focus. For example,
requiring active job search while receiving cash EI benefits, closely monitoring and supporting
active job search, and enforcing consequences when found deficient. A common theme
emerging from all the studies is to provide high quality services, while at the same time
expecting a high level of effort from customers.
5.4

Next Steps: Suggestions for Improving the Draft Cycle II Evaluation Plan

We endorse the plan to use administrative data as the main information source for round
two of EBSM evaluations under LMDA. We endorse the national strategy for pooling data
across provinces to evaluate particularly small active measures, and for programs with larger
participant counts, to facilitate extensive analysis of impacts by participant subgroups, labour
market characteristics, and program features.
Participation of the federal partner should yield economies of scale in evaluation design
and operations. Program administrative data linked to Revenue Canada records should be the
main sources of information for evaluations. A national perspective in evaluation could also
help adjust for economic conditions and generate labour market adjusted estimates to facilitate
comparison of effectiveness across areas.
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